In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: cancel pending_rx_work before taking conn->lock
l2cap_conn_del() takes conn->lock and then calls cancel_work_sync() for
pending_rx_work. process_pending_rx() takes the same mutex, so teardown
can deadlock against the worker it is flushing.
This issue was found by our static analysis tool and then manually
reviewed against the current tree.
The grounded PoC kept the l2cap_conn_ready() -> queue_work(...,
&conn->pending_rx_work) submit path, the l2cap_conn_del() ->
cancel_work_sync(&conn->pending_rx_work) teardown path, and the
process_pending_rx() -> mutex_lock(&conn->lock) worker edge. Lockdep
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
process_pending_rx+0x21/0x2a [vuln_msv]
l2cap_conn_del.constprop.0+0x3f/0x4e [vuln_msv]
*** DEADLOCK ***
Cancel pending_rx_work before taking conn->lock, matching the existing
lock-before-drain ordering used for the two delayed works in the same
teardown path. The pending_rx queue is still purged after the work has
been cancelled and conn->lock has been acquired.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: fail recovery on a committed log item with no regions
If the first op of a transaction is a bare transaction header
(len == sizeof(struct xfs_trans_header)), xlog_recover_add_to_trans()
adds an item but no region, leaving it on r_itemq with ri_cnt == 0 and
ri_buf == NULL.
The header can be split across op records, so later ops may still add
regions; the item is only invalid if the transaction commits with none.
The runtime commit path never emits such a transaction, so this only
happens on a crafted log. It came from an AI-assisted code audit of the
recovery parser.
xlog_recover_reorder_trans() calls ITEM_TYPE() on the item, which reads
*(unsigned short *)item->ri_buf[0].iov_base and faults on the NULL
ri_buf. Reject it there, before the commit handlers that also read
ri_buf[0].
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
RIP: 0010:xlog_recover_reorder_trans (fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c:1836)
xlog_recover_commit_trans (fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c:2043)
xlog_recover_process_data (fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c:2501)
xlog_do_recovery_pass (fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c:3244)
xlog_recover (fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c:3493)
xfs_log_mount (fs/xfs/xfs_log.c:618)
xfs_mountfs (fs/xfs/xfs_mount.c:1034)
xfs_fs_fill_super (fs/xfs/xfs_super.c:1938)
vfs_get_tree (fs/super.c:1695)
path_mount (fs/namespace.c:4161)
__x64_sys_mount (fs/namespace.c:4367)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: qualcomm: rmnet: fix endpoint use-after-free in rmnet_dellink()
rmnet_dellink() removes the endpoint from the hash table with
hlist_del_init_rcu() and then immediately frees it with kfree(). However,
RCU readers on the receive path (rmnet_rx_handler ->
__rmnet_map_ingress_handler) may still hold a reference to the endpoint and
dereference ep->egress_dev after the memory has been freed. The endpoint is
a kmalloc-32 object, and the stale read at offset 8 corresponds to the
egress_dev pointer.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffde942eef
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 137 Comm: poc_write Not tainted 7.0.0+ #4 PREEMPTLAZY
RIP: 0010:rmnet_vnd_rx_fixup (rmnet_vnd.c:27)
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__rmnet_map_ingress_handler (rmnet_handlers.c:48 rmnet_handlers.c:101)
rmnet_rx_handler (rmnet_handlers.c:129 rmnet_handlers.c:235)
__netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0 (net/core/dev.c:6096)
__netif_receive_skb_one_core (net/core/dev.c:6208)
netif_receive_skb (net/core/dev.c:6467)
tun_get_user (drivers/net/tun.c:1955)
tun_chr_write_iter (drivers/net/tun.c:2003)
vfs_write (fs/read_write.c:688)
ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:740)
</TASK>
Add an rcu_head field to struct rmnet_endpoint and replace kfree() with
kfree_rcu() so the endpoint memory remains valid through the RCU grace
period. Also remove the rmnet_vnd_dellink() call and inline only the
nr_rmnet_devs decrement, since rmnet_vnd_dellink() would set
ep->egress_dev to NULL during the grace period, creating a data race
with lockless readers.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: ipset: fix race between dump and ip_set_list resize
The release path of ip_set_dump_do() and ip_set_dump_done() read
inst->ip_set_list via ip_set_ref_netlink(), a plain rcu_dereference_raw()
of the array pointer. These run from netlink_recvmsg() without the nfnl
mutex and without an RCU read-side critical section.
A concurrent ip_set_create() can grow the array: it publishes the new
array, calls synchronize_net() and then kvfree()s the old one. Since the
dump paths read the array outside any RCU reader, synchronize_net() does
not wait for them and the old array can be freed while they still index
into it, causing a use-after-free.
The dumped set itself stays pinned via set->ref_netlink, so only the
array load needs protecting. Take rcu_read_lock() around it, matching
ip_set_get_byname() and __ip_set_put_byindex().
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ip_set_dump_do (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c:1697)
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800b5c4018 by task exploit/150
Call Trace:
...
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
ip_set_dump_do (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c:1697)
netlink_dump (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2325)
netlink_recvmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1976)
sock_recvmsg (net/socket.c:1159)
__sys_recvfrom (net/socket.c:2315)
...
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address ... KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0x02d6...d0-0x02d6...d7]
RIP: 0010:ip_set_dump_do (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c:1698)
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btmtk: fix urb->setup_packet leak in error paths
The setup_packet of control urb is not freed if usb_submit_urb fails or
the submitted urb is killed. Add free in these two paths.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_unix: Fix UAF read of tail->len in unix_stream_data_wait()
unix_stream_data_wait() does skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue) without
holding any lock that prevents SKBs on that queue from being dequeued and
freed.
This has been the case since commit 79f632c71bea ("unix/stream: fix
peeking with an offset larger than data in queue").
The first consequence of this is that the pointer comparison
`tail != last` can be false even if `last` semantically refers to an
already-freed SKB while `tail` is a new SKB allocated at the same address;
which can cause unix_stream_data_wait() to wrongly keep blocking after new
data has arrived, but only in a weird scenario where a peeking recv() and
a normal recv() on the same socket are racing, which is probably not a
real problem.
But since commit 2b514574f7e8 ("net: af_unix: implement splice for stream
af_unix sockets"), `tail` is actually dereferenced, which can cause UAF in
the following race scenario (where test_setup() runs single-threaded,
and afterwards, test_thread1() and test_thread2() run concurrently in
two threads:
```
static int socks[2];
void test_setup(void) {
socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, socks);
send(socks[1], "A", 1, 0);
int peekoff = 1;
setsockopt(socks[0], SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEEK_OFF, &peekoff, sizeof(peekoff));
}
void test_thread1(void) {
char dummy;
recv(socks[0], &dummy, 1, MSG_PEEK);
}
void test_thread2(void) {
char dummy;
recv(socks[0], &dummy, 1, 0);
shutdown(socks[1], SHUT_WR);
}
```
when racing like this:
```
thread1 thread2
unix_stream_read_generic
mutex_lock(&u->iolock)
skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue)
skb_peek_next(skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue)
mutex_unlock(&u->iolock)
unix_stream_read_generic
unix_state_lock(sk)
skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue)
unix_state_unlock(sk)
unix_stream_data_wait
unix_state_lock(sk)
tail = skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue)
spin_lock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock)
__skb_unlink(skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue)
spin_unlock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock)
consume_skb(skb) [frees the SKB]
`tail != last`: false
`tail`: true
`tail->len != last_len` ***UAF***
```
Fix the UAF by removing the read of tail->len; checking tail->len would
only make sense if SKBs in the receive queue of a UNIX socket could grow,
which can no longer happen.
Kuniyuki explained:
> When commit 869e7c62486e ("net: af_unix: implement stream sendpage
> support") added sendpage() support, data could be appended to the last
> skb in the receiver's queue.
>
> That's why we needed to check if the length of the last skb was changed
> while waiting for new data in unix_stream_data_wait().
>
> However, commit a0dbf5f818f9 ("af_unix: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES") and
> commit 57d44a354a43 ("unix: Convert unix_stream_sendpage() to use
> MSG_SPLICE_PAGES") refactored sendmsg(), and now data is always added
> to a new skb.
That means this fix is not suitable for kernels before 6.5.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rbd: eliminate a race in lock_dwork draining on unmap
Given how rbd_lock_add_request() and rbd_img_exclusive_lock() are
written, lock_dwork may be (re)queued more than it's actually needed:
for example in case a new I/O request comes in while we are in the
middle of rbd_acquire_lock() on behalf of another I/O request. This is
expected and with rbd_release_lock() preemptively canceling lock_dwork
is benign under normal operation.
A more problematic example is maybe_kick_acquire():
if (have_requests || delayed_work_pending(&rbd_dev->lock_dwork)) {
dout("%s rbd_dev %p kicking lock_dwork\n", __func__, rbd_dev);
mod_delayed_work(rbd_dev->task_wq, &rbd_dev->lock_dwork, 0);
}
It's not unrealistic for lock_dwork to get canceled right after
delayed_work_pending() returns true and for mod_delayed_work() to
requeue it right there anyway. This is a classic TOCTOU race.
When it comes to unmapping the image, there is an implicit assumption
of no self-initiated exclusive lock activity past the point of return
from rbd_dev_image_unlock() which unlocks the lock if it happens to be
held. This unlock is assumed to be final and lock_dwork (as well as
all other exclusive lock tasks, really) isn't expected to get queued
again. However, lock_dwork is canceled only in cancel_tasks_sync()
(i.e. later in the unmap sequence) and on top of that the cancellation
can get in effect nullified by maybe_kick_acquire(). This may result
in rbd_acquire_lock() executing after rbd_dev_device_release() and
rbd_dev_image_release() run and free and/or reset a bunch of things.
One of the possible failure modes then is a violated
rbd_assert(rbd_image_format_valid(rbd_dev->image_format));
in rbd_dev_header_info() which is called via rbd_dev_refresh() from
rbd_post_acquire_action().
Redo exclusive lock task draining to provide saner semantics and try
to meet the assumptions around rbd_dev_image_unlock().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: vgic-its: Reject restored DTE with out-of-range num_eventid_bits
Userspace can restore an ITS Device Table Entry whose Size field encodes
more EventID bits than the virtual ITS supports. The live MAPD path
rejects that state, but vgic_its_restore_dte() accepts it and stores the
out-of-range value in dev->num_eventid_bits.
Reject restored DTEs with num_eventid_bits > VITS_TYPER_IDBITS before
allocating the device. This mirrors the MAPD check and prevents the
restored state from reaching vgic_its_restore_itt(), where the unchecked
value can be converted into an oversized scan_its_table() range.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: tp_meter: fix tp_vars reference leak in receiver shutdown
The receiver shutdown timer handler, batadv_tp_receiver_shutdown(), is
responsible for releasing the tp_vars reference it holds. However, the
existing logic for coordinating this release with batadv_tp_stop_all() was
flawed.
timer_shutdown_sync() guarantees the timer will not fire again after it
returns, but it returns non-zero only when the timer was pending at the
time of the call. If the timer had already expired (and
batadv_tp_stop_all() would unsucessfully try to rearm itself),
batadv_tp_stop_all() skips its batadv_tp_vars_put(), and
batadv_tp_receiver_shutdown() fails to put its own reference as well.
Fix this by introducing a new atomic variable receiving that is set to 1
when the receiver is initialized and cleared atomically with atomic_xchg()
by whichever side claims it first. Only the side that observes the
transition from 1 to 0 is responsible for releasing the tp_vars timer
reference, eliminating the uncertainty.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: tp_meter: directly shut down timer on cleanup
batadv_tp_sender_cleanup() was calling timer_delete_sync() followed by
timer_delete() to guard against the timer handler re-arming itself between
the two calls. This double-deletion hack relied on the sending status being
set to 0 to suppress re-arming.
Replace both calls with a single timer_shutdown_sync(). This function both
waits for any running timer callback to complete (like timer_delete_sync())
and permanently disarms the timer so it cannot be re-armed afterwards,
making re-arming prevention unconditional and self-documenting.
The re-arming property is also required because otherwise:
1. context 0 (batadv_tp_recv_ack()) checks in
batadv_tp_reset_sender_timer() if sending is still 1 -> it is
2. context 1 changes in batadv_tp_sender_shutdown() sending to 0 and in
this process forces the kthread to stop timer in
batadv_tp_sender_cleanup()
3. context 0 continues in batadv_tp_reset_sender_timer() and rearms the
timer -> but the reference for it is already gone