In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/fcntl: fix SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order in fasync signaling
A SOFTIRQ-safe to SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order deadlock can occur in
send_sigio() and send_sigurg() when a process group receives a signal.
When FASYNC is configured for a process group (PIDTYPE_PGID), both
functions use read_lock(&tasklist_lock) to traverse the task list.
However, they are frequently called from softirq context:
- send_sigio() via input_inject_event -> kill_fasync
- send_sigurg() via tcp_check_urg -> sk_send_sigurg (NET_RX_SOFTIRQ)
The deadlock is caused by the rwlock writer fairness mechanism:
1. CPU 0 (process context) holds read_lock(&tasklist_lock) in do_wait().
2. CPU 1 (process context) attempts write_lock(&tasklist_lock) in
fork() or exit() and spins, which blocks all new readers.
3. CPU 0 is interrupted by a softirq (e.g., TCP URG packet reception).
4. The softirq calls send_sigurg() and attempts to acquire
read_lock(&tasklist_lock), deadlocking because CPU 1 is waiting.
Since PID hashing and do_each_pid_task() traversals are already
RCU-protected, the read_lock on tasklist_lock is no longer strictly
required for safe traversal. Fix this by replacing tasklist_lock with
rcu_read_lock(), aligning the process group signaling path with the
single-PID path. This also mitigates a potential remote denial of
service vector via TCP URG packets.
Lockdep splat:
=====================================================
WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected
[...]
Chain exists of:
&dev->event_lock --> &f_owner->lock --> tasklist_lock
Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(tasklist_lock);
local_irq_disable();
lock(&dev->event_lock);
lock(&f_owner->lock);
<Interrupt>
lock(&dev->event_lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: qrtr: fix refcount saturation and potential UAF in qrtr_port_remove
In qrtr_port_remove(), the socket reference count is decremented via
__sock_put() before the port is removed from the qrtr_ports XArray and
before the RCU grace period elapses.
This breaks the fundamental RCU update paradigm. It exposes a race
window where a concurrent RCU reader (such as qrtr_reset_ports() or
qrtr_port_lookup()) can obtain a pointer to the socket from the XArray,
and attempt to call sock_hold() on a socket whose reference count has
already dropped to zero.
This exact race condition was hit during syzkaller fuzzing, leading to
the following refcount saturation warning and a potential Use-After-Free:
refcount_t: saturated; leaking memory.
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1273 at lib/refcount.c:22 refcount_warn_saturate+0xae/0x1d0
Modules linked in: qrtr(+) bochs drm_shmem_helper ...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
qrtr_reset_ports net/qrtr/af_qrtr.c:768 [inline] [qrtr]
__qrtr_bind.isra.0+0x48b/0x570 net/qrtr/af_qrtr.c:805 [qrtr]
qrtr_bind+0x17d/0x210 net/qrtr/af_qrtr.c:901 [qrtr]
kernel_bind+0xe4/0x120 net/socket.c:3592
qrtr_ns_init+0x1a6/0x380 net/qrtr/ns.c:715 [qrtr]
qrtr_proto_init+0x3b/0xff0 net/qrtr/af_qrtr.c:169 [qrtr]
do_one_initcall+0xf5/0x5e0 init/main.c:1283
...
</TASK>
Fix this by deferring the reference count decrement until after the
xa_erase() and the synchronize_rcu() complete.
(Note: The v1 of this patch incorrectly replaced __sock_put() with
sock_put(). As Simon Horman pointed out, the callers of qrtr_port_remove()
still hold a reference to the socket, so freeing the socket memory here
would lead to a subsequent UAF in the caller. Thus, the __sock_put() is
kept, but only repositioned to close the RCU race.)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: dev: prevent integer overflow in I2C_TIMEOUT ioctl
While fuzzing with Syzkaller, a persistent `schedule_timeout: wrong
timeout value` warning was observed, accompanied by SMBus controller
state machine corruption.
The I2C_TIMEOUT ioctl accepts a user-provided timeout in multiples of
10 ms. The user argument is checked against INT_MAX, but it is
subsequently multiplied by 10 before being passed to msecs_to_jiffies().
A malicious user can pass a large value (e.g., 429496729) that passes
the `arg > INT_MAX` check but overflows when multiplied by 10. This
results in a truncated 32-bit unsigned value that bypasses the
internal `(int)m < 0` check in `msecs_to_jiffies()`.
The truncated value is then assigned to `client->adapter->timeout`
(a signed 32-bit int), which is reinterpreted as a negative number.
When passed to wait_for_completion_timeout(), this negative value
undergoes sign extension to a 64-bit unsigned long, triggering the
`schedule_timeout` warning and causing premature returns. This leaves
the SMBus state machine in an unrecoverable state, constituting a
local Denial of Service (DoS).
Fix this by bounding the user argument to `INT_MAX / 10`.
[wsa: move the comment as well]
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/rds: fix NULL deref in rds_ib_send_cqe_handler() on masked atomic completion
rds_ib_xmit_atomic() always programs a masked atomic opcode
(IB_WR_MASKED_ATOMIC_CMP_AND_SWP or IB_WR_MASKED_ATOMIC_FETCH_AND_ADD)
for every RDS atomic cmsg. But the completion-side switch in
rds_ib_send_unmap_op() only handles the non-masked opcodes, so a masked
atomic completion falls through to default and returns rm == NULL while
send->s_op is left set. rds_ib_send_cqe_handler() then dereferences the
NULL rm via rm->m_final_op, oopsing in softirq context. An unprivileged
AF_RDS sendmsg() of an atomic cmsg over an active RDS/IB connection
triggers it; on hardware that natively accepts masked atomics (mlx4,
mlx5) no extra setup is needed.
RDS/IB: rds_ib_send_unmap_op: unexpected opcode 0xd in WR!
Oops: general protection fault [#1] SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000190-0x0000000000000197]
RIP: rds_ib_send_cqe_handler+0x25c/0xb10 (net/rds/ib_send.c:282)
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
rds_ib_send_cqe_handler (net/rds/ib_send.c:282)
poll_scq (net/rds/ib_cm.c:274)
rds_ib_tasklet_fn_send (net/rds/ib_cm.c:294)
tasklet_action_common (kernel/softirq.c:943)
handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:573)
run_ksoftirqd (kernel/softirq.c:479)
</IRQ>
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
Handle the masked atomic opcodes in the same case as the non-masked
ones: they map to the same struct rds_message.atomic union member, so
the existing container_of()/rds_ib_send_unmap_atomic() body is correct
for them.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_log: validate MAC header was set before dumping it
The fallback path of dump_mac_header() guards the MAC header access
only with "skb->mac_header != skb->network_header", without checking
skb_mac_header_was_set(). When the MAC header is unset, mac_header is
0xffff, so the test passes and skb_mac_header(skb) returns
skb->head + 0xffff, ~64 KiB past the buffer; the loop then reads
dev->hard_header_len bytes out of bounds into the kernel log.
This is reachable via the netdev logger: nf_log_unknown_packet() calls
dump_mac_header() unconditionally, and an skb sent through AF_PACKET
with PACKET_QDISC_BYPASS reaches the egress hook with mac_header still
unset (__dev_queue_xmit(), which would reset it, is bypassed).
Add the skb_mac_header_was_set() check the ARPHRD_ETHER path already
uses, and replace the open-coded MAC header length test with
skb_mac_header_len(). Only skbs with an unset MAC header are affected;
valid ones are dumped as before.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dump_mac_header (net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:831)
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88800ea49d3f by task exploit/148
Call Trace:
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
dump_mac_header (net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:831)
nf_log_netdev_packet (net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:938 net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:963)
nf_log_packet (net/netfilter/nf_log.c:260)
nft_log_eval (net/netfilter/nft_log.c:60)
nft_do_chain (net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:285)
nft_do_chain_netdev (net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c:307)
nf_hook_slow (net/netfilter/core.c:619)
nf_hook_direct_egress (net/packet/af_packet.c:257)
packet_xmit (net/packet/af_packet.c:280)
packet_sendmsg (net/packet/af_packet.c:3114)
__sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2265)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: stream: fully roll back denied add-stream state
When ADD_OUT_STREAMS is denied, SCTP only shrinks the queued chunks and
then lowers outcnt. That leaves removed stream metadata behind, so a
later re-add can reuse a stale ext and hit a null-pointer dereference in
the scheduler get path.
Fix the rollback by tearing down the removed stream state the same way
other stream resizes do. Unschedule the current scheduler state, drop
the removed stream ext state with sctp_stream_outq_migrate(), and then
reschedule the remaining streams.
This keeps scheduler-private RR/FC/PRIO lists consistent while fully
rolling back denied outgoing stream additions.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipc/shm: serialize orphan cleanup with shm_nattch updates
shm_destroy_orphaned() walks the shm idr under shm_ids(ns).rwsem, but that
does not serialize all fields tested by shm_may_destroy(). In particular,
shm_nattch is updated while holding shm_perm.lock, and attach paths can do
that without holding the rwsem.
Do not decide that an orphaned segment is unused before taking the object
lock. Move the shm_may_destroy() check under shm_perm.lock, matching the
other destroy paths, and unlock the segment when it no longer qualifies
for removal.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: tp_meter: avoid use of uninit sender vars
batadv_tp_recv_ack() and batadv_tp_stop() are only valid for tp_vars in the
BATADV_TP_SENDER role. When called with a BATADV_TP_RECEIVER role, it
proceeds to read sender-only members that were never initialized, leading
to undefined behavior.
This can be triggered when a node that is currently acting as a receiver in
an ongoing tp_meter session receives a malicious ACK packet.
Guard against this by checking tp_vars->role immediately after the
lookup and bailing out if it is not BATADV_TP_SENDER, before any of
those members are accessed.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: tvlv: reject oversized TVLV packets
batadv_tvlv_container_ogm_append() builds a TVLV packet section from
the tvlv.container_list. The total size of this section is computed by
batadv_tvlv_container_list_size(), which sums the sizes of all registered
containers.
The return type and accumulator in batadv_tvlv_container_list_size() were
u16. If the accumulated size exceeds U16_MAX, the value wraps around,
causing the subsequent allocation in batadv_tvlv_container_ogm_append()
to be undersized. The memcpy-style copy that follows would then write
beyond the end of the allocated buffer, corrupting kernel memory.
Fix this by widening the return type of batadv_tvlv_container_list_size()
to size_t. In batadv_tvlv_container_ogm_append(), check the computed length
against U16_MAX before proceeding, and bail out as if the allocation had
failed when the limit is exceeded.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: jitterentropy - replace long-held spinlock with mutex
jent_kcapi_random() serializes the shared jitterentropy state, but it
currently holds a spinlock across the jent_read_entropy() call. That
path performs expensive jitter collection and SHA3 conditioning, so
parallel readers can trigger stalls as contending waiters spin for
the same lock.
To prevent non-preemptible lock hold, replace rng->jent_lock with a
mutex so contended readers sleep instead of spinning on a shared lock
held across expensive entropy generation.