In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (pmbus/adm1266) cap PDIO scan in get_multiple at ADM1266_PDIO_NR
adm1266_gpio_get_multiple() iterates the PDIO portion of the
caller-supplied mask using
for_each_set_bit_from(gpio_nr, mask,
ADM1266_GPIO_NR + ADM1266_PDIO_STATUS) {
...
}
where ADM1266_PDIO_STATUS is the PMBus command code (0xE9, i.e. 233),
not the number of PDIO pins. The intended upper bound is
ADM1266_GPIO_NR + ADM1266_PDIO_NR = 25.
gpiolib hands in a mask sized for gc.ngpio (= 25 bits on this chip),
so the iteration walks find_next_bit() up to 242, reading up to 217
extra bits (a handful of unsigned-long words: four on 64-bit, seven
on 32-bit) of whatever lives past the end of the mask in the
caller's stack. Any incidental set bit in that range then drives a
set_bit(gpio_nr, bits) call that writes past the end of the
caller-supplied bits array too -- both out-of-bounds.
Substitute ADM1266_PDIO_NR for the constant so the scan stops at the
last real PDIO bit.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (pmbus/adm1266) bounce blackbox records through a protocol-sized buffer
adm1266_pmbus_block_xfer() copies the device-supplied block payload
into the caller-provided buffer using the device-supplied length:
memcpy(data_r, &msgs[1].buf[1], msgs[1].buf[0]);
The helper does not know how large data_r is and trusts the device to
return at most one record's worth of bytes. adm1266_nvmem_read_blackbox()
violates that contract: it advances read_buff inside data->dev_mem in
ADM1266_BLACKBOX_SIZE (64-byte) strides while the helper is willing to
write up to ADM1266_PMBUS_BLOCK_MAX (255) bytes. A device that returns
more than 64 bytes on the trailing record (read_buff offset 1984 in
the 2048-byte dev_mem allocation) overflows dev_mem by up to 191 bytes
before the post-call
if (ret != ADM1266_BLACKBOX_SIZE)
return -EIO;
can reject the response.
Contain the fix in the caller without changing the helper signature:
read each record into a 255-byte local bounce buffer that matches the
helper's maximum output, validate the returned length, and only then
copy exactly ADM1266_BLACKBOX_SIZE bytes into the dev_mem slot.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (pmbus/adm1266) include PEC byte in pmbus_block_xfer read buffer
adm1266_pmbus_block_xfer() sets up the read transaction with
.buf = data->read_buf,
.len = ADM1266_PMBUS_BLOCK_MAX + 2,
but read_buf in struct adm1266_data is declared as
u8 read_buf[ADM1266_PMBUS_BLOCK_MAX + 1];
For a max-length block response (length byte = 255 + up to 1 PEC
byte), the i2c controller is told to write 257 bytes into a 256-byte
buffer, putting one byte past the end of read_buf. The same response
also makes the subsequent PEC compare
if (crc != msgs[1].buf[msgs[1].buf[0] + 1])
read a byte beyond the array.
Bump the read_buf declaration to ADM1266_PMBUS_BLOCK_MAX + 2 so the
buffer can hold the length byte, up to 255 payload bytes, and the PEC
byte the i2c_msg length already accounts for.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (pmbus/adm1266) reject implausible blackbox record_count
adm1266_nvmem_read_blackbox() loops over a record_count that comes
straight from byte 3 of the BLACKBOX_INFO response. The destination
buffer is data->dev_mem, sized for the nvmem cell's declared 2048
bytes (ADM1266_BLACKBOX_MAX_RECORDS * ADM1266_BLACKBOX_SIZE = 32 * 64).
A device that reports a record_count greater than 32 -- whether due
to firmware bugs, bus corruption, or a non-responsive slave returning
0xff -- would walk read_buff past the end of the dev_mem allocation
on the trailing iterations.
Cap record_count at ADM1266_BLACKBOX_MAX_RECORDS (introduced here)
before entering the loop and return -EIO on any larger value, so a
malformed BLACKBOX_INFO response cannot drive the loop out of bounds.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: tt: fix negative tt_buff_len
batadv_orig_node::tt_buff_len was declared as s16, but the field is never
intended to hold a negative value. When a value greater than 32767 is
assigned, it wraps to a negative signed integer.
In batadv_send_other_tt_response(), tt_buff_len is temporarily widened to
s32. The incorrectly negative s16 value propagates into the s32, causing
batadv_tt_prepare_tvlv_global_data() to allocate a full sized buffer but
populates only a small portion of it with the collected changeset. All
remaining bits are kept uninitialized.
Using an u16 avoids this type confusion and ensures that no (negative) sign
extension is performed in batadv_send_other_tt_response().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: tt: fix negative last_changeset_len
batadv_piv_tt::last_changeset_len len was declared as s16, but the field is
never intended to hold a negative value. When a value greater than 32767 is
assigned, it wraps to a negative signed integer.
In batadv_send_my_tt_response(), last_changeset_len is temporarily widened
to s32. The incorrectly negative s16 value propagates into the s32, causing
batadv_tt_prepare_tvlv_local_data() to allocate a full sized buffer but
populates only a small portion of it with the collected changeset. All
remaining bits are kept uninitialized.
Using an u16 avoids this type confusion and ensures that no (negative) sign
extension is performed in batadv_send_my_tt_response().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: tt: avoid empty VLAN responses
The commit 16116dac2339 ("batman-adv: prevent TT request storms by not
sending inconsistent TT TLVLs") added checks to the local (direct) TT
response code. But the response can also be done indirectly by another node
using the global TT state. To avoid such inconsistency states reported in
the original fix, also avoid sending empty VLANs for replies from the
global TT state.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: tt: fix TOCTOU race for reported vlans
The local TT based TVLV is generated by first checking the number of VLANs
which have at least one TT entry. A new buffer with the correct size for
the VLANs is then allocated. Only then, the list of VLANs s used to fill
the VLAN entries in the buffer. During this time, the meshif_vlan_list_lock
is held. But the actual number of TT entries of each VLAN can still
increase during this time - just not the number of VLANs in the list.
But the prefilter used in the buffer size calculation might still cause an
increase of the number of VLANs which need to be stored. Simply because a
VLAN might now suddenly have at least one entry when it had none in the
pre-alloc check - and then needs to occupy space which was not allocated.
It is better to overestimate the buffer size at the beginning and then fill
the buffer only with the VLANs which are not empty.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (pmbus/adm1266) reject short block-read responses in the GPIO accessors
adm1266_gpio_get() and adm1266_gpio_get_multiple() both compose the
pin-status word as
pins_status = read_buf[0] + (read_buf[1] << 8);
right after i2c_smbus_read_block_data(), guarding only against an
error return. A well-behaved device returns 2 bytes for
GPIO_STATUS/PDIO_STATUS, but the helper happily reports a 0- or
1-byte response too. If the device returns 0 bytes, both read_buf
slots are uninitialized stack memory; if it returns 1 byte, read_buf[1]
is.
The composed value then flows through set_bit() into the caller's
*bits in adm1266_gpio_get_multiple(), or into the return value of
adm1266_gpio_get(), and ends up in userspace via gpiolib (sysfs and
the char-dev ioctls). That leaks a few bits of kernel stack per
request on any device whose firmware glitch, bus error, or hostile
slave produces a short block-read response.
Add the missing length check to both call sites and surface a short
response as -EIO.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ethernet: cortina: Make RX SKB per-port
The SKB used to assemble packets from fragments in gmac_rx()
is static local, but the Gemini has two ethernet ports, meaning
there can be races between the ports on a bad day if a device
is using both.
Make the RX SKB a per-port variable and carry it over between
invocations in the port struct instead.
Zero the pointer once we call napi_gro_frags(), on error (after
calling napi_free_frags()) or if the port is stopped.
Zero it in some place where not strictly necessary just to
emphasize what is going on.
This was found by Sashiko during normal patch review.