In Slice, there is a possible disclosure of installed applications due to side channel information disclosure. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.
In Package Manager, there is a possible way to determine whether an app is installed, without query permissions, due to side channel information disclosure. This could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.
In PackageManager, there is a possible way to determine whether an app is installed, without query permissions, due to side channel information disclosure. This could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.
In telecom service, there is a possible missing permission check. This could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges
In SoundRecorder service, there is a possible missing permission check. This could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges
In SoundRecorder service, there is a possible missing permission check. This could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges
In TVAPI, there is a possible out of bounds write due to a missing bounds check. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with System execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: DTV03802522; Issue ID: DTV03802522.
he vulnerability is that the Call management ("com.android.server.telecom") app patched by LG launches implicit intents that disclose sensitive data to all third-party apps installed on the same device. Those intents include data such as contact details and phone numbers.
he vulnerability is to delete arbitrary files in LGInstallService ("com.lge.lginstallservies") app. The app contains the exported "com.lge.lginstallservies.InstallService" service that exposes an AIDL interface. All its "installPackage*" methods are finally calling the "installPackageVerify()" method that performs signature validation after the delete file method. An attacker can control conditions so this security check is never performed and an attacker-controlled file is deleted.