IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to bypass security restrictions due to an interpretation conflict in the multipart parser.
IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 is vulnerable to privilege escalation via Navigator for i. An authenticated user could elevate privileges to a root user to execute commands.
IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information and manipulate files due to a path traversal vulnerability.
IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information and compromise system integrity due to an XML injection flaw.
IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 is vulnerable to stored cross-site scripting. This vulnerability allows an authenticated user to embed arbitrary JavaScript code in the Web UI thus altering the intended functionality potentially leading to credentials disclosure within a trusted session.
Apache Airflow's Backfill API authorized a request against a Dag id supplied by the caller whenever the `backfill_id` path segment failed to parse. The authorization dependency parsed it with `int()` while the route handler parsed it as pydantic's `NonNegativeInt`, which accepts values `int()` rejects (`1.0` coerces to `1`); FastAPI resolves dependencies before endpoint validation, so the two acted on different Dags. An authenticated user holding edit permission on any single Dag could therefore read, pause and cancel backfills belonging to any other Dag, including moving another Dag's queued runs to `failed`. No non-default configuration is required and backfill ids are sequential, so finding a target is trivial. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later, which parses the backfill id with the same type the routes declare.
Apache Airflow wrote Variable values and Connection `extra` contents to the audit log in cleartext when they were submitted through the bulk endpoints (`PATCH /api/v2/variables` and `PATCH /api/v2/connections`). The audit-log masking recognised only top-level request fields, and a bulk request nests its entities two levels below, so no masking was applied to them. Any authenticated user with audit-log read access -- who need not hold Variables or Connections read at all -- could recover those secrets verbatim, and the Connection `extra` copy is stored unencrypted in the log while the connection table encrypts it. The Airflow UI's *Import Variables* action posts to this endpoint, so an ordinary operator import wrote every secret in the file to the log. This is a different code path from CVE-2026-50204: that fix shipped in 3.3.0 and covers the single-entity endpoints only, so deployments that upgraded in response to that advisory remain affected and must upgrade again. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later.