In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: Fix memory leak after mt76_connac_mcu_alloc_sta_req()
mt76_connac_mcu_alloc_sta_req() allocates an skb which is expected to
be freed eventually by mt76_mcu_skb_send_msg(). However, currently if
an intermediate function fails before sending, the allocated skb is
leaked.
Specifically, mt76_connac_mcu_sta_wed_update() and
mt76_connac_mcu_sta_key_tlv() may fail, leading to an immediate memory
leak in the error path.
Fix this by explicitly freeing the skb in these error paths.
Commit 7c0f63fe37a5 ("wifi: mt76: mt7996: fix memory leak on
mt7996_mcu_sta_key_tlv error") made a similar change.
Compile tested only. Issue found using a prototype static analysis tool
and code review.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7925: fix potential deadlock in mt7925_roc_abort_sync
roc_abort_sync() can deadlock with roc_work(). roc_work() holds
dev->mt76.mutex, while cancel_work_sync() waits for roc_work()
to finish. If the caller already owns the same mutex, both
sides block and no progress is possible.
This deadlock can occur during station removal when
mt76_sta_state() -> mt76_sta_remove() ->
mt7925_mac_sta_remove_link() -> mt7925_mac_link_sta_remove() ->
mt7925_roc_abort_sync() invokes cancel_work_sync() while
roc_work() is still running and holding dev->mt76.mutex.
This avoids the mutex deadlock and preserves exactly-once
work ownership.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: Fix memory leak destroying device
All MT76 rx queues have an associated page_pool even if the queue is not
associated to a NAPI (e.g. WED RRO queues with WED enabled). Destroy the
page_pool running mt76_dma_cleanup routine during module unload.
Moreover returns pages to the page pool if WED is not enabled for WED RRO
queues.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Do not allow deleting local storage in NMI
Currently, local storage may deadlock when deferring freeing selem or
local storage through kfree_rcu(), call_rcu() or call_rcu_tasks_trace()
in NMI or reentrant. Since deleting selem in NMI is an unlikely use
case, partially mitigate it by returning error when calling from
bpf_xxx_storage_delete() helpers in NMI. Note that, it is still possible
to deadlock through reentrant. A full mitigation requires returning
error when irqs_disabled() is true, which, however is too heavy-handed
for bpf_xxx_storage_delete().
The long-term solution requires _nolock versions of call_rcu. Another
possible solution is to defer the free through irq_work [0], but it
would grow the size of selem, which is non-ideal.
The check is only needed in bpf_selem_unlink(), which is used by helpers
and syscalls. bpf_selem_unlink_nofail() is fine as it is called during
map and owner tear down that never run in NMI or reentrant.
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260205190233.912-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com/
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: libertas: don't kill URBs in interrupt context
Serialization for the TX path was enforced by calling
usb_kill_urb()/usb_kill_anchored_urbs(), to prevent transmission before
a previous URB was completed. usb_tx_block() can be called from
interrupt context (e.g. in the HCD giveback path), so we can't always
use it to kill in-flight URBs.
Prevent sleeping during interrupt context by checking the tx_submitted
anchor for existing URBs. We now return -EBUSY, to indicate there's
a pending request.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix use-after-free in offloaded map/prog info fill
When querying info for an offloaded BPF map or program,
bpf_map_offload_info_fill_ns() and bpf_prog_offload_info_fill_ns()
obtain the network namespace with get_net(dev_net(offmap->netdev)).
However, the associated netdev's netns may be racing with teardown
during netns destruction. If the netns refcount has already reached 0,
get_net() performs a refcount_t increment on 0, triggering:
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
Although rtnl_lock and bpf_devs_lock ensure the netdev pointer remains
valid, they cannot prevent the netns refcount from reaching zero.
Fix this by using maybe_get_net() instead of get_net(). maybe_get_net()
uses refcount_inc_not_zero() and returns NULL if the refcount is already
zero, which causes ns_get_path_cb() to fail and the caller to return
-ENOENT -- the correct behavior when the netns is being destroyed.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix ld_{abs,ind} failure path analysis in subprogs
Usage of ld_{abs,ind} instructions got extended into subprogs some time
ago via commit 09b28d76eac4 ("bpf: Add abnormal return checks."). These
are only allowed in subprograms when the latter are BTF annotated and
have scalar return types.
The code generator in bpf_gen_ld_abs() has an abnormal exit path (r0=0 +
exit) from legacy cBPF times. While the enforcement is on scalar return
types, the verifier must also simulate the path of abnormal exit if the
packet data load via ld_{abs,ind} failed.
This is currently not the case. Fix it by having the verifier simulate
both success and failure paths, and extend it in similar ways as we do
for tail calls. The success path (r0=unknown, continue to next insn) is
pushed onto stack for later validation and the r0=0 and return to the
caller is done on the fall-through side.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: pull headers in qdisc_pkt_len_segs_init()
Most ndo_start_xmit() methods expects headers of gso packets
to be already in skb->head.
net/core/tso.c users are particularly at risk, because tso_build_hdr()
does a memcpy(hdr, skb->data, hdr_len);
qdisc_pkt_len_segs_init() already does a dissection of gso packets.
Use pskb_may_pull() instead of skb_header_pointer() to make
sure drivers do not have to reimplement this.
Some malicious packets could be fed, detect them so that we can
drop them sooner with a new SKB_DROP_REASON_SKB_BAD_GSO drop_reason.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix linked reg delta tracking when src_reg == dst_reg
Consider the case of rX += rX where src_reg and dst_reg are pointers to
the same bpf_reg_state in adjust_reg_min_max_vals(). The latter first
modifies the dst_reg in-place, and later in the delta tracking, the
subsequent is_reg_const(src_reg)/reg_const_value(src_reg) reads the
post-{add,sub} value instead of the original source.
This is problematic since it sets an incorrect delta, which sync_linked_regs()
then propagates to linked registers, thus creating a verifier-vs-runtime
mismatch. Fix it by just skipping this corner case.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix same-register dst/src OOB read and pointer leak in sock_ops
When a BPF sock_ops program accesses ctx fields with dst_reg == src_reg,
the SOCK_OPS_GET_SK() and SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() macros fail to zero the
destination register in the !fullsock / !locked_tcp_sock path.
Both macros borrow a temporary register to check is_fullsock /
is_locked_tcp_sock when dst_reg == src_reg, because dst_reg holds the
ctx pointer. When the check is false (e.g., TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV state with
a request_sock), dst_reg should be zeroed but is not, leaving the stale
ctx pointer:
- SOCK_OPS_GET_SK: dst_reg retains the ctx pointer, passes NULL checks
as PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL, and can be used as a bogus socket pointer,
leading to stack-out-of-bounds access in helpers like
bpf_skc_to_tcp6_sock().
- SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD: dst_reg retains the ctx pointer which the
verifier believes is a SCALAR_VALUE, leaking a kernel pointer.
Fix both macros by:
- Changing JMP_A(1) to JMP_A(2) in the fullsock path to skip the
added instruction.
- Adding BPF_MOV64_IMM(si->dst_reg, 0) after the temp register
restore in the !fullsock path, placed after the restore because
dst_reg == src_reg means we need src_reg intact to read ctx->temp.