In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
isofs: validate Rock Ridge CE continuation extent against volume size
rock_continue() reads rs->cont_extent verbatim from the Rock Ridge CE
record and passes it to sb_bread() without checking that the block
number is within the mounted ISO 9660 volume. commit e595447e177b
("[PATCH] rock.c: handle corrupted directories") added cont_offset
and cont_size rejection for the CE continuation but did not validate
the extent block number itself. commit f54e18f1b831 ("isofs: Fix
infinite looping over CE entries") later capped the CE chain length
at RR_MAX_CE_ENTRIES = 32 but again left the block number unchecked.
With a crafted ISO mounted via udisks2 (desktop optical auto-mount)
or via CAP_SYS_ADMIN mount, rs->cont_extent can therefore point at
an out-of-range block or at blocks belonging to an adjacent
filesystem on the same block device. sb_bread() on an out-of-range
block returns NULL cleanly via the block layer EIO path, so there
is no memory-safety violation. For in-range reads of adjacent-
filesystem data, the CE buffer is parsed as Rock Ridge records and
only the text of SL sub-records reaches userspace through
readlink(), which makes the info-leak channel narrow and difficult
to exploit; still, rejecting the malformed CE outright matches the
rejection shape already present in the same function for
cont_offset and cont_size.
Add an ISOFS_SB(sb)->s_nzones bounds check to rock_continue() next
to the existing offset/size rejection, printing the same
corrupted-directory-entry notice.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: caam - guard HMAC key hex dumps in hash_digest_key
Use print_hex_dump_devel() for dumping sensitive HMAC key bytes in
hash_digest_key() to avoid leaking secrets at runtime when
CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG is enabled.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pmdomain: core: Fix detach procedure for virtual devices in genpd
If a device is attached to a PM domain through genpd_dev_pm_attach_by_id(),
genpd calls pm_runtime_enable() for the corresponding virtual device that
it registers. While this avoids boilerplate code in drivers, there is no
corresponding call to pm_runtime_disable() in genpd_dev_pm_detach().
This means these virtual devices are typically detached from its genpd,
while runtime PM remains enabled for them, which is not how things are
designed to work. In worst cases it may lead to critical errors, like a
NULL pointer dereference bug in genpd_runtime_suspend(), which was recently
reported. For another case, we may end up keeping an unnecessary vote for a
performance state for the device.
To fix these problems, let's add this missing call to pm_runtime_disable()
in genpd_dev_pm_detach().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm: fix a buffer overflow in ioctl processing
Tony Asleson (using Claude) found a buffer overflow in dm-ioctl in the
function retrieve_status:
1. The code in retrieve_status checks that the output string fits into
the output buffer and writes the output string there
2. Then, the code aligns the "outptr" variable to the next 8-byte
boundary:
outptr = align_ptr(outptr);
3. The alignment doesn't check overflow, so outptr could point past the
buffer end
4. The "for" loop is iterated again, it executes:
remaining = len - (outptr - outbuf);
5. If "outptr" points past "outbuf + len", the arithmetics wraps around
and the variable "remaining" contains unusually high number
6. With "remaining" being high, the code writes more data past the end of
the buffer
Luckily, this bug has no security implications because:
1. Only root can issue device mapper ioctls
2. The commonly used libraries that communicate with device mapper
(libdevmapper and devicemapper-rs) use buffer size that is aligned to
8 bytes - thus, "outptr = align_ptr(outptr)" can't overshoot the input
buffer and the bug can't happen accidentally
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ibmveth: Disable GSO for packets with small MSS
Some physical adapters on Power systems do not support segmentation
offload when the MSS is less than 224 bytes. Attempting to send such
packets causes the adapter to freeze, stopping all traffic until
manually reset.
Implement ndo_features_check to disable GSO for packets with small MSS
values. The network stack will perform software segmentation instead.
The 224-byte minimum matches ibmvnic
commit <f10b09ef687f> ("ibmvnic: Enforce stronger sanity checks
on GSO packets")
which uses the same physical adapters in SEA configurations.
The issue occurs specifically when the hardware attempts to perform
segmentation (gso_segs > 1) with a small MSS. Single-segment GSO packets
(gso_segs == 1) do not trigger the problematic LSO code path and are
transmitted normally without segmentation.
Add an ndo_features_check callback to disable GSO when MSS < 224 bytes.
Also call vlan_features_check() to ensure proper handling of VLAN packets,
particularly QinQ (802.1ad) configurations where the hardware parser may
not support certain offload features.
Validated using iptables to force small MSS values. Without the fix,
the adapter freezes. With the fix, packets are segmented in software
and transmission succeeds. Comprehensive regression testing completedd
(MSS tests, performance, stability).
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
inet: RAW sockets using IPPROTO_RAW MUST drop incoming ICMP
Yizhou Zhao reported that simply having one RAW socket on protocol
IPPROTO_RAW (255) was dangerous.
socket(AF_INET, SOCK_RAW, 255);
A malicious incoming ICMP packet can set the protocol field to 255
and match this socket, leading to FNHE cache changes.
inner = IP(src="192.168.2.1", dst="8.8.8.8", proto=255)/Raw("TEST")
pkt = IP(src="192.168.1.1", dst="192.168.2.1")/ICMP(type=3, code=4, nexthopmtu=576)/inner
"man 7 raw" states:
A protocol of IPPROTO_RAW implies enabled IP_HDRINCL and is able
to send any IP protocol that is specified in the passed header.
Receiving of all IP protocols via IPPROTO_RAW is not possible
using raw sockets.
Make sure we drop these malicious packets.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
power: supply: rt9455: Fix use-after-free in power_supply_changed()
Using the `devm_` variant for requesting IRQ _before_ the `devm_`
variant for allocating/registering the `power_supply` handle, means that
the `power_supply` handle will be deallocated/unregistered _before_ the
interrupt handler (since `devm_` naturally deallocates in reverse
allocation order). This means that during removal, there is a race
condition where an interrupt can fire just _after_ the `power_supply`
handle has been freed, *but* just _before_ the corresponding
unregistration of the IRQ handler has run.
This will lead to the IRQ handler calling `power_supply_changed()` with
a freed `power_supply` handle. Which usually crashes the system or
otherwise silently corrupts the memory...
Note that there is a similar situation which can also happen during
`probe()`; the possibility of an interrupt firing _before_ registering
the `power_supply` handle. This would then lead to the nasty situation
of using the `power_supply` handle *uninitialized* in
`power_supply_changed()`.
Fix this racy use-after-free by making sure the IRQ is requested _after_
the registration of the `power_supply` handle.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pstore/ram: fix buffer overflow in persistent_ram_save_old()
persistent_ram_save_old() can be called multiple times for the same
persistent_ram_zone (e.g., via ramoops_pstore_read -> ramoops_get_next_prz
for PSTORE_TYPE_DMESG records).
Currently, the function only allocates prz->old_log when it is NULL,
but it unconditionally updates prz->old_log_size to the current buffer
size and then performs memcpy_fromio() using this new size. If the
buffer size has grown since the first allocation (which can happen
across different kernel boot cycles), this leads to:
1. A heap buffer overflow (OOB write) in the memcpy_fromio() calls
2. A subsequent OOB read when ramoops_pstore_read() accesses the buffer
using the incorrect (larger) old_log_size
The KASAN splat would look similar to:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ramoops_pstore_read+0x...
Read of size N at addr ... by task ...
The conditions are likely extremely hard to hit:
0. Crash with a ramoops write of less-than-record-max-size bytes.
1. Reboot: ramoops registers, pstore_get_records(0) reads old crash,
allocates old_log with size X
2. Crash handler registered, timer started (if pstore_update_ms >= 0)
3. Oops happens (non-fatal, system continues)
4. pstore_dump() writes oops via ramoops_pstore_write() size Y (>X)
5. pstore_new_entry = 1, pstore_timer_kick() called
6. System continues running (not a panic oops)
7. Timer fires after pstore_update_ms milliseconds
8. pstore_timefunc() → schedule_work() → pstore_dowork() → pstore_get_records(1)
9. ramoops_get_next_prz() → persistent_ram_save_old()
10. buffer_size() returns Y, but old_log is X bytes
11. Y > X: memcpy_fromio() overflows heap
Requirements:
- a prior crash record exists that did not fill the record size
(almost impossible since the crash handler writes as much as it
can possibly fit into the record, capped by max record size and
the kmsg buffer almost always exceeds the max record size)
- pstore_update_ms >= 0 (disabled by default)
- Non-fatal oops (system survives)
Free and reallocate the buffer when the new size differs from the
previously allocated size. This ensures old_log always has sufficient
space for the data being copied.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
MIPS: Work around LLVM bug when gp is used as global register variable
On MIPS, __current_thread_info is defined as global register variable
locating in $gp, and is simply assigned with new address during kernel
relocation.
This however is broken with LLVM, which always restores $gp if it finds
$gp is clobbered in any form, including when intentionally through a
global register variable. This is against GCC's documentation[1], which
requires a callee-saved register used as global register variable not to
be restored if it's clobbered.
As a result, $gp will continue to point to the unrelocated kernel after
the epilog of relocate_kernel(), leading to an early crash in init_idle,
[ 0.000000] CPU 0 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000000000000000, epc == ffffffff81afada8, ra == ffffffff81afad90
[ 0.000000] Oops[#1]:
[ 0.000000] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Tainted: G W 6.19.0-rc5-00262-gd3eeb99bbc99-dirty #188 VOLUNTARY
[ 0.000000] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[ 0.000000] Hardware name: loongson,loongson64v-4core-virtio
[ 0.000000] $ 0 : 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 0000000000000000
[ 0.000000] $ 4 : ffffffff80b80ec0 ffffffff80b53d48 0000000000000000 00000000000f4240
[ 0.000000] $ 8 : 0000000000000100 ffffffff81d82f80 ffffffff81d82f80 0000000000000001
[ 0.000000] $12 : 0000000000000000 ffffffff81776f58 00000000000005da 0000000000000002
[ 0.000000] $16 : ffffffff80b80e40 0000000000000000 ffffffff80b81614 9800000005dfbe80
[ 0.000000] $20 : 00000000540000e0 ffffffff81980000 0000000000000000 ffffffff80f81c80
[ 0.000000] $24 : 0000000000000a26 ffffffff8114fb90
[ 0.000000] $28 : ffffffff80b50000 ffffffff80b53d40 0000000000000000 ffffffff81afad90
[ 0.000000] Hi : 0000000000000000
[ 0.000000] Lo : 0000000000000000
[ 0.000000] epc : ffffffff81afada8 init_idle+0x130/0x270
[ 0.000000] ra : ffffffff81afad90 init_idle+0x118/0x270
[ 0.000000] Status: 540000e2 KX SX UX KERNEL EXL
[ 0.000000] Cause : 00000008 (ExcCode 02)
[ 0.000000] BadVA : 0000000000000000
[ 0.000000] PrId : 00006305 (ICT Loongson-3)
[ 0.000000] Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo=(____ptrval____), task=(____ptrval____), tls=0000000000000000)
[ 0.000000] Stack : 9800000005dfbf00 ffffffff8178e950 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[ 0.000000] 0000000000000000 ffffffff81970000 000000000000003f ffffffff810a6528
[ 0.000000] 0000000000000001 9800000005dfbe80 9800000005dfbf00 ffffffff81980000
[ 0.000000] ffffffff810a6450 ffffffff81afb6c0 0000000000000000 ffffffff810a2258
[ 0.000000] ffffffff81d82ec8 ffffffff8198d010 ffffffff81b67e80 ffffffff8197dd98
[ 0.000000] ffffffff81d81c80 ffffffff81930000 0000000000000040 0000000000000000
[ 0.000000] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[ 0.000000] 0000000000000000 000000000000009e ffffffff9fc01000 0000000000000000
[ 0.000000] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[ 0.000000] 0000000000000000 ffffffff81ae86dc ffffffff81b3c741 0000000000000002
[ 0.000000] ...
[ 0.000000] Call Trace:
[ 0.000000] [<ffffffff81afada8>] init_idle+0x130/0x270
[ 0.000000] [<ffffffff81afb6c0>] sched_init+0x5c8/0x6c0
[ 0.000000] [<ffffffff81ae86dc>] start_kernel+0x27c/0x7a8
This bug has been reported to LLVM[2] and affects version from (at
least) 18 to 21. Let's work around this by using inline assembly to
assign $gp before a fix is widely available.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
regulator: core: fix locking in regulator_resolve_supply() error path
If late enabling of a supply regulator fails in
regulator_resolve_supply(), the code currently triggers a lockdep
warning:
WARNING: drivers/regulator/core.c:2649 at _regulator_put+0x80/0xa0, CPU#6: kworker/u32:4/596
...
Call trace:
_regulator_put+0x80/0xa0 (P)
regulator_resolve_supply+0x7cc/0xbe0
regulator_register_resolve_supply+0x28/0xb8
as the regulator_list_mutex must be held when calling _regulator_put().
To solve this, simply switch to using regulator_put().
While at it, we should also make sure that no concurrent access happens
to our rdev while we clear out the supply pointer. Add appropriate
locking to ensure that.
While the code in question will be removed altogether in a follow-up
commit, I believe it is still beneficial to have this corrected before
removal for future reference.