Apache Airflow's serialization layer reconstructed exception nodes by calling `import_string()` on a class name taken from the serialized blob and instantiating it with arguments from the same blob, with no restriction on what could be imported. An operator's `executor_config` reaches that branch, so a Dag author could place a value there that causes an arbitrary callable to be imported and invoked -- for example `subprocess.check_output`, or `builtins.eval` on the `builtins`-prefixed variant. The code runs in the **Scheduler**, which reconstructs serialized Dags in its normal loop with no request involved, and in the **API server**, on any authenticated read of the Dag such as `GET /api/v2/dags/{dag_id}/details`. Both are components the Airflow security model states must never execute Dag-author code, and both hold the metadata database credentials and the JWT signing secret. No non-default configuration is required. This is a **different sink from CVE-2026-33264**, which covered only the trigger branch of the same deserializer: deployments that upgraded in response to that advisory are still affected through the exception branch and must upgrade again. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later, which restricts the imported class to a subclass of `BaseException`.
Apache Airflow's secrets masker hides values stored under sensitive key names when they are displayed in the UI. The masker's recursion-depth limit did not descend into values nested inside a list, tuple, or set beyond that limit, so an Airflow Variable holding such a deeply-nested value was shown unmasked in the Variables UI. The exposure is limited to the UI: any authenticated user who can see the Variable in the UI can already read its full value through the Variables REST API, so this does not disclose data the user could not otherwise obtain — the masking is a shoulder-surfing defense for the UI, not an access-control boundary.
This is an incomplete-fix follow-up to CVE-2026-42358, whose fix made only the dictionary walk unbounded; lists, tuples, and sets beyond the depth limit remained unmasked in the UI. Deployments that applied the CVE-2026-42358 fix should also upgrade to address this residual case. Upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later.
The Bulk Variables API in Apache Airflow called the redactor without passing the variable's key, so the key-based `should_hide_value_for_key` check (which triggers on secret-suffixed key names like `*_password` / `*_token` / `*_secret`) could not fire for JSON-decodable variable values. An authenticated UI/API user with bulk Variable read permission could retrieve plaintext values from JSON variables whose key would otherwise trigger redaction. Affects deployments that store sensitive values in JSON-typed Airflow Variables under secret-suffixed key names. Users are advised to upgrade to `apache-airflow` 3.3.0 or later (the fix landed on `main` after 3.2.2; no 3.2.x backport).
A bug in Apache Airflow's `/ui/dependencies` scheduling graph endpoint applied the caller's readable-Dag filter to the top-level serialized Dag key but still emitted referenced Dag IDs through the `dep.source` and `dep.target` fields of trigger / sensor dependency entries. An authenticated UI user with read permission on some Dags could enumerate the identifiers of other Dags they were not authorized to read by inspecting the dependency graph for trigger / sensor references. Affects deployments that rely on per-Dag read scoping to keep Dag identifiers private across teams. This is a residual gap in the fix for CVE-2026-28563, which filtered the top-level Dag key but did not propagate the filter into the trigger / sensor dep-source / dep-target fields. Users who already upgraded for CVE-2026-28563 should additionally upgrade to `apache-airflow` 3.3.0 or later to cover the residual trigger / sensor dependency leak.
The Config API in Apache Airflow surfaced per-key secrets-backend overrides (environment variables like `AIRFLOW__SECRETS__BACKEND_KWARG__SECRET_ID` and `AIRFLOW__WORKERS__SECRETS_BACKEND_KWARG__SECRET_ID`) as synthetic config options whose option names were not in `sensitive_config_values`, so the masker did not redact them. An authenticated UI/API user with Config read permission could retrieve plaintext secrets-backend credentials (Vault `role_id` / `secret_id`, etc.) from the Config API output. Affects deployments that configure secrets backends via per-key environment overrides. Users are advised to upgrade to `apache-airflow` 3.3.0 or later.
Before apache-airflow 3.3.0, a user authorized to read one Dag could disclose the source of other Dags co-located in the same source file. `GET /api/v2/dagSources/{dag_id}` — and the equivalent Dag-source view in the UI — returned the entire source file without redacting Dags the caller was not authorized to read, bypassing per-DAG read authorization. Deployments that co-locate multiple Dags in a single file and rely on per-DAG access control to limit source visibility are affected; single-Dag-per-file deployments are not. Upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.0 or later.
In Apache Airflow before 3.3.0, the REST API task-instance detail and list
endpoints returned a deferred task's trigger kwargs without masking. When a
deferred operator passed a secret (for example a provider API key) into its
trigger, any authenticated user with DAG-scoped task-instance read access for
that DAG could read that secret in clear text while the task was deferred.
Users should upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.0 or later, which masks sensitive
values in trigger kwargs returned by the API.
A bug in `BaseSerialization.deserialize()` allowed unrestricted `import_string()` of attacker-controlled class paths when the Scheduler / API Server loaded a serialized DAG: a DAG author could embed a malicious trigger into a DAG to gain remote code execution on the API Server / Scheduler process, crossing the Airflow security boundary that DAG-author code must never execute in those processes. Users are advised to upgrade to `apache-airflow` 3.3.0 or later. As a defense-in-depth mitigation, deployments where DAG-author trust is limited can restrict the `[core] allowed_deserialization_classes` config to a narrow allowlist.
The Event Log detail endpoint `GET /api/v2/eventLogs/{event_log_id}` in Apache Airflow fetched audit-log rows directly by numeric ID after only the generic Audit Log permission check, while the collection endpoint `GET /api/v2/eventLogs` applied per-Dag scoping. An authenticated UI/API user with audit-log read permission for one Dag could retrieve audit-log entries for any other Dag by guessing or enumerating the numeric event log ID. Affects deployments that rely on per-Dag audit-log scoping. Users are advised to upgrade to `apache-airflow` 3.2.2 or later.
A bug in Apache Airflow's auth manager logout handling left previously-issued JWT tokens valid after the user clicked logout in the UI: the logout flow for `FabAuthManager` and `KeycloakAuthManager` did not actually reach the underlying `revoke_token()` call, so the JWT remained accepted by the API server until its natural expiry. An attacker holding a previously-issued JWT for a logged-out user could continue to make authenticated API calls as that user. Affects deployments configured with `FabAuthManager` or `KeycloakAuthManager` (the bug does not affect SimpleAuthManager). This is a residual gap in the fix for CVE-2025-57735, which addressed cookie-side invalidation in PR #57992 / PR #61339 but did not cover the provider-side `revoke_token()` reachability in the FAB / Keycloak code paths. Users who already upgraded for CVE-2025-57735 should additionally upgrade to `apache-airflow` 3.2.2 or later to cover the FAB / Keycloak logout paths.