Wasmtime is a runtime for WebAssembly. From 25.0.0 to before 36.0.7, 42.0.2, and 43.0.1, Wasmtime's Winch compiler contains a vulnerability where the compilation of the table.fill instruction can result in a host panic. This means that a valid guest can be compiled with Winch, on any architecture, and cause the host to panic. This represents a denial-of-service vulnerability in Wasmtime due to guests being able to trigger a panic. The specific issue is that a historical refactoring changed how compiled code referenced tables within the table.* instructions. This refactoring forgot to update the Winch code paths associated as well, meaning that Winch was using the wrong indexing scheme. Due to the feature support of Winch the only problem that can result is tables being mixed up or nonexistent tables being used, meaning that the guest is limited to panicking the host (using a nonexistent table), or executing spec-incorrect behavior and modifying the wrong table. This vulnerability is fixed in 36.0.7, 42.0.2, and 43.0.1.
Wasmtime is a runtime for WebAssembly. From 32.0.0 to before 36.0.7, 42.0.2, and 43.0.1, Wasmtime's Cranelift compilation backend contains a bug on aarch64 when performing a certain shape of heap accesses which means that the wrong address is accessed. When combined with explicit bounds checks a guest WebAssembly module this can create a situation where there are two diverging computations for the same address: one for the address to bounds-check and one for the address to load. This difference in address being operated on means that a guest module can pass a bounds check but then load a different address. Combined together this enables an arbitrary read/write primitive for guest WebAssembly when accesssing host memory. This is a sandbox escape as guests are able to read/write arbitrary host memory. This vulnerability has a few ingredients, all of which must be met, for this situation to occur and bypass the sandbox restrictions. This miscompiled shape of load only occurs on 64-bit WebAssembly linear memories, or when Config::wasm_memory64 is enabled. 32-bit WebAssembly is not affected. Spectre mitigations or signals-based-traps must be disabled. When spectre mitigations are enabled then the offending shape of load is not generated. When signals-based-traps are disabled then spectre mitigations are also automatically disabled. The specific bug in Cranelift is a miscompile of a load of the shape load(iadd(base, ishl(index, amt))) where amt is a constant. The amt value is masked incorrectly to test if it's a certain value, and this incorrect mask means that Cranelift can pattern-match this lowering rule during instruction selection erroneously, diverging from WebAssembly's and Cranelift's semantics. This incorrect lowering would, for example, load an address much further away than intended as the correct address's computation would have wrapped around to a smaller value insetad. This vulnerability is fixed in 36.0.7, 42.0.2, and 43.0.1.
Wasmtime is a runtime for WebAssembly. Prior to 24.0.7, 36.0.7, 42.0.2, and 43.0.1, Wasmtime contains a vulnerability where when transcoding a UTF-16 string to the latin1+utf16 component-model encoding it would incorrectly validate the byte length of the input string when performing a bounds check. Specifically the number of code units were checked instead of the byte length, which is twice the size of the code units. This vulnerability can cause the host to read beyond the end of a WebAssembly's linear memory in an attempt to transcode nonexistent bytes. In Wasmtime's default configuration this will read unmapped memory on a guard page, terminating the process with a segfault. Wasmtime can be configured, however, without guard pages which would mean that host memory beyond the end of linear memory may be read and interpreted as UTF-16. A host segfault is a denial-of-service vulnerability in Wasmtime, and possibly being able to read beyond the end of linear memory is additionally a vulnerability. Note that reading beyond the end of linear memory requires nonstandard configuration of Wasmtime, specifically with guard pages disabled. This vulnerability is fixed in 24.0.7, 36.0.7, 42.0.2, and 43.0.1.
Wasmtime is a runtime for WebAssembly. Prior to 24.0.7, 36.0.7, 42.0.2, and 43.0.1, Wasmtime's implementation of transcoding strings into the Component Model's utf16 or latin1+utf16 encodings improperly verified the alignment of reallocated strings. This meant that unaligned pointers could be passed to the host for transcoding which would trigger a host panic. This panic is possible to trigger from malicious guests which transfer very specific strings across components with specific addresses. Host panics are considered a DoS vector in Wasmtime as the panic conditions are controlled by the guest in this situation. This vulnerability is fixed in 24.0.7, 36.0.7, 42.0.2, and 43.0.1.
Wasmtime is a runtime for WebAssembly. Prior to versions 24.0.6, 36.0.6, 4.0.04, 41.0.4, and 42.0.0, Wasmtime's implementation of WASI host interfaces are susceptible to guest-controlled resource exhaustion on the host. Wasmtime did not appropriately place limits on resource allocations requested by the guests. This serves as a Denial of Service vector. Wasmtime 24.0.6, 36.0.6, 40.0.4, 41.0.4, and 42.0.0 have all been released with the fix for this issue. These versions do not prevent this issue in their default configuration to avoid breaking preexisting behaviors. All versions of Wasmtime have appropriate knobs to prevent this behavior, and Wasmtime 42.0.0-and-later will have these knobs tuned by default to prevent this issue from happening. There are no known workarounds for this issue without upgrading. Embedders are recommended to upgrade and configure their embeddings as necessary to prevent possibly-malicious guests from triggering this issue.
Wasmtime is a runtime for WebAssembly. Prior to versions 24.0.6, 36.0.6, 4.0.04, 41.0.4, and 42.0.0, Wasmtime's implementation of the `wasi:http/types.fields` resource is susceptible to panics when too many fields are added to the set of headers. Wasmtime's implementation in the `wasmtime-wasi-http` crate is backed by a data structure which panics when it reaches excessive capacity and this condition was not handled gracefully in Wasmtime. Panicking in a WASI implementation is a Denial of Service vector for embedders and is treated as a security vulnerability in Wasmtime. Wasmtime 24.0.6, 36.0.6, 40.0.4, 41.0.4, and 42.0.0 patch this vulnerability and return a trap to the guest instead of panicking. There are no known workarounds at this time. Embedders are encouraged to update to a patched version of Wasmtime.
Wasmtime is a runtime for WebAssembly. Wasmtime 37.0.0 and 37.0.1 have memory leaks in the C/C++ API when using bindings for the `anyref` or `externref` WebAssembly values. This is caused by a regression introduced during the development of 37.0.0 and all prior versions of Wasmtime are unaffected. If `anyref` or `externref` is not used in the C/C++ API then embeddings are also unaffected by the leaky behavior. The `wasmtime` Rust crate is unaffected by this leak.
Development of Wasmtime 37.0.0 included a refactoring in Rust of changing the old `ManuallyRooted<T>` type to a new `OwnedRooted<T>` type. This change was integrated into Wasmtime's C API but left the C API in a state which had memory leaks. Additionally the new ownership semantics around this type were not reflected into the C++ API, making it leak-prone. A short version of the change is that previously `ManuallyRooted<T>`, as the name implies, required manual calls to an "unroot" operation. If this was forgotten then the memory was still cleaned up when the `wasmtime_store_t` itself was destroyed eventually. Documentation of when to "unroot" was sparse and there were already situations prior to 37.0.0 where memory would be leaked until the store was destroyed anyway. All memory, though, was always bound by the store, and destroying the store would guarantee that there were no memory leaks.
In migrating to `OwnedRooted<T>` the usage of the type in Rust changed. A manual "unroot" operation is no longer required and it happens naturally as a destructor of the `OwnedRooted<T>` type in Rust itself. These new resource ownership semantics were not fully integrated into the preexisting semantics of the C/C++ APIs in Wasmtime. A crucial distinction of `OwnedRooted<T>` vs `ManuallyRooted<T>` is that the `OwnedRooted<T>` type allocates host memory outside of the store. This means that if an `OwnedRooted<T>` is leaked then destroying a store does not release this memory and it's a permanent memory leak on the host.
This led to a few distinct, but related, issues arising: A typo in the `wasmtime_val_unroot` function in the C API meant that it did not actually unroot anything. This meant that even if embedders faithfully call the function then memory will be leaked. If a host-defined function returned a `wasmtime_{externref,anyref}_t` value then the value was never unrooted. The C/C++ API no longer has access to the value and the Rust implementation did not unroot. This meant that any values returned this way were never unrooted. The goal of the C++ API of Wasmtime is to encode automatic memory management in the type system, but the C++ API was not updated when `OwnedRooted<T>` was added. This meant that idiomatic usage of the C++ API would leak memory due to a lack of destructors on values.
These issues have all been fixed in a 37.0.2 release of Wasmtime. The implementation of the C and C++ APIs have been updated accordingly and respectively to account for the changes of ownership here. For example `wasmtime_val_unroot` has been fixed to unroot, the Rust-side implementation of calling an embedder-defined function will unroot return values, and the C++ API now has destructors on the `ExternRef`, `AnyRef`, and `Val` types. These changes have been made to the 37.0.x release branch in a non-API-breaking fashion. Changes to the 38.0.0 release branch (and `main` in the Wasmtime repository) include minor API updates to better accommodate the API semantic changes. The only known workaround at this time is to avoid using `externref` and `anyref` in the C/C++ API of Wasmtime. If avoiding those types is not possible then it's required for users to update to mitigate the leak issue.