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Vulnerable Software
Linux:  >> Linux Kernel  >> 6.6.143  Security Vulnerabilities
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwrng: core - use RCU and work_struct to fix race condition Currently, hwrng_fill is not cleared until the hwrng_fillfn() thread exits. Since hwrng_unregister() reads hwrng_fill outside the rng_mutex lock, a concurrent hwrng_unregister() may call kthread_stop() again on the same task. Additionally, if hwrng_unregister() is called immediately after hwrng_register(), the stopped thread may have never been executed. Thus, hwrng_fill remains dirty even after hwrng_unregister() returns. In this case, subsequent calls to hwrng_register() will fail to start new threads, and hwrng_unregister() will call kthread_stop() on the same freed task. In both cases, a use-after-free occurs: refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. WARNING: ... at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xec/0x1c0 Call Trace: kthread_stop+0x181/0x360 hwrng_unregister+0x288/0x380 virtrng_remove+0xe3/0x200 This patch fixes the race by protecting the global hwrng_fill pointer inside the rng_mutex lock, so that hwrng_fillfn() thread is stopped only once, and calls to kthread_run() and kthread_stop() are serialized with the lock held. To avoid deadlock in hwrng_fillfn() while being stopped with the lock held, we convert current_rng to RCU, so that get_current_rng() can read current_rng without holding the lock. To remove the lock from put_rng(), we also delay the actual cleanup into a work_struct. Since get_current_rng() no longer returns ERR_PTR values, the IS_ERR() checks are removed from its callers. With hwrng_fill protected by the rng_mutex lock, hwrng_fillfn() can no longer clear hwrng_fill itself. Therefore, if hwrng_fillfn() returns directly after current_rng is dropped, kthread_stop() would be called on a freed task_struct later. To fix this, hwrng_fillfn() calls schedule() now to keep the task alive until being stopped. The kthread_stop() call is also moved from hwrng_unregister() to drop_current_rng(), ensuring kthread_stop() is called on all possible paths where current_rng becomes NULL, so that the thread would not wait forever.
CVSS Score
4.7
EPSS Score
0.001
Published
2026-05-27
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: stmmac: fix oops when split header is enabled For GMAC4, when split header is enabled, in some rare cases, the hardware does not fill buf2 of the first descriptor with payload. Thus we cannot assume buf2 is always fully filled if it is not the last descriptor. Otherwise, the length of buf2 of the second descriptor will be calculated wrong and cause an oops: Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff00019246bfc0 ... x2 : 0000000000000040 x1 : ffff00019246bfc0 x0 : ffff00009246c000 Call trace: dcache_inval_poc+0x28/0x58 (P) dma_direct_sync_single_for_cpu+0x38/0x6c __dma_sync_single_for_cpu+0x34/0x6c stmmac_napi_poll_rx+0x8f0/0xb60 __napi_poll.constprop.0+0x30/0x144 net_rx_action+0x160/0x274 handle_softirqs+0x1b8/0x1fc ... To fix this, the PL bit-field in RDES3 register is used for all descriptors, whether it is the last descriptor or not.
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.002
Published
2026-05-27
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: erofs: fix inline data read failure for ztailpacking pclusters Compressed folios for ztailpacking pclusters must be valid before adding these pclusters to I/O chains. Otherwise, z_erofs_decompress_pcluster() may assume they are already valid and then trigger a NULL pointer dereference. It is somewhat hard to reproduce because the inline data is in the same block as the tail of the compressed indexes, which are usually read just before. However, it may still happen if a fatal signal arrives while read_mapping_folio() is running, as shown below: erofs: (device dm-1): z_erofs_pcluster_begin: failed to get inline data -4 Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000008 ... pc : z_erofs_decompress_queue+0x4c8/0xa14 lr : z_erofs_decompress_queue+0x160/0xa14 sp : ffffffc08b3eb3a0 x29: ffffffc08b3eb570 x28: ffffffc08b3eb418 x27: 0000000000001000 x26: ffffff8086ebdbb8 x25: ffffff8086ebdbb8 x24: 0000000000000001 x23: 0000000000000008 x22: 00000000fffffffb x21: dead000000000700 x20: 00000000000015e7 x19: ffffff808babb400 x18: ffffffc089edc098 x17: 00000000c006287d x16: 00000000c006287d x15: 0000000000000004 x14: ffffff80ba8f8000 x13: 0000000000000004 x12: 00000006589a77c9 x11: 0000000000000015 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 000000000000003f x5 : 0000000000000040 x4 : ffffffffffffffe0 x3 : 0000000000000020 x2 : 0000000000000008 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000 Call trace: z_erofs_decompress_queue+0x4c8/0xa14 z_erofs_runqueue+0x908/0x97c z_erofs_read_folio+0x128/0x228 filemap_read_folio+0x68/0x128 filemap_get_pages+0x44c/0x8b4 filemap_read+0x12c/0x5b8 generic_file_read_iter+0x4c/0x15c do_iter_readv_writev+0x188/0x1e0 vfs_iter_read+0xac/0x1a4 backing_file_read_iter+0x170/0x34c ovl_read_iter+0xf0/0x140 vfs_read+0x28c/0x344 ksys_read+0x80/0xf0 __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x34 invoke_syscall+0x60/0x114 el0_svc_common+0x88/0xe4 do_el0_svc+0x24/0x30 el0_svc+0x40/0xa8 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x70/0xbc el0t_64_sync+0x1bc/0x1c0 Fix this by reading the inline data before allocating and adding the pclusters to the I/O chains.
CVSS Score
7.1
EPSS Score
0.001
Published
2026-05-27
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/vt-d: Clear Present bit before tearing down context entry When tearing down a context entry, the current implementation zeros the entire 128-bit entry using multiple 64-bit writes. This creates a window where the hardware can fetch a "torn" entry — where some fields are already zeroed while the 'Present' bit is still set — leading to unpredictable behavior or spurious faults. While x86 provides strong write ordering, the compiler may reorder writes to the two 64-bit halves of the context entry. Even without compiler reordering, the hardware fetch is not guaranteed to be atomic with respect to multiple CPU writes. Align with the "Guidance to Software for Invalidations" in the VT-d spec (Section 6.5.3.3) by implementing the recommended ownership handshake: 1. Clear only the 'Present' (P) bit of the context entry first to signal the transition of ownership from hardware to software. 2. Use dma_wmb() to ensure the cleared bit is visible to the IOMMU. 3. Perform the required cache and context-cache invalidation to ensure hardware no longer has cached references to the entry. 4. Fully zero out the entry only after the invalidation is complete. Also, add a dma_wmb() to context_set_present() to ensure the entry is fully initialized before the 'Present' bit becomes visible.
CVSS Score
7.5
EPSS Score
0.001
Published
2026-05-27
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix tcx/netkit detach permissions when prog fd isn't given This commit fixes a security issue where BPF_PROG_DETACH on tcx or netkit devices could be executed by any user when no program fd was provided, bypassing permission checks. The fix adds a capability check for CAP_NET_ADMIN or CAP_SYS_ADMIN in this case.
CVSS Score
7.3
EPSS Score
0.001
Published
2026-05-27
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix EEXIST abort due to non-consecutive gaps in chunk allocation I have been observing a number of systems aborting at insert_dev_extents() in btrfs_create_pending_block_groups(). The following is a sample stack trace of such an abort coming from forced chunk allocation (typically behind CONFIG_BTRFS_EXPERIMENTAL) but this can theoretically happen to any DUP chunk allocation. [81.801] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [81.801] BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -17) [81.801] WARNING: fs/btrfs/block-group.c:2876 at btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x721/0x770 [btrfs], CPU#1: bash/319 [81.802] Modules linked in: virtio_net btrfs xor zstd_compress raid6_pq null_blk [81.803] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 319 Comm: bash Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.19.0-rc6+ #319 NONE [81.803] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.17.0-2-2 04/01/2014 [81.804] RIP: 0010:btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x723/0x770 [btrfs] [81.806] RSP: 0018:ffffa36241a6bce8 EFLAGS: 00010282 [81.806] RAX: 000000000000000d RBX: ffff8e699921e400 RCX: 0000000000000000 [81.807] RDX: 0000000002040001 RSI: 00000000ffffffef RDI: ffffffffc0608bf0 [81.807] RBP: 00000000ffffffef R08: ffff8e69830f6000 R09: 0000000000000007 [81.808] R10: ffff8e699921e5e8 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8e6999228000 [81.808] R13: ffff8e6984d82000 R14: ffff8e69966a69c0 R15: ffff8e69aa47b000 [81.809] FS: 00007fec6bdd9740(0000) GS:ffff8e6b1b379000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [81.809] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [81.810] CR2: 00005604833670f0 CR3: 0000000116679000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [81.810] Call Trace: [81.810] <TASK> [81.810] __btrfs_end_transaction+0x3e/0x2b0 [btrfs] [81.811] btrfs_force_chunk_alloc_store+0xcd/0x140 [btrfs] [81.811] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x15f/0x240 [81.812] vfs_write+0x264/0x500 [81.812] ksys_write+0x6c/0xe0 [81.812] do_syscall_64+0x66/0x770 [81.812] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [81.813] RIP: 0033:0x7fec6be66197 [81.814] RSP: 002b:00007fffb159dd30 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [81.815] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fec6bdd9740 RCX: 00007fec6be66197 [81.815] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000560483374f80 RDI: 0000000000000001 [81.816] RBP: 0000560483374f80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [81.816] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000002 [81.817] R13: 00007fec6bfb85c0 R14: 00007fec6bfb5ee0 R15: 00005604833729c0 [81.817] </TASK> [81.817] irq event stamp: 20039 [81.818] hardirqs last enabled at (20047): [<ffffffff99a68302>] __up_console_sem+0x52/0x60 [81.818] hardirqs last disabled at (20056): [<ffffffff99a682e7>] __up_console_sem+0x37/0x60 [81.819] softirqs last enabled at (19470): [<ffffffff999d2b46>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x96/0xc0 [81.819] softirqs last disabled at (19463): [<ffffffff999d2b46>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x96/0xc0 [81.820] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [81.820] BTRFS: error (device dm-7 state A) in btrfs_create_pending_block_groups:2876: errno=-17 Object already exists Inspecting these aborts with drgn, I observed a pattern of overlapping chunk_maps. Note how stripe 1 of the first chunk overlaps in physical address with stripe 0 of the second chunk. Physical Start Physical End Length Logical Type Stripe ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 0x0000000102500000 0x0000000142500000 1.0G 0x0000000641d00000 META|DUP 0/2 0x0000000142500000 0x0000000182500000 1.0G 0x0000000641d00000 META|DUP 1/2 0x0000000142500000 0x0000000182500000 1.0G 0x0000000601d00000 META|DUP 0/2 0x0000000182500000 0x00000001c2500000 1.0G 0x0000000601d00000 META|DUP 1/2 Now how could this possibly happen? All chunk allocation is ---truncated---
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.001
Published
2026-05-27
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipvs: do not keep dest_dst if dev is going down There is race between the netdev notifier ip_vs_dst_event() and the code that caches dst with dev that is going down. As the FIB can be notified for the closed device after our handler finishes, it is possible valid route to be returned and cached resuling in a leaked dev reference until the dest is not removed. To prevent new dest_dst to be attached to dest just after the handler dropped the old one, add a netif_running() check to make sure the notifier handler is not currently running for device that is closing.
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.001
Published
2026-05-27
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_tables: revert commit_mutex usage in reset path It causes circular lock dependency between commit_mutex, nfnl_subsys_ipset and nlk_cb_mutex when nft reset, ipset list, and iptables-nft with '-m set' rule run at the same time. Previous patches made it safe to run individual reset handlers concurrently so commit_mutex is no longer required to prevent this.
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.002
Published
2026-05-27
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: apparmor: Fix & Optimize table creation from possibly unaligned memory Source blob may come from userspace and might be unaligned. Try to optize the copying process by avoiding unaligned memory accesses. - Added Fixes tag - Added "Fix &" to description as this doesn't just optimize but fixes a potential unaligned memory access [jj: remove duplicate word "convert" in comment trigger checkpatch warning]
CVSS Score
7.1
EPSS Score
0.001
Published
2026-05-27
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/vt-d: Clear Present bit before tearing down PASID entry The Intel VT-d Scalable Mode PASID table entry consists of 512 bits (64 bytes). When tearing down an entry, the current implementation zeros the entire 64-byte structure immediately using multiple 64-bit writes. Since the IOMMU hardware may fetch these 64 bytes using multiple internal transactions (e.g., four 128-bit bursts), updating or zeroing the entire entry while it is active (P=1) risks a "torn" read. If a hardware fetch occurs simultaneously with the CPU zeroing the entry, the hardware could observe an inconsistent state, leading to unpredictable behavior or spurious faults. Follow the "Guidance to Software for Invalidations" in the VT-d spec (Section 6.5.3.3) by implementing the recommended ownership handshake: 1. Clear only the 'Present' (P) bit of the PASID entry. 2. Use a dma_wmb() to ensure the cleared bit is visible to hardware before proceeding. 3. Execute the required invalidation sequence (PASID cache, IOTLB, and Device-TLB flush) to ensure the hardware has released all cached references. 4. Only after the flushes are complete, zero out the remaining fields of the PASID entry. Also, add a dma_wmb() in pasid_set_present() to ensure that all other fields of the PASID entry are visible to the hardware before the Present bit is set.
CVSS Score
7.8
EPSS Score
0.001
Published
2026-05-27


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