In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
team: avoid NETDEV_CHANGEMTU event when unregistering slave
syzbot is reporting
unregister_netdevice: waiting for netdevsim0 to become free. Usage count = 3
ref_tracker: netdev@ffff88807dcf8618 has 1/2 users at
__netdev_tracker_alloc include/linux/netdevice.h:4400 [inline]
netdev_hold include/linux/netdevice.h:4429 [inline]
inetdev_init+0x201/0x4e0 net/ipv4/devinet.c:286
inetdev_event+0x251/0x1610 net/ipv4/devinet.c:1600
notifier_call_chain+0x19d/0x3a0 kernel/notifier.c:85
call_netdevice_notifiers_mtu net/core/dev.c:2318 [inline]
netif_set_mtu_ext+0x5aa/0x800 net/core/dev.c:9886
netif_set_mtu+0xd7/0x1b0 net/core/dev.c:9907
dev_set_mtu+0x126/0x260 net/core/dev_api.c:248
team_port_del+0xb07/0xcb0 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:1333
team_del_slave drivers/net/team/team_core.c:1936 [inline]
team_device_event+0x207/0x5b0 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2929
notifier_call_chain+0x19d/0x3a0 kernel/notifier.c:85
call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2281 [inline]
call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2295 [inline]
__dev_change_net_namespace+0xcb7/0x2050 net/core/dev.c:12592
do_setlink+0x2ce/0x4590 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3060
rtnl_changelink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3776 [inline]
__rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3935 [inline]
rtnl_newlink+0x15a9/0x1be0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4072
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x7d5/0xbe0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6958
netlink_rcv_skb+0x232/0x4b0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1318 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x80f/0x9b0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1344
netlink_sendmsg+0x813/0xb40 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1894
problem. Ido Schimmel found steps to reproduce
ip link add name team1 type team
ip link add name dummy1 mtu 1499 master team1 type dummy
ip netns add ns1
ip link set dev dummy1 netns ns1
ip -n ns1 link del dev dummy1
and also found that the same issue was fixed in the bond driver in
commit f51048c3e07b ("bonding: avoid NETDEV_CHANGEMTU event when
unregistering slave").
Let's do similar thing for the team driver, with commit ad7c7b2172c3 ("net:
hold netdev instance lock during sysfs operations") and commit 303a8487a657
("net: s/__dev_set_mtu/__netif_set_mtu/") also applied.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: Drop the lock in skb_may_tx_timestamp()
skb_may_tx_timestamp() may acquire sock::sk_callback_lock. The lock must
not be taken in IRQ context, only softirq is okay. A few drivers receive
the timestamp via a dedicated interrupt and complete the TX timestamp
from that handler. This will lead to a deadlock if the lock is already
write-locked on the same CPU.
Taking the lock can be avoided. The socket (pointed by the skb) will
remain valid until the skb is released. The ->sk_socket and ->file
member will be set to NULL once the user closes the socket which may
happen before the timestamp arrives.
If we happen to observe the pointer while the socket is closing but
before the pointer is set to NULL then we may use it because both
pointer (and the file's cred member) are RCU freed.
Drop the lock. Use READ_ONCE() to obtain the individual pointer. Add a
matching WRITE_ONCE() where the pointer are cleared.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: cpsw_new: Fix potential unregister of netdev that has not been registered yet
If an error occurs during register_netdev() for the first MAC in
cpsw_register_ports(), even though cpsw->slaves[0].ndev is set to NULL,
cpsw->slaves[1].ndev would remain unchanged. This could later cause
cpsw_unregister_ports() to attempt unregistering the second MAC.
To address this, add a check for ndev->reg_state before calling
unregister_netdev(). With this change, setting cpsw->slaves[i].ndev
to NULL becomes unnecessary and can be removed accordingly.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/amd: serialize sequence allocation under concurrent TLB invalidations
With concurrent TLB invalidations, completion wait randomly gets timed out
because cmd_sem_val was incremented outside the IOMMU spinlock, allowing
CMD_COMPL_WAIT commands to be queued out of sequence and breaking the
ordering assumption in wait_on_sem().
Move the cmd_sem_val increment under iommu->lock so completion sequence
allocation is serialized with command queuing.
And remove the unnecessary return.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: qcom: q6asm: drop DSP responses for closed data streams
'Commit a354f030dbce ("ASoC: qcom: q6asm: handle the responses
after closing")' attempted to ignore DSP responses arriving
after a stream had been closed.
However, those responses were still handled, causing lockups.
Fix this by unconditionally dropping all DSP responses associated with
closed data streams.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netconsole: avoid OOB reads, msg is not nul-terminated
msg passed to netconsole from the console subsystem is not guaranteed
to be nul-terminated. Before recent
commit 7eab73b18630 ("netconsole: convert to NBCON console infrastructure")
the message would be placed in printk_shared_pbufs, a static global
buffer, so KASAN had harder time catching OOB accesses. Now we see:
printk: console [netcon_ext0] enabled
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in string+0x1f7/0x240
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88813b6d4c00 by task pr/netcon_ext0/594
CPU: 65 UID: 0 PID: 594 Comm: pr/netcon_ext0 Not tainted 6.19.0-11754-g4246fd6547c9
Call Trace:
kasan_report+0xe4/0x120
string+0x1f7/0x240
vsnprintf+0x655/0xba0
scnprintf+0xba/0x120
netconsole_write+0x3fe/0xa10
nbcon_emit_next_record+0x46e/0x860
nbcon_kthread_func+0x623/0x750
Allocated by task 1:
nbcon_alloc+0x1ea/0x450
register_console+0x26b/0xe10
init_netconsole+0xbb0/0xda0
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88813b6d4000
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-4k of size 4096
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 3072-byte region [ffff88813b6d4000, ffff88813b6d4c00)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: fix potential race in tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
Code in tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock() after the call to tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock()
is done too late.
After tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock(), the child socket is already visible
from TCP ehash table and other cpus might use it.
Since newinet->pinet6 is still pointing to the listener ipv6_pinfo
bad things can happen as syzbot found.
Move the problematic code in tcp_v6_mapped_child_init()
and call this new helper from tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock() before
the ehash insertion.
This allows the removal of one tcp_sync_mss(), since
tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock() will call it with the correct
context.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Fix "scheduling while atomic" in IPsec MAC address query
Fix a "scheduling while atomic" bug in mlx5e_ipsec_init_macs() by
replacing mlx5_query_mac_address() with ether_addr_copy() to get the
local MAC address directly from netdev->dev_addr.
The issue occurs because mlx5_query_mac_address() queries the hardware
which involves mlx5_cmd_exec() that can sleep, but it is called from
the mlx5e_ipsec_handle_event workqueue which runs in atomic context.
The MAC address is already available in netdev->dev_addr, so no need
to query hardware. This avoids the sleeping call and resolves the bug.
Call trace:
BUG: scheduling while atomic: kworker/u112:2/69344/0x00000200
__schedule+0x7ab/0xa20
schedule+0x1c/0xb0
schedule_timeout+0x6e/0xf0
__wait_for_common+0x91/0x1b0
cmd_exec+0xa85/0xff0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_cmd_exec+0x1f/0x50 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_query_nic_vport_mac_address+0x7b/0xd0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_query_mac_address+0x19/0x30 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_ipsec_init_macs+0xc1/0x720 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_ipsec_build_accel_xfrm_attrs+0x422/0x670 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_ipsec_handle_event+0x2b9/0x460 [mlx5_core]
process_one_work+0x178/0x2e0
worker_thread+0x2ea/0x430
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix signededness bug in smb_direct_prepare_negotiation()
smb_direct_prepare_negotiation() casts an unsigned __u32 value
from sp->max_recv_size and req->preferred_send_size to a signed
int before computing min_t(int, ...). A maliciously provided
preferred_send_size of 0x80000000 will return as smaller than
max_recv_size, and then be used to set the maximum allowed
alowed receive size for the next message.
By sending a second message with a large value (>1420 bytes)
the attacker can then achieve a heap buffer overflow.
This fix replaces min_t(int, ...) with min_t(u32)