In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
thunderbolt: Reject zero-length property entries in validator
tb_property_entry_valid() accepts entries with length == 0 for
DIRECTORY, DATA, and TEXT types. A zero-length TEXT entry passes
validation but causes an underflow in the null-termination logic:
property->value.text[property->length * 4 - 1] = '\0';
When property->length is 0 this writes to offset -1 relative to
the allocation.
Reject zero-length entries early in the validator since they have no
valid representation in the XDomain property protocol.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix the ACK parser to extract the SACK table for parsing
Fix modification of the received skbuff in rxrpc_input_soft_acks() and a
potential incorrect access of the buffer in a fragmented UDP packet (the
packet would probably have to be deliberately pre-generated as fragmented)
when AF_RXRPC tries to extract the contents of the SACK table by copying
out the contents of the SACK table into a buffer before attempting to parse
AF_RXRPC assumes that it can just call skb_condense() and then validly
access the SACK table from skb->data and that it will be a flat buffer -
but skb_condense() can silently fail to do anything under some
circumstances.
Note that whilst rxrpc_input_soft_acks() should be able to parse extended
ACKs, the rest of AF_RXRPC doesn't currently support that.
Further, there's then no need to call skb_condense() in rxrpc_input_ack(),
so don't.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/hugetlb: restore reservation on error in hugetlb folio copy paths
Two sites in mm/hugetlb.c allocate a hugetlb folio via
alloc_hugetlb_folio() (consuming a VMA reservation) and then call
copy_user_large_folio(), which became int-returning in commit 1cb9dc4b475c
("mm: hwpoison: support recovery from HugePage copy-on-write faults") and
can now fail (e.g. -EHWPOISON on a hwpoisoned source page). On the
failure path, folio_put() restores the global hugetlb pool count through
free_huge_folio(), but the per-VMA reservation map entry is left marked
consumed:
- hugetlb_mfill_atomic_pte() resubmission path (UFFDIO_COPY)
- copy_hugetlb_page_range() fork-time CoW path when
hugetlb_try_dup_anon_rmap() fails (rare: pinned hugetlb anon
folio under fork)
User-visible effect: on UFFDIO_COPY into a private hugetlb VMA where the
resubmission copy fails, the reservation for that address is leaked from
the VMA's reserve map. A subsequent fault at the same address takes the
no-reservation path, and under hugetlb pool pressure the task is SIGBUSed
at an address it had previously reserved. The fork-time CoW path leaks
the same way in the child VMA's reserve map, though it requires the much
rarer combination of pinned hugetlb anon page + hwpoisoned source.
Add the missing restore_reserve_on_error() call before folio_put() on both
error paths.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmem: core: fix use-after-free bugs in error paths
Fix several instances of error paths in which we call
__nvmem_device_put() - which may end up freeing the underlying memory
and other resources - and then keep on using the nvmem structure. Always
put the reference to the nvmem device as the last step before returning
the error code.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Clamp HDMI HDCP2 rx_id_list read to buffer size
[Why & How]
During HDCP 2.x repeater authentication over HDMI, the driver reads the
sink's RxStatus register and extracts a 10-bit message size field (max
value 1023). This value is used as the read length for the ReceiverID
list without being clamped to the size of the destination buffer
rx_id_list[177]. A malicious HDMI repeater could advertise a message
size larger than the buffer, causing an out-of-bounds write during the
I2C read.
Clamp the read length in mod_hdcp_read_rx_id_list() to the size of the
rx_id_list buffer, matching the approach already used in the DP branch.
(cherry picked from commit 229212219e4247d9486f8ba41ef087358490be09)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Bound VBIOS record-chain walk loops
[Why & How]
All record-chain walk loops in bios_parser.c and bios_parser2.c use
for(;;) and only terminate on a 0xFF record_type sentinel or zero
record_size. A malformed VBIOS image missing the terminator record
causes unbounded iteration at probe time, potentially hundreds of
thousands of iterations with record_size=1. In the final iterations
near the BIOS image boundary, struct casts beyond the 2-byte header
validated by GET_IMAGE can also read out of bounds.
Cap all 14 record-chain walk loops to BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD (256)
iterations. The atombios.h defines up to 22 distinct record types
and atomfirmware.h has 13. Assuming an average of less than 10
records per type (which is reasonable since most are connector-
based) 256 is a generous upper bound.
(cherry picked from commit 95700a3d660287ed657d6892f7be9ffc0e294a93)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/v3d: Skip CSD when it has zeroed workgroups
A compute shader dispatch encodes its workgroup counts in the CFG0..CFG2
registers. Kicking off a dispatch with a zero count in any of the three
dimensions is invalid. First, the hardware will process 0 as 65536,
while the user-space driver exposes a maximum of 65535. Over that, a
submission with a zeroed workgroup dimension should be a no-op.
These zeroed counts can reach the dispatch path through an indirect CSD
job, whose workgroup counts are only known once the indirect buffer is
read and may legitimately be zero, but such scenario should only result in
a no-op.
Overwrite the indirect CSD job workgroup counts with the indirect BO
ones, even if they are zeroed, and don't submit the job to the hardware
when any of the workgroup counts is zero, so the job completes immediately
instead of running the shader.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: Fix buffer overflow in SDMA queue checkpoint/restore on GFX11
The v11 MQD manager incorrectly assigned the CP-compute variants of
checkpoint_mqd/restore_mqd for KFD_MQD_TYPE_SDMA queues. These functions
use sizeof(struct v11_compute_mqd) (2048 bytes) instead of sizeof(struct
v11_sdma_mqd) (512 bytes), causing a 1536-byte overflow.
During CRIU checkpoint of an SDMA queue on Navi3x:
- checkpoint_mqd() reads 2048 bytes from a 512-byte SDMA MQD buffer,
leaking 1536 bytes of adjacent GTT memory to userspace
During CRIU restore:
- restore_mqd() writes 2048 bytes into a 512-byte SDMA MQD buffer,
corrupting 1536 bytes of adjacent GTT memory (often the ring buffer
or neighboring MQDs)
This is a copy-paste regression unique to v11. All other ASIC backends
(cik, vi, v9, v10, v12) correctly use the SDMA-specific variants.
Add checkpoint_mqd_sdma() and restore_mqd_sdma() functions that properly
handle the smaller v11_sdma_mqd structure, matching the pattern used in
other MQD managers.
(cherry picked from commit 6fa41db7ffdec97d62433adf03b7b9b759af8c2c)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: fix NULL dereference in get_queue_ids()
When usr_queue_id_array is NULL and num_queues is non-zero,
get_queue_ids() returns NULL. The callers check only IS_ERR() on the
return value; since IS_ERR(NULL) == false the check passes, and
suspend_queues() calls q_array_invalidate() which immediately
dereferences NULL while iterating num_queues times.
Userspace can trigger this via kfd_ioctl_set_debug_trap() by supplying
num_queues > 0 with a zero queue_array_ptr, causing a kernel panic.
A NULL usr_queue_id_array with num_queues == 0 is a legitimate no-op
(q_array_invalidate never executes, and resume_queues already guards
all queue_ids dereferences behind a NULL check). Return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL)
only when num_queues is non-zero and the pointer is absent; both callers
already propagate IS_ERR() returns correctly to userspace.
(cherry picked from commit f165a82cdf503884bb1797771c61b2fcc72113d4)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
thunderbolt: Limit XDomain response copy to actual frame size
tb_xdomain_copy() copies req->response_size bytes from the received
packet buffer regardless of the actual frame size. When a short
response arrives, this reads past the valid frame data in the DMA
pool buffer into stale contents from previous transactions.
Use the minimum of frame size and expected response size for the
copy length.