Chain intermediate CA:TRUE without keyCertSign accepted as a signing CA. Intermediate CA certificates are required to have the keyCertSign key usage when a Key Usage extension is present, but chain-supplied temporary CAs (WOLFSSL_TEMP_CA) added while building a certificate path were previously exempted from this check, so an intermediate asserting CA:TRUE but lacking keyCertSign was accepted as a signing CA. The check now applies to chain-supplied temporary CAs as well; only operator-loaded root certificates (WOLFSSL_USER_CA) and self-signed roots remain exempt. Per RFC 5280 an absent Key Usage extension implies all usages, so the requirement is enforced only when the extension is actually present (extKeyUsageSet). Affects the OpenSSL-compatibility certificate-path-building path (X509_verify_cert / X509_STORE, OPENSSL_EXTRA/OPENSSL_ALL), where untrusted chain intermediates are added as temporary CAs; native (non-OpenSSL-compat) certificate verification does not create temporary CAs and is unaffected. Within those builds, the check applies unless ALLOW_INVALID_CERTSIGN is defined.
wolfSSL's AVX2-optimized ML-KEM implementation (mlkem_cmp_avx2) compares only 1536 of the 1568 ciphertext bytes during the Fujisaki-Okamoto re-encryption check in ML-KEM-1024 decapsulation. Ciphertexts that differ from the expected re-encryption solely in bytes 1536-1567 bypass implicit rejection and are accepted as valid, breaking IND-CCA2 security. An attacker able to submit chosen ciphertexts to a decapsulation oracle that uses a static ML-KEM-1024 key, and to observe whether the genuine shared secret or the implicit-rejection secret was produced, can use this as a plaintext-checking oracle to recover the private key. A proof of concept recovered a full ML-KEM-1024 private key with approximately 98% success using roughly 350 chosen ciphertexts. The flaw is a deterministic logic error and does not rely on timing measurements.
The X25519 x86_64 assembly implementation fails to clear the most significant bit during the final modular reduction, so the computed result may not be fully reduced modulo the field prime 2^255 - 19. This can leave the field element in a non-canonical form, producing an incorrect result from the scalar multiplication and potentially a wrong shared secret. The final carry-propagation chains in the x64 and AVX2 reduction routines could overflow into the top bit, and the high limb was not masked afterward, so the 255-bit field element was left non-canonical.
Certificates with wildcard DNS SANs (e.g. *.example.com) bypassed CA name-constraint checks. A certificate with a wildcard DNS SAN that should be rejected by the issuing CA's permitted/excluded DNS name constraints could be accepted.
X.509 trust-chain bypass in the OpenSSL compatibility certificate verifier (wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert()). This affects only builds with --enable-opensslextra (OPENSSL_EXTRA) and whose application validates certificates by calling X509_verify_cert() with caller-supplied untrusted intermediate certificates; for those users it is critical, otherwise the library is unaffected. In particular, native wolfSSL TLS/DTLS usage is not impacted. wolfSSL's X509_verify_cert() temporarily loads each caller-supplied untrusted intermediate into the certificate manager but failed to drop them before the trusted-store check, so an untrusted intermediate could anchor the path itself. An attacker can present a chain that never reaches a configured trust anchor and have it accepted, resulting in acceptance of an attacker-controlled certificate. This is certificate verification independent of TLS (e.g. S/MIME/CMS, code/firmware signing, JWT/JWS x5c), is not specific to any key type or algorithm, and a single untrusted intermediate suffices. The default wolfSSL TLS handshake (WOLFSSL_VERIFY_PEER) is not affected; only TLS applications doing manual or deferred peer verification through this API are, which also requires --enable-sessioncerts.
Out-of-bounds heap read during SM2/SM3 certificate signature verification. When parsing a certificate with an SM3wSM2 signature, the Subject Key Identifier computation reads the trailing 65 bytes of the public key without checking that the key is at least that long. A public key shorter than 65 bytes results in an out-of-bounds heap read, leading to a potential crash (denial of service); there is no out-of-bounds write. Note this only affects builds with SM2 support (--enable-sm2 or --enable-all).
wolfSSL_PKCS7_verify() returning success for a degenerate (certs-only) PKCS#7 object that contains no signer. Such an object has empty signerInfos, so the underlying signed-data verification succeeds without authenticating any content. The compatibility-layer verify path now rejects the object when no signer signature has actually been verified, so a PKCS#7 carrying no valid signature is no longer reported as verified. This is enforced regardless of the PKCS7_NOVERIFY flag, which only suppresses signer certificate chain validation and was never intended to waive the requirement that a signature exist. Only affects OpenSSL compatibility builds that call the PKCS7_verify() compatibility API on potentially degenerate PKCS#7 bundles.
AES-GCM encryption/decryption with extremely large cumulative single message sizes (>64 GiB) were not properly rejected by the streaming APIs, allowing counter wrap, keystream reuse, and consequent plaintext recovery.
Partial-chain certificate verification may accept chains that terminate at a peer-supplied, untrusted intermediate certificate rather than a trusted anchor. An attacker could present a chain that ends at an intermediate they control and have it accepted as valid. This affects the OpenSSL compatibility certificate-path-building path (wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert / X509_STORE, OPENSSL_EXTRA) when the X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN verify flag is enabled.
Heap buffer overread in wc_PKCS7_DecodeEnvelopedData when parsing crafted PKCS7 EnvelopedData. This could theoretically be triggered by attacker-supplied data delivered via S/MIME or CMS.