IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary commands due to improper privilege management during monitor owner reassignment.
IBM i 7.6, and 7.5 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary commands with elevated privileges due to improper neutralization of special elements used in an OS command.
Apache Airflow's Backfill API authorized a request against a Dag id supplied by the caller whenever the `backfill_id` path segment failed to parse. The authorization dependency parsed it with `int()` while the route handler parsed it as pydantic's `NonNegativeInt`, which accepts values `int()` rejects (`1.0` coerces to `1`); FastAPI resolves dependencies before endpoint validation, so the two acted on different Dags. An authenticated user holding edit permission on any single Dag could therefore read, pause and cancel backfills belonging to any other Dag, including moving another Dag's queued runs to `failed`. No non-default configuration is required and backfill ids are sequential, so finding a target is trivial. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later, which parses the backfill id with the same type the routes declare.
Apache Airflow wrote Variable values and Connection `extra` contents to the audit log in cleartext when they were submitted through the bulk endpoints (`PATCH /api/v2/variables` and `PATCH /api/v2/connections`). The audit-log masking recognised only top-level request fields, and a bulk request nests its entities two levels below, so no masking was applied to them. Any authenticated user with audit-log read access -- who need not hold Variables or Connections read at all -- could recover those secrets verbatim, and the Connection `extra` copy is stored unencrypted in the log while the connection table encrypts it. The Airflow UI's *Import Variables* action posts to this endpoint, so an ordinary operator import wrote every secret in the file to the log. This is a different code path from CVE-2026-50204: that fix shipped in 3.3.0 and covers the single-entity endpoints only, so deployments that upgraded in response to that advisory remain affected and must upgrade again. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later.
Apache Airflow's Task SDK did not mask the contents of a Variable whose JSON value is a list, so secrets stored in that shape appeared in cleartext in task logs and in the Rendered Templates UI. Masking was applied only when the deserialized value was a string or a dict; a list at the top level matched neither and was returned unmasked. Any authenticated user able to read the logs or rendered templates of a task that references such a Variable could recover the values, with no special configuration required. This is the list-shaped counterpart of CVE-2026-59244, whose fix covered the dict case only, so deployments that upgraded in response to that advisory remain affected and must upgrade again. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later.
Apache Airflow's asset materialization endpoint (`POST /api/v2/assets/{asset_id}/materialize`) and the XCom result check on `wait_dag_run_until_finished` authorized the target Dag without its team, unlike every other authorization site. A team-aware auth manager distinguishes a team-scoped Dag from a global one by that field -- the Keycloak auth manager, for example, checks the `DAG` resource instead of `DAG:<team>` -- so the team-scoped permission that should gate the request was never consulted. In a deployment running multi-team mode with a team-aware auth manager, an authenticated user in one team could trigger Dag runs belonging to another team, supplying their own `dag_run_id` and `conf`, and could read another team's XCom values. Deployments using the FAB auth manager are unaffected, as it has no multi-team support. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later, which resolves the Dag's team at both sites.
Apache Airflow's environment-variable secrets backend resolved a team-scoped Connection or Variable from the wrong team's scope. The guard meant to prevent this only ran when no team scope was supplied, and its pattern could not match a team name containing an underscore, which team names are allowed to contain. When the guard did not apply, the lookup fell through to an unconditional global read that resolved the stored `AIRFLOW_CONN__<TEAM>___<ID>` variable regardless of which team asked. In multi-team mode an authenticated user of one team could therefore have `POST /api/v2/connections/test` resolve another team's Connection and authenticate outward with that team's credentials; the endpoint uses the credentials rather than returning them. Exploitation requires `[core] multi_team` enabled, `[core] test_connection` set to `Enabled` (it ships `Disabled`), team-scoped secrets provisioned as environment variables in the API-server process, and knowledge of the encoded identifier. Redirecting the test at an attacker-controlled host is separately blocked. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later.
Apache Airflow's Config API did not mask team-scoped sensitive configuration values in multi-team deployments. When an administrator has enabled multi-team mode and exposed the Config API, an authenticated Viewer holding only configuration-read access — with no prior access to the secret — could read a team-scoped Celery broker URL, including its embedded credentials, in cleartext, while the equivalent global option was correctly masked. The secrets masker matched only base section and option names and did not normalize team-prefixed sections before the sensitivity check (CWE-200). This is a distinct masker bypass from CVE-2026-48828 and CVE-2026-48892: deployments that upgraded to apache-airflow 3.3.0 to address those issues remain affected by this team-scoped variant. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later, which normalizes team-scoped sections before masking.