In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
6lowpan: fix off-by-one in multicast context address compression
The second memcpy in lowpan_iphc_mcast_ctx_addr_compress() uses
&data[1] as destination and &ipaddr->s6_addr[11] as source, but
both should be offset by one: &data[2] and &ipaddr->s6_addr[12]
respectively.
This off-by-one has two consequences:
1. data[1] is overwritten with s6_addr[11], corrupting the RIID
field in the compressed multicast address
2. data[5] is never written, so uninitialized kernel stack memory
is transmitted over the network via lowpan_push_hc_data(),
leaking kernel stack contents
The correct inline data layout must match what the decompression
function lowpan_uncompress_multicast_ctx_daddr() expects:
data[0..1] = s6_addr[1..2] (flags/scope + RIID)
data[2..5] = s6_addr[12..15] (group ID)
Also zero-initialize the data array as a defensive measure against
similar bugs in the future.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_api: use RCU with deferred freeing for action lifecycle
When NEWTFILTER and DELFILTER are run concurrently it is possible to create a
race with an associated action.
Let's illustrate with CPU0 running NEWTFILTER and CPU1 running DELFILTER:
0: mutex_lock() <-- holds the idr lock
0: rcu_read_lock()
0: p = idr_find(idr, index) <-- action p is valid (RCU protects IDR)
0: mutex_unlock() <-- releases the idr lock
1: refcount_dec_and_mutex_lock() <-- refcnt 1->0, mutex held
1: idr_remove(idr, index) <-- Action removed from IDR
1: mutex_unlock() <-- mutex released allowing us to delete the action
1: tcf_action_cleanup(p); kfree(p) <-- Kfrees p immediately, no deferral
0: refcount_inc_not_zero(&p->tcfa_refcnt) <-- ouch, UAF p points to freed memory
This patch fixes the race condition between NEWTFILTER and DELFILTER by
adding struct rcu_head to tc_action used in the deferral and introducing a
call_rcu() in the delete path to defer the final kfree().
Note: this is a revert of commit d7fb60b9cafb ("net_sched: get rid of tcfa_rcu")
but also modernization/simplification to directly use kfree_rcu().
Let's illustrate the new restored code path:
0: rcu_read_lock()
1: refcount_dec_and_mutex_lock() <-- refcnt 1->0, mutex held
1: idr_remove(idr, index)
1: mutex_unlock()
1: call_rcu(&p->tcfa_rcu, tcf_action_rcu_free) <-- defer kfree after grace period
0: p = idr_find(idr, index)
0: refcount_inc_not_zero(&p->tcfa_refcnt) <-- fails, refcnt already 0
1: rcu_read_unlock() <-- release so freeing can run after grace period
After CPU1 calls idr_remove(), the object is no longer reachable through the IDR.
CPU0's subsequent idr_find() will return NULL, and even if it still held a
stale pointer, the immediate kfree() is now deferred until after the RCU grace
period, so no UAF can occur.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: bridge: make ebt_snat ARP rewrite writable
The ebtables SNAT target keeps the Ethernet source address rewrite
behind skb_ensure_writable(skb, 0). This is intentional: at the bridge
ebtables hooks the Ethernet header is addressed through
skb_mac_header()/eth_hdr(), while skb->data points at the Ethernet
payload. Asking skb_ensure_writable() for ETH_HLEN bytes would check
the payload, not the Ethernet header, and would reintroduce the small
packet regression fixed by commit 63137bc5882a.
However, the optional ARP sender hardware address rewrite is different.
It writes through skb_store_bits() at an offset relative to skb->data:
skb_store_bits(skb, sizeof(struct arphdr), info->mac, ETH_ALEN)
skb_header_pointer() only safely reads the ARP header; it does not make
the later sender hardware address range writable. If that range is
still held in a nonlinear skb fragment backed by a splice-imported file
page, skb_store_bits() maps the frag page and copies the new MAC address
directly into it.
Ensure the ARP SHA range is writable before reading the ARP header and
before calling skb_store_bits().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_ct: bail out on template ct in get eval
I noticed this issue while looking at a historic syzbot report [1].
A rule like the one below is enough to trigger the bug:
table ip t {
chain pre {
type filter hook prerouting priority raw;
ct zone set 1
ct original saddr 1.2.3.4 accept
}
}
The first expression attaches a per-cpu template ct via
nft_ct_set_zone_eval() (nf_ct_tmpl_alloc -> kzalloc, tuple is all
zero, nf_ct_l3num(ct) == 0). The next expression then calls
nft_ct_get_eval() on the same skb, treats the template as a real ct
and hits the 16-byte memcpy path. With dreg at NFT_REG32_15 this
overflows past struct nft_regs on the kernel stack; with smaller
dreg values it silently clobbers adjacent registers.
Reject template ct at the eval entry and in nft_ct_get_fast_eval(),
mirroring the check nft_ct_set_eval() already has. Additionally,
bound the address copy in NFT_CT_SRC / NFT_CT_DST by priv->len
instead of by nf_ct_l3num(ct): nf_ct_get_tuple() zeroes the tuple
before pkt_to_tuple() fills in only the protocol-relevant leading
bytes, so the trailing bytes of tuple->{src,dst}.u3.all are
well-defined zero. priv->len is validated at rule load, so the
copy size is now bounded by the destination register rather than
by an untrusted field on the conntrack.
[1]: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=389cf09cb72926114fce90dc85a2c3231dcb647c
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: conntrack_irc: fix possible out-of-bounds read
When parsing fails after we've matched the command string we
should bail out instead of trying to match a different command.
This helper should be deprecated, given prevalence of TLS I doubt it has
any relevance in 2026.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: bnep: reject short frames before parsing
A BNEP peer can send a short BNEP SDU. bnep_rx_frame() reads the
packet type byte immediately and, for control packets, reads the control
opcode and setup UUID-size byte before proving that those bytes are
present. bnep_rx_control() also dereferences the control opcode without
rejecting an empty control payload.
Use skb_pull_data() for the fixed fields in bnep_rx_frame() so a NULL
return gates each dereference. Split the control handler so the frame
path can pass an opcode that has already been pulled, and keep the
byte-buffer wrapper for extension control payloads.
For BNEP_SETUP_CONN_REQ, name the UUID-size byte before pulling the
setup payload. struct bnep_setup_conn_req carries destination and source
service UUIDs after that byte, each uuid_size bytes, so the parser now
documents that tuple explicitly instead of leaving the pull length as an
opaque multiplication.
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in bnep_rx_frame.isra.0+0x130c/0x1790
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800c0f7908 which belongs
to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 1-byte
region [ffff88800c0f7908, ffff88800c0f7909)
Read of size 1
Call trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0xb3/0x140 (?:?)
print_address_description+0x57/0x3a0 (?:?)
bnep_rx_frame+0x130c/0x1790 (net/bluetooth/bnep/core.c:306)
print_report+0xb9/0x2b0 (?:?)
__virt_addr_valid+0x1ba/0x3a0 (?:?)
srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?)
kasan_addr_to_slab+0x21/0x60 (?:?)
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 (?:?)
process_one_work+0xfce/0x17e0 (kernel/workqueue.c:3200)
worker_thread+0x65c/0xe40 (?:?)
__kthread_parkme+0x184/0x230 (?:?)
kthread+0x35e/0x470 (?:?)
_raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x28/0x50 (?:?)
ret_from_fork+0x586/0x870 (?:?)
__switch_to+0x74f/0xdc0 (?:?)
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 (?:?)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: RFCOMM: validate skb length in MCC handlers
The RFCOMM MCC handlers cast skb->data to protocol-specific structs
without validating skb->len first. A malicious remote device can send
truncated MCC frames and trigger out-of-bounds reads in these handlers.
Fix this by using skb_pull_data() to validate and access the required
data before dereferencing it.
rfcomm_recv_rpn() requires special handling since ETSI TS 07.10 allows
1-byte RPN requests. Handle this by validating only the DLCI byte first,
and validating the full struct only when len > 1.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: MGMT: validate advertising TLV before type checks
tlv_data_is_valid() reads each advertising data field length from
data[i], then inspects data[i + 1] for managed EIR types before
checking that the current field still fits inside the supplied buffer.
A malformed field whose length byte is the last byte of the buffer can
therefore make the parser read one byte past the advertising data.
KASAN reported the following when a malformed MGMT_OP_ADD_ADVERTISING
request reached that path:
BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in tlv_data_is_valid()
Read of size 1
Call trace:
tlv_data_is_valid()
add_advertising()
hci_mgmt_cmd()
hci_sock_sendmsg()
Move the existing element-length check before any type-octet inspection
so each non-empty element is proven to contain its type byte before the
parser looks at data[i + 1].
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: RFCOMM: hold listener socket in rfcomm_connect_ind()
rfcomm_get_sock_by_channel() scans rfcomm_sk_list under the list lock,
but returns the selected listener after dropping that lock without
taking a reference. rfcomm_connect_ind() then locks the listener,
queues a child socket on it, and may notify it after unlocking it.
The buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the
order within that path:
rfcomm_connect_ind(): listener close:
1. Find parent in 1. close() enters
rfcomm_get_sock_by_channel() rfcomm_sock_release().
2. Drop rfcomm_sk_list.lock 2. rfcomm_sock_shutdown()
without pinning parent. closes the listener.
3. Call lock_sock(parent) and 3. rfcomm_sock_kill()
bt_accept_enqueue(parent, unlinks and puts parent.
sk, true).
4. Read parent flags and may 4. parent can be freed.
call sk_state_change().
If close wins the race, parent can be freed before
rfcomm_connect_ind() reaches lock_sock(), bt_accept_enqueue(), or the
deferred-setup callback.
Take a reference on the listener before leaving rfcomm_sk_list.lock.
After lock_sock() succeeds, recheck that it is still in BT_LISTEN
before queueing a child, cache the deferred-setup bit while the parent
is locked, and drop the reference after the last parent use.
KASAN reported a slab-use-after-free in lock_sock_nested() from
rfcomm_connect_ind(), with the freeing stack going through
rfcomm_sock_kill() and rfcomm_sock_release().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: fix leak if split 6 GHz scanning fails
rdev->int_scan_req is leaked if cfg80211_scan() fails. Note that it's
supposed to be released at ___cfg80211_scan_done() but this doesn't happen
as rdev->scan_req is NULL at that point, too, leading to the early return
from the freeing function.
unreferenced object 0xffff8881161d0800 (size 512):
comm "wpa_supplicant", pid 379, jiffies 4294749765
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f0 81 13 16 81 88 ff ff ................
backtrace (crc c867fdb6):
kmemleak_alloc+0x89/0x90
__kmalloc_noprof+0x2fd/0x410
cfg80211_scan+0x133/0x730
nl80211_trigger_scan+0xc69/0x1cc0
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x204/0x2f0
genl_rcv_msg+0x431/0x6b0
netlink_rcv_skb+0x143/0x3f0
genl_rcv+0x27/0x40
netlink_unicast+0x4f6/0x820
netlink_sendmsg+0x797/0xce0
__sock_sendmsg+0xc4/0x160
____sys_sendmsg+0x5e4/0x890
___sys_sendmsg+0xf8/0x180
__sys_sendmsg+0x136/0x1e0
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x76/0xc0
x64_sys_call+0x13f0/0x17d0
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org).