A heap-buffer-overflow vulnerability exists in wolfSSL's wolfSSL_d2i_SSL_SESSION() function. When deserializing session data with SESSION_CERTS enabled, certificate and session id lengths are read from an untrusted input without bounds validation, allowing an attacker to overflow fixed-size buffers and corrupt heap memory. A maliciously crafted session would need to be loaded from an external source to trigger this vulnerability. Internal sessions were not vulnerable.
Two buffer overflow vulnerabilities existed in the wolfSSL CRL parser when parsing CRL numbers: a heap-based buffer overflow could occur when improperly storing the CRL number as a hexadecimal string, and a stack-based overflow for sufficiently sized CRL numbers. With appropriately crafted CRLs, either of these out of bound writes could be triggered. Note this only affects builds that specifically enable CRL support, and the user would need to load a CRL from an untrusted source.
A stack buffer overflow vulnerability exists in wolfSSL's PKCS7 SignedData encoding functionality. In wc_PKCS7_BuildSignedAttributes(), when adding custom signed attributes, the code passes an incorrect capacity value (esd->signedAttribsCount) to EncodeAttributes() instead of the remaining available space in the fixed-size signedAttribs[7] array. When an application sets pkcs7->signedAttribsSz to a value greater than MAX_SIGNED_ATTRIBS_SZ (default 7) minus the number of default attributes already added, EncodeAttributes() writes beyond the array bounds, causing stack memory corruption. In WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK builds, this becomes heap corruption. Exploitation requires an application that allows untrusted input to control the signedAttribs array size when calling wc_PKCS7_EncodeSignedData() or related signing functions.
Integer underflow in wolfSSL packet sniffer <= 5.8.4 allows an attacker to cause a buffer overflow in the AEAD decryption path by injecting a TLS record shorter than the explicit IV plus authentication tag into traffic inspected by ssl_DecodePacket. The underflow wraps a 16-bit length to a large value that is passed to AEAD decryption routines, causing heap buffer overflow and a crash. An unauthenticated attacker can trigger this remotely via malformed TLS Application Data records.
In the OpenSSL compatibility layer implementation, the function RAND_poll() was not behaving as expected and leading to the potential for predictable values returned from RAND_bytes() after fork() is called. This can lead to weak or predictable random numbers generated in applications that are both using RAND_bytes() and doing fork() operations. This only affects applications explicitly calling RAND_bytes() after fork() and does not affect any internal TLS operations. Although RAND_bytes() documentation in OpenSSL calls out not being safe for use with fork() without first calling RAND_poll(), an additional code change was also made in wolfSSL to make RAND_bytes() behave similar to OpenSSL after a fork() call without calling RAND_poll(). Now the Hash-DRBG used gets reseeded after detecting running in a new process. If making use of RAND_bytes() and calling fork() we recommend updating to the latest version of wolfSSL. Thanks to Per Allansson from Appgate for the report.
The side-channel protected T-Table implementation in wolfSSL up to version 5.6.5 protects against a side-channel attacker with cache-line resolution. In a controlled environment such as Intel SGX, an attacker can gain a per instruction sub-cache-line resolution allowing them to break the cache-line-level protection. For details on the attack refer to: https://doi.org/10.46586/tches.v2024.i1.457-500
In function MatchDomainName(), input param str is treated as a NULL terminated string despite being user provided and unchecked. Specifically, the function X509_check_host() takes in a pointer and length to check against, with no requirements that it be NULL terminated. If a caller was attempting to do a name check on a non-NULL terminated buffer, the code would read beyond the bounds of the input array until it found a NULL terminator.This issue affects wolfSSL: through 5.7.0.
An issue was discovered in wolfSSL before 5.7.0. A safe-error attack via Rowhammer, namely FAULT+PROBE, leads to ECDSA key disclosure. When WOLFSSL_CHECK_SIG_FAULTS is used in signing operations with private ECC keys,
such as in server-side TLS connections, the connection is halted if any fault occurs. The success rate in a certain amount of connection requests can be processed via an advanced technique for ECDSA key recovery.
A malicious TLS1.2 server can force a TLS1.3 client with downgrade capability to use a ciphersuite that it did not agree to and achieve a successful connection. This is because, aside from the extensions, the client was skipping fully parsing the server hello. https://doi.org/10.46586/tches.v2024.i1.457-500
Generating the ECDSA nonce k samples a random number r and then
truncates this randomness with a modular reduction mod n where n is the
order of the elliptic curve. Meaning k = r mod n. The division used
during the reduction estimates a factor q_e by dividing the upper two
digits (a digit having e.g. a size of 8 byte) of r by the upper digit of
n and then decrements q_e in a loop until it has the correct size.
Observing the number of times q_e is decremented through a control-flow
revealing side-channel reveals a bias in the most significant bits of
k. Depending on the curve this is either a negligible bias or a
significant bias large enough to reconstruct k with lattice reduction
methods. For SECP160R1, e.g., we find a bias of 15 bits.