In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: appleir: fix UAF on pending key_up_timer in remove()
appleir_remove() runs hid_hw_stop() before timer_delete_sync().
hid_hw_stop() synchronously unregisters the HID input device via
hid_disconnect() -> hidinput_disconnect() -> input_unregister_device(),
which drops the last reference and frees the underlying input_dev when
no userspace handle holds it open.
key_up_tick() reads appleir->input_dev and calls input_report_key() /
input_sync() on it. The timer is armed from appleir_raw_event() with
a HZ/8 (~125 ms) timeout on every keydown and key-repeat report. If a
key was pressed shortly before the device is disconnected, the timer
can fire after hid_hw_stop() has freed input_dev but before the
teardown drains it.
A simple reorder is not sufficient. Putting the timer drain first
still leaves a window where a USB URB completion (raw_event) running
during hid_hw_stop() can call mod_timer() and re-arm the timer, which
then fires after hidinput_disconnect() has freed input_dev. The same
URB-completion window also lets raw_event() reach key_up(), key_down()
and battery_flat() directly, all of which dereference
appleir->input_dev.
Introduce a 'removing' flag on struct appleir, gated by the existing
spinlock. appleir_remove() sets the flag under the lock and then
shuts down the timer with timer_shutdown_sync(), which both drains any
in-flight callback and permanently disables further mod_timer() calls.
appleir_raw_event() and key_up_tick() bail out early if the flag is
set, so no path can arm or run the timer, or dereference
appleir->input_dev, after remove() has started tearing down.
The keyrepeat and flatbattery branches of appleir_raw_event()
previously called into the input layer without holding the spinlock;
take it now so the flag check is well-defined. This incidentally
closes a pre-existing read-side race on appleir->current_key in the
keyrepeat branch.
This bug is structurally a sibling of commit 4db2af929279 ("HID:
appletb-kbd: fix UAF in inactivity-timer cleanup path") and has been
present since the driver was introduced.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: free iso schedules on failed submit
EHCI and FOTG210 isochronous submits build an ehci_iso_sched before
linking the URB to the endpoint queue, and keep the staged schedule in
urb->hcpriv until iso_stream_schedule() and the link helpers consume it.
If the controller is no longer accessible, or usb_hcd_link_urb_to_ep()
fails, submit jumps to done_not_linked before that handoff happens and
leaks the staged schedule still attached to urb->hcpriv.
Free the staged schedule from done_not_linked when submit fails before
the URB is linked and clear urb->hcpriv after the free.
The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are
developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing
v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly
available. Manual inspection confirms that the bug is still
present in v7.1.1.
An x86_64 allyesconfig build showed no new warnings. As we do not have an
EHCI host controller with a USB isochronous device to test with, no
runtime testing was able to be performed.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: cdnsp: fix stream context array leak in cdnsp_alloc_stream_info()
cdnsp_alloc_stream_info() allocates stream_info->stream_ctx_array with
cdnsp_alloc_stream_ctx(). If a later stream ring allocation or stream
mapping update fails, the error path frees the allocated stream rings
and stream_rings array, but leaves stream_ctx_array allocated.
Free the stream context array before falling through to the stream_rings
cleanup path.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: usb: kalmia: bound RX frame length in kalmia_rx_fixup()
kalmia_rx_fixup() computes usb_packet_length = skb->len - (2 *
KALMIA_HEADER_LENGTH) as a u16, guarded only by a pre-loop check that
skb->len is at least KALMIA_HEADER_LENGTH, which is 6. A device can
deliver a short bulk-IN frame with skb->len in the 6 to 11 range, or
leave a short trailing remainder on a later loop iteration. Either case
underflows usb_packet_length to about 65530.
That bypasses the usb_packet_length < ether_packet_length truncation path.
The device-supplied ether_packet_length, a le16 up to 65535 read from
header_start[2], then drives a memcmp() and the following skb_trim() and
skb_pull() past the end of the rx buffer. The rx buffer is hard_mtu * 10,
which is 14000 bytes. That is an out of bounds read.
Require both the start and end framing headers to be present before
subtracting them, on every loop iteration.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Allow LPM map access from sleepable BPF programs
trie_lookup_elem() annotates its rcu_dereference_check() walks with
only rcu_read_lock_bh_held(). Because rcu_dereference_check(p, c)
resolves to "c || rcu_read_lock_held()", this passes for XDP/NAPI and
classic RCU readers but fails for sleepable BPF programs, which enter
via __bpf_prog_enter_sleepable() and hold only rcu_read_lock_trace().
trie_update_elem() and trie_delete_elem() have the same problem in a
different form: they walk the trie with plain rcu_dereference(), which
asserts rcu_read_lock_held() unconditionally. Both are reachable from
sleepable BPF programs via the bpf_map_update_elem / bpf_map_delete_elem
helpers, and from the syscall path under classic rcu_read_lock(). In
the writer paths the trie is actually protected by trie->lock (an
rqspinlock taken across the walk); we never relied on the RCU read-side
lock to keep nodes alive there.
A sleepable LSM hook that ends up touching an LPM trie therefore
triggers lockdep on debug kernels:
=============================
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
7.1.0-... Tainted: G E
-----------------------------
kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c:249 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
1 lock held by net_tests/540:
#0: (rcu_tasks_trace_srcu_struct){....}-{0:0},
at: __bpf_prog_enter_sleepable+0x26/0x280
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl
lockdep_rcu_suspicious
trie_lookup_elem
bpf_prog_..._enforce_security_socket_connect
bpf_trampoline_...
security_socket_connect
__sys_connect
do_syscall_64
This is lockdep-only -- no UAF, since Tasks Trace RCU does serialize
against the trie's reclaim path -- but it spams the console once per
distinct callsite on every debug kernel running a sleepable BPF LSM
that touches an LPM trie, which is increasingly common.
For the lookup path, switch the rcu_dereference_check() annotation
from rcu_read_lock_bh_held() to bpf_rcu_lock_held(), which accepts all
three contexts (classic, BH, Tasks Trace). Other map types already
follow this convention.
For trie_update_elem() and trie_delete_elem(), annotate the walks as
rcu_dereference_protected(*p, 1) -- matching trie_free() in the same
file -- since trie->lock is held across the walk. rqspinlock has no
lockdep_map, so the predicate degenerates to '1' rather than
lockdep_is_held(&trie->lock); the protection is real but not
machine-verifiable. trie_get_next_key() also uses bare
rcu_dereference() but is reachable only from the BPF syscall, which
holds classic rcu_read_lock() before dispatching, so it is left
untouched.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject fragmented frames in devmap
Devmap broadcast redirects clone the packet for all but the last
destination.
For native XDP, that clone path copies only the linear xdp_frame data,
while fragmented frames keep skb_shared_info in tailroom outside the
linear area. Cloning such a frame leaves XDP_FLAGS_HAS_FRAGS set but
without valid frag metadata, and the later free path can interpret
uninitialized tail data as skb_shared_info, leading to an out-of-bounds
access during frame return.
Reject fragmented native XDP frames in dev_map_enqueue_clone().
Add the same restriction to the generic XDP clone path in
dev_map_redirect_clone(). Generic XDP represents fragmented packets as
nonlinear skbs, and rejecting them here keeps clone-based broadcast
support aligned between native and generic XDP.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: iowarrior: fix use-after-free on disconnect race
mutex_unlock() may access the mutex structure after releasing the lock
and therefore cannot be used to manage lifetime of objects directly
(unlike spinlocks and refcounts). [1][2]
Use a kref to release the driver data to avoid use-after-free in
mutex_unlock() when release() races with disconnect().
[1] a51749ab34d9 ("locking/mutex: Document that mutex_unlock() is non-atomic")
[2] 2b9d9e0a9ba0 ("locking/mutex: Clarify that mutex_unlock(), and most
other sleeping locks, can still use the lock object
after it's unlocked")
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: iowarrior: fix use-after-free on disconnect
Submitted write URBs are not stopped on close() and therefore need to be
stopped unconditionally on disconnect() to avoid use-after-free in the
completion handler.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: ldusb: fix use-after-free on disconnect race
mutex_unlock() may access the mutex structure after releasing the lock
and therefore cannot be used to manage lifetime of objects directly
(unlike spinlocks and refcounts). [1][2]
Use a kref to release the driver data to avoid use-after-free in
mutex_unlock() when release() races with disconnect().
[1] a51749ab34d9 ("locking/mutex: Document that mutex_unlock() is
non-atomic")
[2] 2b9d9e0a9ba0 ("locking/mutex: Clarify that mutex_unlock(), and most
other sleeping locks, can still use the lock object
after it's unlocked")
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: idmouse: fix use-after-free on disconnect race
mutex_unlock() may access the mutex structure after releasing the lock
and therefore cannot be used to manage lifetime of objects directly
(unlike spinlocks and refcounts). [1][2]
Use a kref to release the driver data to avoid use-after-free in
mutex_unlock() when release() races with disconnect().
[1] a51749ab34d9 ("locking/mutex: Document that mutex_unlock() is
non-atomic")
[2] 2b9d9e0a9ba0 ("locking/mutex: Clarify that mutex_unlock(), and most
other sleeping locks, can still use the lock object
after it's unlocked")