Cacti is an open source performance and fault management framework. Versions 1.2.30 and prior have missing session_regenerate_id() after login, leading to Session Fixation. session_regenerate_id() is NOT called after successful login. The login flow at auth_login.php:203-207 directly sets $_SESSION[SESS_USER_ID] without rotating the session ID. The session cookie configuration is otherwise good (httponly=true, samesite=Strict, secure=true for HTTPS at include/global.php:513-537), but these do not prevent session fixation via same-site vectors. This issue has been fixed in version 1.2.31.
Cacti is an open source performance and fault management framework. Versions 1.2.30 and prior have SQL Injection through unsanitized unserialize+implode in managers.php. At line 756 of managers.php, the application assigns $selected_items by calling cacti_unserialize(stripslashes(gnrv('selected_graphs_array'))). The cacti_unserialize() function calls unserialize() with allowed_classes set to false, which prevents object injection but still allows arbitrary string arrays to be deserialized. Then, at lines 760 to 766, the deserialized array values are passed directly into db_execute('DELETE FROM snmpagent_managers WHERE id IN (' . implode(',', $selected_items) . ')'), where they are imploded into the SQL statement without any integer validation, resulting in SQL Injection when using SNMP agent management permissions. This issue has been fixed in version 1.2.31.
HMAC zero-length tag forgery in EVP_DigestVerifyFinal, where a zero-length tag could be accepted as valid during HMAC verification. In the OpenSSL-compatibility HMAC verify path the supplied signature length was only checked as not exceeding the MAC length, so a zero-length or otherwise truncated tag could pass verification. The fix requires the supplied tag length to exactly equal the MAC length and rejects a zero-length MAC, so a forged short or empty tag is no longer accepted.
PKCS7_verify signer confusion allows forged signatures, where the signer associated with a signature is not correctly bound, permitting a forged signature to be accepted.
wc_Blake2bHmacFinal and wc_Blake2sHmacFinal discard the message when the key length exceeds the block size, producing a MAC that is independent of the input. When the supplied key is longer than the BLAKE2 block size the key-hashing branch reinitialized the running hash state, discarding the accumulated message data, so the resulting MAC depended only on the key and not on the message being authenticated. This bug is specific to the HMAC-BLAKE2 APIs that were added in wolfSSL version 5.9.0.
iPAddress name constraints bypass when WOLFSSL_IP_ALT_NAME is not defined. IP address name constraints are not enforced in that configuration, allowing a certificate to bypass an issuing CA's IP address constraints.
TLS 1.3 post-handshake authentication (PHA) issue where a server could accept a client's Finished message without the client having sent a Certificate and CertificateVerify. The post-handshake-auth exemption that allows an empty/absent peer certificate was only intended for the initial handshake, but it was also being applied while a post-handshake CertificateRequest was still outstanding. The check is now scoped to the initial handshake only: on the server, once a post-handshake CertificateRequest has been sent (certReqCtx is set), a peer certificate and a valid CertificateVerify are required again before the Finished is accepted, with empty-certificate handling following the configured verify mode (FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT) just as during first-handshake client authentication. Only affects TLS 1.3 servers built with post-handshake authentication support (WOLFSSL_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH / --enable-postauth, included in --enable-all) that enable WOLFSSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE and request a client certificate after the handshake via wolfSSL_request_certificate(). Clients, and servers that do not use post-handshake authentication, are unaffected.
Out-of-bounds write in SetSuitesHashSigAlgo when processing an oversized signature algorithms list, allowing a write past the bounds of the destination buffer.
The ML-KEM ARM64 NEON ciphertext comparison only compares half of the input, breaking the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform's implicit rejection and weakening IND-CCA2 security on that code path. The constant-time comparison effectively ignored part of the re-encrypted ciphertext, so a decapsulating party could fail to detect a manipulated ciphertext and proceed without the standard's required implicit rejection.