Linux: >> Linux Kernel >> 6.19 Security Vulnerabilities
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: amphion: Fix race between m2m job_abort and device_run
Fix kernel panic caused by race condition where v4l2_m2m_ctx_release()
frees m2m_ctx while v4l2_m2m_try_run() is about to call device_run
with the same context.
Race sequence:
v4l2_m2m_try_run(): v4l2_m2m_ctx_release():
lock/unlock v4l2_m2m_cancel_job()
job_abort()
v4l2_m2m_job_finish()
kfree(m2m_ctx) <- frees ctx
device_run() <- use-after-free crash at 0x538
Crash trace:
Unable to handle kernel read from unreadable memory at virtual address
0000000000000538
v4l2_m2m_try_run+0x78/0x138
v4l2_m2m_device_run_work+0x14/0x20
The amphion vpu driver does not rely on the m2m framework's device_run
callback to perform encode/decode operations.
Fix the race by preventing m2m framework job scheduling entirely:
- Add job_ready callback returning 0 (no jobs ready for m2m framework)
- Remove job_abort callback to avoid the race condition
CVSS Score
7.8
EPSS Score
0.001
Published
2026-05-27
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: nSVM: Always use NextRIP as vmcb02's NextRIP after first L2 VMRUN
For guests with NRIPS disabled, L1 does not provide NextRIP when running
an L2 with an injected soft interrupt, instead it advances the current RIP
before running it. KVM uses the current RIP as the NextRIP in vmcb02 to
emulate a CPU without NRIPS.
However, after L2 runs the first time, NextRIP will be updated by the CPU
and/or KVM, and the current RIP is no longer the correct value to use in
vmcb02. Hence, after save/restore, use the current RIP if and only if a
nested run is pending, otherwise use NextRIP. Give soft_int_next_rip the
same treatment, as it's the same logic, just for a narrower use case.
[sean: give soft_int_next_rip the same treatment]
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.001
Published
2026-05-27
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: qat - fix IRQ cleanup on 6xxx probe failure
When adf_dev_up() partially completes and then fails, the IRQ
handlers registered during adf_isr_resource_alloc() are not detached
before the MSI-X vectors are released.
Since the device is enabled with pcim_enable_device(), calling
pci_alloc_irq_vectors() internally registers pcim_msi_release() as a
devres action. On probe failure, devres runs pcim_msi_release() which
calls pci_free_irq_vectors(), tearing down the MSI-X vectors while IRQ
handlers (for example 'qat0-bundle0') are still attached. This causes
remove_proc_entry() warnings:
[ 22.163964] remove_proc_entry: removing non-empty directory 'irq/143', leaking at least 'qat0-bundle0'
Moving the devm_add_action_or_reset() before adf_dev_up() does not solve
the problem since devres runs in LIFO order and pcim_msi_release(),
registered later inside adf_dev_up(), would still fire before
adf_device_down().
Fix by calling adf_dev_down() explicitly when adf_dev_up() fails, to
properly free IRQ handlers before devres releases the MSI-X vectors.
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.001
Published
2026-05-27
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
jbd2: fix deadlock in jbd2_journal_cancel_revoke()
Commit f76d4c28a46a ("fs/jbd2: use sleeping version of
__find_get_block()") changed jbd2_journal_cancel_revoke() to use
__find_get_block_nonatomic() which holds the folio lock instead of
i_private_lock. This breaks the lock ordering (folio -> buffer) and
causes an ABBA deadlock when the filesystem blocksize < pagesize:
T1 T2
ext4_mkdir()
ext4_init_new_dir()
ext4_append()
ext4_getblk()
lock_buffer() <- A
sync_blockdev()
blkdev_writepages()
writeback_iter()
writeback_get_folio()
folio_lock() <- B
ext4_journal_get_create_access()
jbd2_journal_cancel_revoke()
__find_get_block_nonatomic()
folio_lock() <- B
block_write_full_folio()
lock_buffer() <- A
This can occasionally cause generic/013 to hang.
Fix by only calling __find_get_block_nonatomic() when the passed
buffer_head doesn't belong to the bdev, which is the only case that we
need to look up its bdev alias. Otherwise, the lookup is redundant since
the found buffer_head is equal to the one we passed in.
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.001
Published
2026-05-27
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
selinux: fix overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checks
The existing SELinux security model for overlayfs is to allow access if
the current task is able to access the top level file (the "user" file)
and the mounter's credentials are sufficient to access the lower
level file (the "backing" file). Unfortunately, the current code does
not properly enforce these access controls for both mmap() and mprotect()
operations on overlayfs filesystems.
This patch makes use of the newly created security_mmap_backing_file()
LSM hook to provide the missing backing file enforcement for mmap()
operations, and leverages the backing file API and new LSM blob to
provide the necessary information to properly enforce the mprotect()
access controls.
CVSS Score
7.1
EPSS Score
0.001
Published
2026-05-27
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix missing brelse() in ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all()
The commit c8e008b60492 ("ext4: ignore xattrs past end")
introduced a refcount leak in when block_csum is false.
ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all() calls ext4_get_inode_loc() to
get iloc.bh, but never releases it with brelse().
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.001
Published
2026-05-27
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: qrtr: ns: Fix use-after-free in driver remove()
In the remove callback, if a packet arrives after destroy_workqueue() is
called, but before sock_release(), the qrtr_ns_data_ready() callback will
try to queue the work, causing use-after-free issue.
Fix this issue by saving the default 'sk_data_ready' callback during
qrtr_ns_init() and use it to replace the qrtr_ns_data_ready() callback at
the start of remove(). This ensures that even if a packet arrives after
destroy_workqueue(), the work struct will not be dereferenced.
Note that it is also required to ensure that the RX threads are completed
before destroying the workqueue, because the threads could be using the
qrtr_ns_data_ready() callback.
CVSS Score
7.8
EPSS Score
0.001
Published
2026-05-27
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: ctxfi: Add fallback to default RSR for S/PDIF
spdif_passthru_playback_get_resources() uses atc->pll_rate as the RSR
for the MSR calculation loop. However, pll_rate is only updated in
atc_pll_init() and not in hw_pll_init(), so it remains 0 after the
card init.
When spdif_passthru_playback_setup() skips atc_pll_init() for
32000 Hz, (rsr * desc.msr) always becomes 0, causing the loop to spin
indefinitely.
Add fallback to use atc->rsr when atc->pll_rate is 0. This reflects
the hardware state, since hw_card_init() already configures the PLL
to the default RSR.
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.001
Published
2026-05-27
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md/raid10: fix deadlock with check operation and nowait requests
When an array check is running it will raise the barrier at which point
normal requests will become blocked and increment the nr_pending value to
signal there is work pending inside of wait_barrier(). NOWAIT requests
do not block and so will return immediately with an error, and additionally
do not increment nr_pending in wait_barrier(). Upstream change commit
43806c3d5b9b ("raid10: cleanup memleak at raid10_make_request") added a
call to raid_end_bio_io() to fix a memory leak when NOWAIT requests hit
this condition. raid_end_bio_io() eventually calls allow_barrier() and
it will unconditionally do an atomic_dec_and_test(&conf->nr_pending) even
though the corresponding increment on nr_pending didn't happen in the
NOWAIT case.
This can be easily seen by starting a check operation while an application
is doing nowait IO on the same array. This results in a deadlocked state
due to nr_pending value underflowing and so the md resync thread gets stuck
waiting for nr_pending to == 0.
Output of r10conf state of the array when we hit this condition:
crash> struct r10conf
barrier = 1,
nr_pending = {
counter = -41
},
nr_waiting = 15,
nr_queued = 0,
Example of md_sync thread stuck waiting on raise_barrier() and other
requests stuck in wait_barrier():
md1_resync
[<0>] raise_barrier+0xce/0x1c0
[<0>] raid10_sync_request+0x1ca/0x1ed0
[<0>] md_do_sync+0x779/0x1110
[<0>] md_thread+0x90/0x160
[<0>] kthread+0xbe/0xf0
[<0>] ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
[<0>] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
kworker/u1040:2+flush-253:4
[<0>] wait_barrier+0x1de/0x220
[<0>] regular_request_wait+0x30/0x180
[<0>] raid10_make_request+0x261/0x1000
[<0>] md_handle_request+0x13b/0x230
[<0>] __submit_bio+0x107/0x1f0
[<0>] submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x16f/0x390
[<0>] ext4_io_submit+0x24/0x40
[<0>] ext4_do_writepages+0x254/0xc80
[<0>] ext4_writepages+0x84/0x120
[<0>] do_writepages+0x7a/0x260
[<0>] __writeback_single_inode+0x3d/0x300
[<0>] writeback_sb_inodes+0x1dd/0x470
[<0>] __writeback_inodes_wb+0x4c/0xe0
[<0>] wb_writeback+0x18b/0x2d0
[<0>] wb_workfn+0x2a1/0x400
[<0>] process_one_work+0x149/0x330
[<0>] worker_thread+0x2d2/0x410
[<0>] kthread+0xbe/0xf0
[<0>] ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
[<0>] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.001
Published
2026-05-27
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md/raid5: fix soft lockup in retry_aligned_read()
When retry_aligned_read() encounters an overlapped stripe, it releases
the stripe via raid5_release_stripe() which puts it on the lockless
released_stripes llist. In the next raid5d loop iteration,
release_stripe_list() drains the stripe onto handle_list (since
STRIPE_HANDLE is set by the original IO), but retry_aligned_read()
runs before handle_active_stripes() and removes the stripe from
handle_list via find_get_stripe() -> list_del_init(). This prevents
handle_stripe() from ever processing the stripe to resolve the
overlap, causing an infinite loop and soft lockup.
Fix this by using __release_stripe() with temp_inactive_list instead
of raid5_release_stripe() in the failure path, so the stripe does not
go through the released_stripes llist. This allows raid5d to break out
of its loop, and the overlap will be resolved when the stripe is
eventually processed by handle_stripe().
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.001
Published
2026-05-27