In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SVM: Fix page overflow in sev_dbg_crypt() for ENCRYPT path
In sev_dbg_crypt(), the per-iteration transfer length is bounded by
the source page offset (PAGE_SIZE - s_off) but not by the destination
page offset (PAGE_SIZE - d_off). When d_off > s_off, the encrypt
path (__sev_dbg_encrypt_user) performs a read-modify-write using a
single-page intermediate buffer (dst_tpage):
1. __sev_dbg_decrypt() expands the size to round_up(len + (d_off & 15), 16)
before issuing the PSP command. If len + (d_off & 15) > PAGE_SIZE,
the PSP writes beyond the end of the 4096-byte dst_tpage allocation.
2. The subsequent memcpy()/copy_from_user() into
page_address(dst_tpage) + (d_off & 15) of 'len' bytes overflows
by up to 15 bytes under the same condition.
Trigger example: s_off = 0, d_off = 1, debug.len = PAGE_SIZE -
the PSP is instructed to write round_up(4097, 16) = 4112 bytes to
a 4096-byte buffer.
Fix by also bounding len by (PAGE_SIZE - d_off), the same check that
sev_send_update_data() already performs for its single-page guest
region.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sev_dbg_crypt+0x993/0xd10 [kvm_amd]
Write of size 4095 at addr ff110062293bb009 by task sev_dbg_test/228214
CPU: 96 UID: 0 PID: 228214 Comm: sev_dbg_test Tainted: G U W 7.0.0-smp--5ce9b0c48211-dbg #156 PREEMPTLAZY
Tainted: [U]=USER, [W]=WARN
Hardware name: Google Astoria/astoria, BIOS 0.20250817.1-0 08/25/2025
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x54/0x70
print_report+0xbc/0x260
kasan_report+0xa2/0xd0
kasan_check_range+0x25f/0x2c0
__asan_memcpy+0x40/0x70
sev_dbg_crypt+0x993/0xd10 [kvm_amd]
sev_mem_enc_ioctl+0x33c/0x450 [kvm_amd]
kvm_vm_ioctl+0x65d/0x6d0 [kvm]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xb2/0x100
do_syscall_64+0xe8/0x870
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
</TASK>
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x7fe72b6a0 pfn:0x62293bb
memcg:ff11000112827d82
flags: 0x1400000000000000(node=1|zone=1)
raw: 1400000000000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: 00000007fe72b6a0 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff ff11000112827d82
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ff110062293bbf00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ff110062293bbf80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ff110062293bc000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
^
ff110062293bc080: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ff110062293bc100: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
[sean: add sample KASAN splat, Fixes, and stable@]
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSv4/pNFS: reject zero-length r_addr in nfs4_decode_mp_ds_addr
nfs4_decode_mp_ds_addr() decodes the r_netid and r_addr opaques of a
netaddr4 from a GETDEVICEINFO multipath-DS body, then immediately
calls strrchr(buf, '.') to locate the port separator. Both decodes
use xdr_stream_decode_string_dup(), and the current code checks only
"nlen < 0" / "rlen < 0" before dereferencing the returned string.
When the on-wire opaque has length zero, xdr_stream_decode_opaque_inline()
returns 0 and xdr_stream_decode_string_dup() falls through to its
"*str = NULL; return ret" tail, leaving buf NULL with a return value
of 0. The "< 0" check does not catch this, and the next line is
strrchr(NULL, '.'), a kernel NULL pointer dereference reachable from
any pNFS-flexfile client mounted against a malicious or compromised
metadata server.
Reject the zero-length cases explicitly so the decoder fails with
-EBADMSG (treated as a malformed GETDEVICEINFO body) instead of
panicking the client.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSv4/flexfiles: reject zero filehandle version count
ff_layout_alloc_lseg() decodes the filehandle-version array count
from the flexfiles layout body. The value is used as the count for
kzalloc_objs(), and the current code only rejects NULL.
A zero count yields ZERO_SIZE_PTR, which can be stored in
dss_info->fh_versions even though later flexfiles paths assume that at
least one filehandle version exists.
Reject fh_count == 0 before the allocation, matching the existing zero
version_count validation in the flexfiles GETDEVICEINFO parser.
A QEMU/KASAN run with a malformed flexfiles layout hit:
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017]
RIP: 0010:ff_layout_encode_ff_layoutupdate.isra.0+0x15f/0x750
ff_layout_encode_layoutreturn+0x683/0x970
nfs4_xdr_enc_layoutreturn+0x278/0x3a0
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
The patched kernel rejects the malformed layout without KASAN/oops/panic,
and a valid fh_count=1 regression still opens, reads, and unmounts cleanly.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: fix posix_acl leak on SETACL decode failure
nfsaclsvc_decode_setaclargs() and nfs3svc_decode_setaclargs() each
call nfs_stream_decode_acl() twice, first for NFS_ACL and then for
NFS_DFACL. Each successful call transfers ownership of a freshly
allocated posix_acl into argp->acl_access or argp->acl_default. If
the first call succeeds but the second fails, the decoder returns
false and argp->acl_access is left dangling.
ACLPROC2_SETACL.pc_release was wired to nfssvc_release_attrstat and
ACLPROC3_SETACL.pc_release was wired to nfs3svc_release_fhandle.
Both only call fh_put() and have no knowledge of the ACL fields on
argp. The posix_acl_release() pairs sat at the out: labels inside
nfsacld_proc_setacl() and nfsd3_proc_setacl(), but svc_process()
skips pc_func when pc_decode returns false, so that cleanup is
unreachable on decode failure:
svc_process_common()
pc_decode() /* decode_setaclargs: false */
/* pc_func skipped */
pc_release() /* fh_put only -- ACLs leaked */
The orphaned posix_acl is leaked for the lifetime of the server.
Fix by adding nfsaclsvc_release_setacl() and nfs3svc_release_setacl(),
which release both argp->acl_access and argp->acl_default in addition
to fh_put(), and wiring them as pc_release for their respective SETACL
procedures. pc_release runs on every path svc_process() takes after
decode, including decode failure, so the posix_acl_release() pairs are
removed from the proc functions' out: labels to keep ownership in one
place. This matches the existing release_getacl() pattern used by
the sibling GETACL procedures.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse: re-lock request before replacing page cache folio
fuse_try_move_folio() unlocks the request on entry but does not
re-lock it on the success path. This means fuse_chan_abort() can end the
request and free the fuse_io_args (eg fuse_readpages_end()) while the
subsequent copy chain logic after fuse_try_move_folio() accesses the
fuse_io_args, leading to use-after-free issues.
Fix this by calling lock_request() before replace_page_cache_folio().
This ensures the request is locked on the success path which will
prevent the fuse_io_args from being freed while the later copying logic
runs, and also ensures that the ap->folios[i]->mapping is never null
since ap->folios[i] will always point to the newfolio after
replace_page_cache_folio().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: zero-initialize GART table on allocation
GART TLB is flushed after unmapping but not after mapping. Since
amdgpu_bo_create_kernel() does not zero-initialize the buffer, when a
single PTE is written the TLB may speculatively load other uninitialized
entries from the same cacheline. Those garbage entries can appear valid,
and a subsequent write to another PTE in the same cacheline may cause the
GPU to use a stale garbage PTE from the TLB.
Fix this by calling memset_io() to zero-initialize the GART table with
gart_pte_flags immediately after allocation.
Using AMDGPU_GEM_CREATE_VRAM_CLEARED, SDMA-based clear will not work
since SDMA needs GART to be initialized to work.
(cherry picked from commit d9af8263b82b6eaa60c5718e0c6631c5037e4b24)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu/vce: Prevent partial address patches
In the case that only one of lo/hi is valid, the patching could result
in a bad address written to in FW.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: Add upper bound check for num_of_nodes
drm/amdkfd: Add upper bound check for num_of_nodes
in kfd_ioctl_get_process_apertures_new.
(cherry picked from commit 98ff46a5ea090c14d2cdb4f5b993b05d74f3949f)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udf: reject descriptors with oversized CRC length
udf_read_tagged() skips CRC verification when descCRCLength +
sizeof(struct tag) exceeds the block size. A crafted UDF image can
set descCRCLength to an oversized value to bypass CRC validation
entirely; the descriptor is then accepted based solely on the 8-bit
tag checksum, which is trivially recomputable.
Reject such descriptors instead of silently accepting them. A
legitimate single-block descriptor should never have a CRC length that
exceeds the block.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix fsck inconsistency caused by incorrect nat_entry flag usage
f2fs_need_dentry_mark() reads nat_entry flags without mutual exclusion
with the checkpoint path, which can result in an incorrect inode block
marking state. The scenario is as follows:
create & write & fsync 'file A' write checkpoint
- f2fs_do_sync_file // inline inode
- f2fs_write_inode // inode folio is dirty
- f2fs_write_checkpoint
- f2fs_flush_merged_writes
- f2fs_sync_node_pages
- f2fs_fsync_node_pages // no dirty node
- f2fs_need_inode_block_update // return true
- f2fs_fsync_node_pages // inode dirtied
- f2fs_need_dentry_mark //return true
- f2fs_flush_nat_entries
- f2fs_write_checkpoint end
- __write_node_folio // inode with DENT_BIT_SHIFT set
SPO, "fsck --dry-run" find inode has already checkpointed but still
with DENT_BIT_SHIFT set
The state observed by f2fs_need_dentry_mark() can differ from the state
observed in __write_node_folio() after acquiring sbi->node_write. The
root cause is that the semantics of IS_CHECKPOINTED and
HAS_FSYNCED_INODE are only guaranteed after the checkpoint write has
fully completed.
This patch moves set_dentry_mark() into __write_node_folio() and
protects it with the sbi->node_write lock.