In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm log: fix out-of-bounds write due to region_count overflow
The local variable region_count in create_log_context() is declared as
unsigned int (32-bit), but dm_sector_div_up() returns sector_t (64-bit).
When a device-mapper target has a sufficiently large ti->len with a small
region_size, the division result can exceed UINT_MAX. The truncated
value is then used to calculate bitset_size, causing clean_bits,
sync_bits, and recovering_bits to be allocated far smaller than needed
for the actual number of regions.
Subsequent log operations (log_set_bit, log_clear_bit, log_test_bit) use
region indices derived from the full untruncated region space, causing
out-of-bounds writes to kernel heap memory allocated by vmalloc.
This can be reproduced by creating a mirror target whose region_count
overflows 32 bits:
dmsetup create bigzero --table '0 8589934594 zero'
dmsetup create mymirror --table '0 8589934594 mirror \
core 2 2 nosync 2 /dev/mapper/bigzero 0 \
/dev/mapper/bigzero 0'
The status output confirms the truncation (sync_count=1 instead of
4294967297, because 0x100000001 was truncated to 1):
$ dmsetup status mymirror
0 8589934594 mirror 2 254:1 254:1 1/4294967297 ...
This leads to a kernel crash in core_in_sync:
BUG: scheduling while atomic: (udev-worker)/9150/0x00000000
RIP: 0010:core_in_sync+0x14/0x30 [dm_log]
CR2: 0000000000000008
Fixing recursive fault but reboot is needed!
Fix by widening the local region_count to sector_t and adding an
explicit overflow check before the value is assigned to lc->region_count.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm cache: fix dirty mapping checking in passthrough mode switching
As mentioned in commit 9b1cc9f251af ("dm cache: share cache-metadata
object across inactive and active DM tables"), dm-cache assumed table
reload occurs after suspension, while LVM's table preload breaks this
assumption. The dirty mapping check for passthrough mode was designed
around this assumption and is performed during table creation, causing
the check to fail with preload while metadata updates are ongoing. This
risks loading dirty mappings into passthrough mode, resulting in data
loss.
Reproduce steps:
1. Create a writeback cache with zero migration_threshold to produce
dirty mappings
dmsetup create cmeta --table "0 8192 linear /dev/sdc 0"
dmsetup create cdata --table "0 131072 linear /dev/sdc 8192"
dmsetup create corig --table "0 262144 linear /dev/sdc 262144"
dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/mapper/cmeta bs=4k count=1 oflag=direct
dmsetup create cache --table "0 262144 cache /dev/mapper/cmeta \
/dev/mapper/cdata /dev/mapper/corig 128 2 metadata2 writeback smq \
2 migration_threshold 0"
2. Preload a table in passthrough mode
dmsetup reload cache --table "0 262144 cache /dev/mapper/cmeta \
/dev/mapper/cdata /dev/mapper/corig 128 2 metadata2 passthrough smq 0"
3. Write to the first cache block to make it dirty
fio --filename=/dev/mapper/cache --name=populate --rw=write --bs=4k \
--direct=1 --size=64k
4. Resume the inactive table. Now it's possible to load the dirty block
into passthrough mode.
dmsetup resume cache
Fix by moving the checks to the preresume phase to support table
preloading. Also remove the unused function dm_cache_metadata_all_clean.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2/dlm: validate qr_numregions in dlm_match_regions()
Patch series "ocfs2/dlm: fix two bugs in dlm_match_regions()".
In dlm_match_regions(), the qr_numregions field from a DLM_QUERY_REGION
network message is used to drive loops over the qr_regions buffer without
sufficient validation. This series fixes two issues:
- Patch 1 adds a bounds check to reject messages where qr_numregions
exceeds O2NM_MAX_REGIONS. The o2net layer only validates message
byte length; it does not constrain field values, so a crafted message
can set qr_numregions up to 255 and trigger out-of-bounds reads past
the 1024-byte qr_regions buffer.
- Patch 2 fixes an off-by-one in the local-vs-remote comparison loop,
which uses '<=' instead of '<', reading one entry past the valid range
even when qr_numregions is within bounds.
This patch (of 2):
The qr_numregions field from a DLM_QUERY_REGION network message is used
directly as loop bounds in dlm_match_regions() without checking against
O2NM_MAX_REGIONS. Since qr_regions is sized for at most O2NM_MAX_REGIONS
(32) entries, a crafted message with qr_numregions > 32 causes
out-of-bounds reads past the qr_regions buffer.
Add a bounds check for qr_numregions before entering the loops.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
efi/capsule-loader: fix incorrect sizeof in phys array reallocation
The krealloc() call for cap_info->phys in __efi_capsule_setup_info() uses
sizeof(phys_addr_t *) instead of sizeof(phys_addr_t), which might be
causing an undersized allocation.
The allocation is also inconsistent with the initial array allocation in
efi_capsule_open() that allocates one entry with sizeof(phys_addr_t),
and the efi_capsule_write() function that stores phys_addr_t values (not
pointers) via page_to_phys().
On 64-bit systems where sizeof(phys_addr_t) == sizeof(phys_addr_t *), this
goes unnoticed. On 32-bit systems with PAE where phys_addr_t is 64-bit but
pointers are 32-bit, this allocates half the required space, which might
lead to a heap buffer overflow when storing physical addresses.
This is similar to the bug fixed in commit fccfa646ef36 ("efi/capsule-loader:
fix incorrect allocation size") which fixed the same issue at the initial
allocation site.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, arm64: Fix off-by-one in check_imm signed range check
check_imm(bits, imm) is used in the arm64 BPF JIT to verify that
a branch displacement (in arm64 instruction units) fits into the
signed N-bit immediate field of a B, B.cond or CBZ/CBNZ encoding
before it is handed to the encoder. The macro currently tests for
(imm > 0 && imm >> bits) || (imm < 0 && ~imm >> bits) which admits
values in [-2^N, 2^N) — effectively a signed (N+1)-bit range. A
signed N-bit field only holds [-2^(N-1), 2^(N-1)), so the check
admits one extra bit of range on each side.
In particular, for check_imm19(), values in [2^18, 2^19) slip past
the check but do not fit into the 19-bit signed imm19 field of
B.cond. aarch64_insn_encode_immediate() then masks the raw value
into the 19-bit field, setting bit 18 (the sign bit) and flipping
a forward branch into a backward one. Same class of issue exists
for check_imm26() and the B/BL encoding. Shift by (bits - 1)
instead of bits so the actual signed N-bit range is enforced.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: usbhid: fix deadlock in hid_post_reset()
You can build a USB device that includes a HID component
and a storage or UAS component. The components can be reset
only together. That means that hid_pre_reset() and hid_post_reset()
are in the block IO error handling. Hence no memory allocation
used in them may do block IO because the IO can deadlock
on the mutex held while resetting a device and calling the
interface drivers.
Use GFP_NOIO for all allocations in them.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: validate group add input before caching
[BUG]
OCFS2_IOC_GROUP_ADD can trigger a BUG_ON in
ocfs2_set_new_buffer_uptodate():
kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/uptodate.c:509!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:ocfs2_set_new_buffer_uptodate+0x194/0x1e0 fs/ocfs2/uptodate.c:509
Code: ffffe88f 42b9fe4c 89e64889 dfe8b4df
Call Trace:
ocfs2_group_add+0x3f1/0x1510 fs/ocfs2/resize.c:507
ocfs2_ioctl+0x309/0x6e0 fs/ocfs2/ioctl.c:887
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:583 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x197/0x1e0 fs/ioctl.c:583
x64_sys_call+0x1144/0x26a0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:17
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x93/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7bbfb55a966d
[CAUSE]
ocfs2_group_add() calls ocfs2_set_new_buffer_uptodate() on a
user-controlled group block before ocfs2_verify_group_and_input()
validates that block number. That helper is only valid for newly
allocated metadata and asserts that the block is not already present in
the chosen metadata cache. The code also uses INODE_CACHE(inode) even
though the group descriptor belongs to main_bm_inode and later journal
accesses use that cache context instead.
[FIX]
Validate the on-disk group descriptor before caching it, then add it to
the metadata cache tracked by INODE_CACHE(main_bm_inode). Keep the
validation failure path separate from the later cleanup path so we only
remove the buffer from that cache after it has actually been inserted.
This keeps the group buffer lifetime consistent across validation,
journaling, and cleanup.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: validate bg_bits during freefrag scan
[BUG]
A crafted filesystem can trigger an out-of-bounds bitmap walk when
OCFS2_IOC_INFO is issued with OCFS2_INFO_FL_NON_COHERENT.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in instrument_atomic_read include/linux/instrumented.h:68 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in _test_bit include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-non-atomic.h:141 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in test_bit_le include/asm-generic/bitops/le.h:21 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ocfs2_info_freefrag_scan_chain fs/ocfs2/ioctl.c:495 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ocfs2_info_freefrag_scan_bitmap fs/ocfs2/ioctl.c:588 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ocfs2_info_handle_freefrag fs/ocfs2/ioctl.c:662 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ocfs2_info_handle_request+0x1c66/0x3370 fs/ocfs2/ioctl.c:754
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888031bce000 by task syz.0.636/1435
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xbe/0x130 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0xd1/0x650 mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0xfb/0x140 mm/kasan/report.c:595
check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:186 [inline]
kasan_check_range+0x11c/0x200 mm/kasan/generic.c:200
__kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 mm/kasan/shadow.c:31
instrument_atomic_read include/linux/instrumented.h:68 [inline]
_test_bit include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-non-atomic.h:141 [inline]
test_bit_le include/asm-generic/bitops/le.h:21 [inline]
ocfs2_info_freefrag_scan_chain fs/ocfs2/ioctl.c:495 [inline]
ocfs2_info_freefrag_scan_bitmap fs/ocfs2/ioctl.c:588 [inline]
ocfs2_info_handle_freefrag fs/ocfs2/ioctl.c:662 [inline]
ocfs2_info_handle_request+0x1c66/0x3370 fs/ocfs2/ioctl.c:754
ocfs2_info_handle+0x18d/0x2a0 fs/ocfs2/ioctl.c:828
ocfs2_ioctl+0x632/0x6e0 fs/ocfs2/ioctl.c:913
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:583 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x197/0x1e0 fs/ioctl.c:583
...
[CAUSE]
ocfs2_info_freefrag_scan_chain() uses on-disk bg_bits directly as the
bitmap scan limit. The coherent path reads group descriptors through
ocfs2_read_group_descriptor(), which validates the descriptor before
use. The non-coherent path uses ocfs2_read_blocks_sync() instead and
skips that validation, so an impossible bg_bits value can drive the
bitmap walk past the end of the block.
[FIX]
Compute the bitmap capacity from the filesystem format with
ocfs2_group_bitmap_size(), report descriptors whose bg_bits exceeds
that limit, and clamp the scan to the computed capacity. This keeps the
freefrag report going while avoiding reads beyond the buffer.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: fix listxattr handling when the buffer is full
[BUG]
If an OCFS2 inode has both inline and block-based xattrs, listxattr()
can return a size larger than the caller's buffer when the inline names
consume that buffer exactly.
kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:usercopy_abort+0xb7/0xd0 mm/usercopy.c:102
Call Trace:
__check_heap_object+0xe3/0x120 mm/slub.c:8243
check_heap_object mm/usercopy.c:196 [inline]
__check_object_size mm/usercopy.c:250 [inline]
__check_object_size+0x5c5/0x780 mm/usercopy.c:215
check_object_size include/linux/ucopysize.h:22 [inline]
check_copy_size include/linux/ucopysize.h:59 [inline]
copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:219 [inline]
listxattr+0xb0/0x170 fs/xattr.c:926
filename_listxattr fs/xattr.c:958 [inline]
path_listxattrat+0x137/0x320 fs/xattr.c:988
__do_sys_listxattr fs/xattr.c:1001 [inline]
__se_sys_listxattr fs/xattr.c:998 [inline]
__x64_sys_listxattr+0x7f/0xd0 fs/xattr.c:998
...
[CAUSE]
Commit 936b8834366e ("ocfs2: Refactor xattr list and remove
ocfs2_xattr_handler().") replaced the old per-handler list accounting
with ocfs2_xattr_list_entry(), but it kept using size == 0 to detect
probe mode.
That assumption stops being true once ocfs2_listxattr() finishes the
inline-xattr pass. If the inline names fill the caller buffer exactly,
the block-xattr pass runs with a non-NULL buffer and a remaining size of
zero. ocfs2_xattr_list_entry() then skips the bounds check, keeps
counting block names, and returns a positive size larger than the
supplied buffer.
[FIX]
Detect probe mode by testing whether the destination buffer pointer is
NULL instead of whether the remaining size is zero.
That restores the pre-refactor behavior and matches the OCFS2 getxattr
helpers. Once the remaining buffer reaches zero while more names are
left, the block-xattr pass now returns -ERANGE instead of reporting a
size larger than the allocated list buffer.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix data loss caused by incorrect use of nat_entry flag
Data loss can occur when fsync is performed on a newly created file
(before any checkpoint has been written) concurrently with a checkpoint
operation. The scenario is as follows:
create & write & fsync 'file A' write checkpoint
- f2fs_do_sync_file // inline inode
- f2fs_write_inode // inode folio is dirty
- f2fs_write_checkpoint
- f2fs_flush_merged_writes
- f2fs_sync_node_pages
- f2fs_flush_nat_entries
- f2fs_fsync_node_pages // no dirty node
- f2fs_need_inode_block_update // return false
SPO and lost 'file A'
f2fs_flush_nat_entries() sets the IS_CHECKPOINTED and HAS_LAST_FSYNC
flags for the nat_entry, but this does not mean that the checkpoint has
actually completed successfully. However, f2fs_need_inode_block_update()
checks these flags and incorrectly assumes that the checkpoint has
finished.
The root cause is that the semantics of IS_CHECKPOINTED and
HAS_LAST_FSYNC are only guaranteed after the checkpoint write fully
completes.
This patch modifies f2fs_need_inode_block_update() to acquire the
sbi->node_write lock before reading the nat_entry flags, ensuring that
once IS_CHECKPOINTED and HAS_LAST_FSYNC are observed to be set, the
checkpoint operation has already completed.