In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_meta_bridge: fix stale stack leak via IIFHWADDR register
NFT_META_BRI_IIFHWADDR declares its destination register with
len = ETH_ALEN (6 bytes), which the register-init tracking rounds up to
two 32-bit registers (8 bytes). nft_meta_bridge_get_eval() then does
memcpy(dest, br_dev->dev_addr, ETH_ALEN), writing only 6 bytes and
leaving the upper 2 bytes of the second register as uninitialised
nft_do_chain() stack. A downstream load of that register span leaks
those stale bytes to userspace.
Zero the second register before the memcpy so the full declared span is
written.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_tunnel: fix use-after-free on object destroy
nft_tunnel_obj_destroy() calls metadata_dst_free() which directly
kfree()s the metadata_dst, ignoring the dst_entry refcount. Packets
that took a reference via dst_hold() in nft_tunnel_obj_eval() and
are still queued (e.g. in a netem qdisc) are left with a dangling
pointer. When these packets are eventually dequeued, dst_release()
operates on freed memory.
Replace metadata_dst_free() with dst_release() so the metadata_dst
is freed only after all references are dropped. The dst subsystem
already handles metadata_dst cleanup in dst_destroy() when
DST_METADATA is set.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/vc4: fix krealloc() memory leak
Don't just overwrite the original pointer passed to krealloc()
with its return value without checking latter:
MEM = krealloc(MEM, SZ, GFP);
If krealloc() returns NULL, that erases the pointer
to the still allocated memory, hence leaks this memory.
Instead, use a temporary variable, check it's not NULL
and only then assign it to the original pointer:
TMP = krealloc(MEM, SZ, GFP);
if (!TMP) return;
MEM = TMP;
While on it, use krealloc_array().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/ivpu: Fix signed integer truncation in IPC receive
Fix potential buffer overflow where firmware-supplied data_size is cast
to signed int before being used in min_t(). Large unsigned values
(>= 0x80000000) become negative, causing unsigned wraparound and
oversized memcpy operations that can overflow the stack buffer.
Change min_t(int, ...) to min() as both values are unsigned and can be
handled by min() without explicit cast.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/ivpu: Add buffer overflow check in MS get_info_ioctl
Add validation that the info size returned from the metric stream info
query is not exceeded when checked against the allocated buffer size.
If the firmware returns a size larger than the buffer, reject the
operation with -EOVERFLOW instead of proceeding with an incorrect
buffer copy.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: stratix10-rsu: Fix NULL deref on rsu_send_msg() timeout in probe
rsu_send_msg() can return -ETIMEDOUT when
wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout() fires while the SMC call is still
pending. In stratix10_rsu_probe(), the error paths for COMMAND_RSU_DCMF_VERSION,
COMMAND_RSU_DCMF_STATUS, COMMAND_RSU_MAX_RETRY and COMMAND_RSU_GET_SPT_TABLE
call stratix10_svc_free_channel() - which sets chan->scl to NULL - but then
fall through and queue the next request on the same channel. The next svc
kthread that runs will dereference pdata->chan->scl in its receive callback
path, triggering a NULL pointer dereference identical to the one fixed by
commit c45f7263100c ("firmware: stratix10-rsu: Fix NULL pointer dereference
when RSU is disabled") for the COMMAND_RSU_STATUS path.
Apply the same cleanup pattern to the remaining failure paths: remove the
async client, free the channel, and return early so no further messages are
queued on a channel whose scl has been cleared.
While at it, clean up stratix10_rsu_probe() in two ways without changing
behavior:
- Drop redundant zero-initialization of fields already cleared by
devm_kzalloc(): client.receive_cb, status.* and spt0/1_address
(INVALID_SPT_ADDRESS is 0x0).
- Replace five identical 3-line error-cleanup blocks
(stratix10_svc_remove_async_client() + stratix10_svc_free_channel() +
return ret) with goto labels (remove_async_client, free_channel),
matching the standard kernel resource-unwinding pattern and making it
easier to extend the probe sequence without forgetting matching
cleanup.
Also move init_completion() next to mutex_init() so sync-primitive
initialization is grouped before anything that could trigger a
callback.
---
v2: Add a minor clean-up of the function stratix10_rsu_probe() to have a
centralize exit for all the rsu_send_async_msg() and rsu_send_msg().
NSD from version 4.13.0 has a heap use-after-free bug in logging errors on TLS connections, causing a crash of the server process, which can be triggered trivially by sending a DNS query over a DoT connection, and closing the connection without reading the response.
NSD version 4.14.0 introduced a bug where a specially crafted APL RR, with an adflength larger than permitted for the address family will overwrite the stack when the zone is written to disk, with a maximum of 111 attacker controlled bytes.
When a provide-xfr is given with a tls-auth-name, a secondary requesting a transfer should provide a client certificate with that name. However, no client certificate is needed when the request comes in over TLS over the regular tls-port (and not the tls-auth-port) or over over TCP over the regular port, when the other conditions of the provide-xfr rule match.
If NSD is configured as secondary for a zone, the primary of that zone can crash NSD with an AXFR containing a DNS message with a special crafted SVCB RR with an rdata size of 65512, that let's an (uint16_t) variable that is used to allocate space needed for the RR wrap (because total size > 65535), causing a heap overflow. The attacker can perform a controlled (RCE class) head write of up to 65509 bytes