**DISPUTED**A failure in the -fstack-protector feature in GCC-based toolchains
that target AArch64 allows an attacker to exploit an existing buffer
overflow in dynamically-sized local variables in your application
without this being detected. This stack-protector failure only applies
to C99-style dynamically-sized local variables or those created using
alloca(). The stack-protector operates as intended for statically-sized
local variables.
The default behavior when the stack-protector
detects an overflow is to terminate your application, resulting in
controlled loss of availability. An attacker who can exploit a buffer
overflow without triggering the stack-protector might be able to change
program flow control to cause an uncontrolled loss of availability or to
go further and affect confidentiality or integrity. NOTE: The GCC project argues that this is a missed hardening bug and not a vulnerability by itself.
Heap/stack buffer overflow in the dlang_lname function in d-demangle.c in libiberty allows attackers to potentially cause a denial of service (segmentation fault and crash) via a crafted mangled symbol.
GCC v12.0 was discovered to contain an uncontrolled recursion via the component libiberty/rust-demangle.c. This vulnerability allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) by consuming excessive CPU and memory resources.
The POWER9 backend in GNU Compiler Collection (GCC) before version 10 could optimize multiple calls of the __builtin_darn intrinsic into a single call, thus reducing the entropy of the random number generator. This occurred because a volatile operation was not specified. For example, within a single execution of a program, the output of every __builtin_darn() call may be the same.
stack_protect_prologue in cfgexpand.c and stack_protect_epilogue in function.c in GNU Compiler Collection (GCC) 4.1 through 8 (under certain circumstances) generate instruction sequences when targeting ARM targets that spill the address of the stack protector guard, which allows an attacker to bypass the protection of -fstack-protector, -fstack-protector-all, -fstack-protector-strong, and -fstack-protector-explicit against stack overflow by controlling what the stack canary is compared against.
Under certain circumstances, the ix86_expand_builtin function in i386.c in GNU Compiler Collection (GCC) version 4.6, 4.7, 4.8, 4.9, 5 before 5.5, and 6 before 6.4 will generate instruction sequences that clobber the status flag of the RDRAND and RDSEED intrinsics before it can be read, potentially causing failures of these instructions to go unreported. This could potentially lead to less randomness in random number generation.
The std::random_device class in libstdc++ in the GNU Compiler Collection (aka GCC) before 4.9.4 does not properly handle short reads from blocking sources, which makes it easier for context-dependent attackers to predict the random values via unspecified vectors.