OAuth2 Proxy is a reverse proxy that provides authentication using OAuth2 providers. Prior to 7.15.2, an authorization bypass exists in OAuth2 Proxy as part of the email_domain enforcement option. An attacker may be able to authenticate with an email claim such as attacker@evil.com@company.com and satisfy an allowed domain check for company.com, even though the claim is not a valid email address. The issue ONLY affects deployments that rely on email_domain restrictions and accept email claim values from identity providers or claim mappings that do not strictly enforce normal email syntax. This vulnerability is fixed in 7.15.2.
OAuth2 Proxy is a reverse proxy that provides authentication using OAuth2 providers. Versions prior to 7.15.2 contain a configuration-dependent authentication bypass in deployments where OAuth2 Proxy is used with an auth_request-style integration (such as nginx auth_request) and either --ping-user-agent is set or --gcp-healthchecks is enabled. In affected configurations, OAuth2 Proxy treats any request with the configured health check User-Agent value as a successful health check regardless of the requested path, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to bypass authentication and access protected upstream resources. Deployments that do not use auth_request-style subrequests or that do not enable --ping-user-agent/--gcp-healthchecks are not affected. This issue is fixed in 7.15.2.
OAuth2-Proxy is an open-source tool that can act as either a standalone reverse proxy or a middleware component integrated into existing reverse proxy or load balancer setups. In versions 7.10.0 and below, oauth2-proxy deployments are vulnerable when using the skip_auth_routes configuration option with regex patterns. Attackers can bypass authentication by crafting URLs with query parameters that satisfy configured regex patterns, allowing unauthorized access to protected resources. The issue stems from skip_auth_routes matching against the full request URI. Deployments using skip_auth_routes with regex patterns containing wildcards or broad matching patterns are most at risk. This issue is fixed in version 7.11.0. Workarounds include: auditing all skip_auth_routes configurations for overly permissive patterns, replacing wildcard patterns with exact path matches where possible, ensuring regex patterns are properly anchored (starting with ^ and ending with $), or implementing custom validation that strips query parameters before regex matching.
OAuth2-Proxy is an open source reverse proxy that provides authentication with Google, Github or other providers. The `--gitlab-group` flag for group-based authorization in the GitLab provider stopped working in the v7.0.0 release. Regardless of the flag settings, authorization wasn't restricted. Additionally, any authenticated users had whichever groups were set in `--gitlab-group` added to the new `X-Forwarded-Groups` header to the upstream application. While adding GitLab project based authorization support in #630, a bug was introduced where the user session's groups field was populated with the `--gitlab-group` config entries instead of pulling the individual user's group membership from the GitLab Userinfo endpoint. When the session groups where compared against the allowed groups for authorization, they matched improperly (since both lists were populated with the same data) so authorization was allowed. This impacts GitLab Provider users who relies on group membership for authorization restrictions. Any authenticated users in your GitLab environment can access your applications regardless of `--gitlab-group` membership restrictions. This is patched in v7.1.0. There is no workaround for the Group membership bug. But `--gitlab-project` can be set to use Project membership as the authorization checks instead of groups; it is not broken.