open-webui before 0.3.14 contains a cross-origin resource sharing misconfiguration allowing arbitrary origins with allow_origins=* and authenticated requests to the /api/v1/functions endpoint. Attackers can execute arbitrary code on the openwebui instance by crafting malicious cross-site requests from attacker-controlled websites when an admin user visits them.
Open WebUI before 0.9.5 contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the OAuth authentication flow where the picture claim URL MIME type is inferred from file extension rather than Content-Type header, allowing SVG files to bypass the profile image validator and be stored as data URIs. Authenticated users who visit the profile image endpoint receive attacker-controlled SVG content with inline disposition and no default security headers, enabling script execution in the same origin to steal authentication tokens and achieve account takeover.
Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. Prior to 0.10.0, WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST matching compared configured host entries against URL strings and non-label-boundary suffixes, allowing path-based blocklist bypasses such as !internal.example.com in a URL path and sibling-domain matches that did not reflect the intended hostname policy. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.0.
Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. Prior to 0.10.0, backend/open_webui/routers/terminals.py built the ws_terminal upstream URL from an unencoded session_id and appended user_id as a query parameter, allowing query injection to make the terminal backend resolve another user identity; the HTTP proxy path also forwarded X-User-Id as an integrity-unbound identity claim. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.0.
Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. Prior to 0.10.0, Open WebUI runs client-side Python with Pyodide in a same-origin web worker, allowing stored chat payloads that use pyodide.http.pyfetch or the js module fetch and XMLHttpRequest APIs to issue authenticated same-origin requests when a victim clicks Run, which can reach admin-only endpoints and execute server-side code through configured tools. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.0.
Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. Prior to 0.10.0, channel thread parent and reply handling did not bind parent_id to the channel in the URL, allowing an authenticated user to reference a message from another private or DM channel and disclose thread context across channels. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.0.
Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. Prior to 0.10.0, get_event_call delivered execute:python and execute:tool Socket.IO events to a client-supplied session_id after checking only that the session was connected, allowing authenticated users who learned another socket ID through ydoc:document:join to run code interpreter Python or tools in that user session. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.0.
Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. Prior to 0.10.0, the file upload path accepted metadata.knowledge_id and auto-linked uploaded files to a target knowledge base without applying the write-access check used by /api/v1/knowledge//file/add, allowing read-only knowledge-base users to add arbitrary files. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.0.
Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. Prior to 0.10.0, the /api/v1/auths/signin endpoint looked users up by email and only ran bcrypt password verification when a credential existed, making registered-account attempts measurably slower than missing-email attempts and allowing unauthenticated account enumeration. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.0.
Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.6, the SafePlaywrightURLLoader implements a validate_url function to prevent SSRF attacks by checking the IP address of the user-provided URL. However, this validation is performed only on the initial URL. Since Playwright automatically follows HTTP redirects (301/302) by default, an attacker can bypass the validation by providing a safe URL that redirects to a restricted internal network address (e.g., localhost, Docker container network, or Cloud Metadata). This allows the application to access internal services despite ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH being set to False This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.6.