RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 3.13.19, 4.0.24, 4.1.15, 4.2.10, and 4.3.5, RabbitMQ Management rendered an AMQP authorization-error reason containing an attacker-controlled queue name as HTML when the OAuth management UI was enabled. Exploitation requires an attacker with queue configure permission, a management administrator who can see but cannot read that queue, and the administrator clicking Get Message(s). A queue name containing a base element can then retarget the automatic relative refresh because the Content Security Policy omits base-uri and connect-src, and an attacker endpoint that permits the management origin through CORS can receive the victim's Authorization header. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.19, 4.0.24, 4.1.15, 4.2.10, and 4.3.5.
RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 3.13.18, 4.0.23, 4.1.14, 4.2.9, and 4.3.3, native MQTT and MQTT over WebSocket behind a trusted PROXY Protocol frontend could lose the proxy-derived client address before the MQTT authentication path checked loopback_users, causing the frontend-to-broker address to be treated as loopback. An attacker who can reach the trusted frontend and has valid credentials for a loopback-restricted account can therefore bypass the source-address restriction; the issue does not bypass password authentication. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.18, 4.0.23, 4.1.14, 4.2.9, and 4.3.3.
RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 4.3.3, 4.2.9 , 4.1.14, 4.0.24, and 3.13.18, Federation upstream in RabbitMQ skips vhost authorization allowing cross-vhost message access. what the bug lets you do. A policymaker on one vhost reads and drains messages out of another vhost it has no permission on. With the default ack-mode the source messages are consumed (deleted), not copied. Why that should not 1. Federation validates the upstream URI without any vhost-access Cross-vhost message read/drain from a per-vhost policymaker, breaking vhost tenancy This issue is fixed in versions 4.3.3, 4.2.9 , 4.1.14, 4.0.24, and 3.13.18.
RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 4.3.3, 4.2.9, 4.1.14, 4.0.23, and 3.13.18, JWKS Fetch Ignores HTTP Response Status Code - Signing Key Destruction Causes Authentication DoS (CWE-252). the JWKS key fetching mechanism in uaajwt.erl does not validate the HTTP response status code when downloading signing keys from the OAuth2 provider's JWKS endpoint. Non-200 responses (including 4xx and 5xx errors) are processed identically to successful responses. When the JWKS endpoint returns an error response with a valid-JSON body that lacks a keys field, all previously cached signing keys are destroyed, causing a persistent authentication denial of Files: deps/rabbitmqauthbackendoauth2/src/uaajwt.erl, lines 50-63 deps/rabbitmqauthbackendoauth2/src/uaajwks.erl, lines 5-7 deps/rabbitmqauthbackendoauth2/src/rabbitoauth2provider.erl, lines 98-107 Bug 1: HTTP status code ignored (uaajwt.erl:50-63): The Erlang httpc module returns {ok, {{HttpVersion, StatusCode, ReasonPhrase}, Headers, Body}}. The pattern {ok, {, , JwksBody}} matches ANY successful HTTP transaction Persistent authentication DoS: Once keys are destroyed, ALL OAuth2/JWT authentication fails for all users until a new successful JWKS refresh occurs Amplification: A single attacker can deny access to all legitimate OAuth2 users across the entire RabbitMQ. This issue is fixed in versions 4.3.3, 4.2.9, 4.1.14, 4.0.23, and 3.13.18.
RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 3.13.15 and 4.0.20 and 4.1.11 and 4.2.6, Atom table exhaustion via management API node field. pUT /api/queues/:vhost/:name (and the exchanges and bindings endpoints) accepts a node JSON field. The value goes through rabbitnodes:make → listtoatom with no cluster membership check first. Each unique value permanently leaks one atom. A March 2026 refactoring (ea61ce2563) introduced safe helpers in rabbitmgmtnodes.erl (parsenodename, safeatom, and requirenodename, using binarytoexistingatom) and fixed several callers (QQ replica ops, wmauthattempts, wmnodememoryets, getsortreverse, and rabbitfederationmgmt), but getnode/1 in rabbitmgmtutil.erl:880-885, the primary vector used by directrequest/6, was not Roughly 900K requests crash the VM via systemlimit, and all tenants lose Any user with the management tag and one vhost, the lowest privilege This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15 and 4.0.20 and 4.1.11 and 4.2.6.
RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 3.13.15 and 4.0.20 and 4.1.11 and 4.2.6, protected tag bypass via bulk-delete. dELETE /api/users/:name refuses to delete users tagged protected (rabbitmgmtwmuser:deleteresource/2 checks isprotecteduser). POST /api/users/bulk-delete iterates the supplied username list and calls rabbitauthbackendinternal:deleteuser/2 directly , that function has no protected-tag check , so the guard is silently An administrator can delete protected-tagged service accounts via the bulk endpoint, bypassing a safeguard the test suite confirms is rabbitmqmanagement enabled Attacker has the administrator tag A protected-tagged user. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15 and 4.0.20 and 4.1.11 and 4.2.6.
RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, and 4.2.6, mechanisms/1 applied list_to_atom/1 to every colon-delimited token in an attacker-controlled auth_mechanism value, permanently consuming Erlang VM atoms and allowing the node to be crashed with a large request. Exploitation requires the Shovel or Federation plugin to be in use, and setting auth_mechanism requires the policymaker tag. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, and 4.2.6.
RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. The advisory establishes affected 3.13, 4.0, 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 maintenance lines but contains conflicting first-fixed versions for the 3.13, 4.0, and 4.1 lines. fill/2 substitutes ${username} into user_dn_pattern without RFC 4514 DN escaping, allowing a crafted username to alter the LDAP bind DN and potentially select a different directory entry. Exploitation requires rabbitmq_auth_backend_ldap with a user_dn_pattern containing ${username}, a directory layout in which the injected suffix resolves usefully, and a password valid for the resulting DN. The advisory body identifies 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.9, and 4.3.3 as fixed, while structured metadata identifies 3.13.18, 4.0.23, 4.1.14, 4.2.9, and 4.3.3. No fixed-version assertion is certifiable until a curator resolves this conflict.
RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 3.13.15 and 4.0.22 and 4.1.11 and 4.2.6 and 4.3.1, Atom exhaustion: OAuth2 JWT tag: scope values. extractscopes/1 parses scopes of the form .tag: and calls rabbitdatacoercion:toatom() to convert to a tag atom. The token signature is verified first, so the attacker cannot forge scopes , but in IdP configurations where scope content is user-influenced, each login with a novel tag value leaks one In deployments where users can influence the scopes included in their IdP-issued JWT rabbitmqauthbackendoauth2 enabled IdP permits attacker-influenced scope values in signed tokens. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15 and 4.0.22 and 4.1.11 and 4.2.6 and 4.3.1.
RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, and 4.2.6, the obsolete GET /api/auth endpoint can disclose the OAuth 2 client secret on RabbitMQ installations configured with management.oauth_client_secret, exposing credentials to unauthenticated callers when the management plugin and that OAuth configuration are enabled. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, and 4.2.6.