Roo Code through 3.54.0 contains a command approval bypass vulnerability in parseCommandLine() that discards command substitutions placed next to * or ? glob characters. Attackers using indirect prompt injection can craft commands like echo *$(...) that match allowlisted prefixes, executing denied commands without user approval when auto-approval is enabled.
Roo Code through 3.54.0 contains a command approval bypass vulnerability in parseCommandLine() that allows attackers to auto-approve arbitrary shell commands by placing a command substitution in command position. Attackers using indirect prompt injection can submit commands like $(echo touch /tmp/x) that pass the echo allowlist check, causing the shell to execute the output without user approval.
Roo Code through 3.54.0 contains a command approval bypass vulnerability in getCommandDecision() that allows attackers to auto-approve denied shell commands by prefixing them with a bare >& redirect. Attackers using indirect prompt injection can make the allowlist match a redirect target like echo while the shell runs the denied command on the developer machine.
Roo Code through 3.54.0 contains a command approval bypass vulnerability that allows attackers to auto-approve denied shell commands by abusing quote-masking regex in parseCommandLine(). Attackers can use indirect prompt injection with escaped or single-quoted double quotes to hide command separators behind allowlisted prefixes like echo, executing commands without user approval.
Roo Code through 3.54.0 contains a command approval bypass vulnerability that allows attackers to run denied shell commands because parseCommandLine() treats ${ command; } substitutions as parameter expansions. Attackers using indirect prompt injection can embed denied commands inside an allowlisted command like echo to execute them without user approval on bash 5.3+ or ksh93.
Roo Code's command auto-approval module contains a critical OS command injection vulnerability that renders its whitelist security mechanism completely ineffective. The system relies on fragile regular expressions to parse command structures; while it attempts to intercept dangerous operations, it fails to account for standard Shell command substitution Roo Code (specifically$(...)and backticks ...). An attacker can construct a command such as git log --grep="$(malicious_command)", forcing Syntx to misidentify it as a safe git operation and automatically approve it. The underlying Shell prioritizes the execution of the malicious code injected within the arguments, resulting in Remote Code Execution without any user interaction.
Roo Code is an AI-powered autonomous coding agent that lives in users' editors. Prior to version 3.26.7, Due to an error in validation it was possible for Roo to automatically execute commands that did not match the allow list prefixes. This issue has been patched in version 3.26.7.
Roo Code is an AI-powered autonomous coding agent that lives in users' editors. Versions 3.25.23 and below contain a default list of allowed commands that do not need manual approval if auto-approve is enabled, and npm install is included in that list. Because npm install executes lifecycle scripts, if a repository’s package.json file contains a malicious postinstall script, it would be executed automatically without user approval. This means that enabling auto-approved commands and opening a malicious repo could result in arbitrary code execution. This is fixed in version 3.26.0.
Roo Code is an AI-powered autonomous coding agent that lives in users' editors. Versions below 3.26.0 contain a vulnerability in the command parsing logic where the Bash parameter expansion and indirect reference were not handled correctly. If the agent was configured to auto-approve execution of certain commands, an attacker able to influence prompts could abuse this weakness to execute additional arbitrary commands alongside the intended one. This is fixed in version 3.26.0.
Roo Code is an AI-powered autonomous coding agent that lives in users' editors. In versions 3.26.6 and below, a Github workflow used unsanitized pull request metadata in a privileged context, allowing an attacker to craft malicious input and achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the Actions runner. The workflow runs with broad permissions and access to repository secrets. It is possible for an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the runner, push or modify code in the repository, access secrets, and create malicious releases or packages, resulting in a complete compromise of the repository and its associated services. This is fixed in version 3.26.7.