In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: validate embedded INIT chunk and address list lengths in cookie
sctp_unpack_cookie() only checked that the embedded INIT chunk length
did not exceed the remaining cookie payload, but did not ensure that the
INIT chunk is large enough to contain a complete INIT header.
A malformed COOKIE_ECHO can therefore carry a truncated INIT chunk whose
length field is smaller than sizeof(struct sctp_init_chunk). Later,
sctp_process_init() accesses INIT parameters unconditionally, which may
lead to out-of-bounds reads.
In addition, raw_addr_list_len is not fully validated against the
remaining cookie payload. When cookie authentication is disabled, an
attacker can supply an oversized raw_addr_list_len and cause
sctp_raw_to_bind_addrs() to read beyond the end of the cookie. The
address parser also lacks sufficient bounds checks for parameter headers
and lengths, allowing malformed address parameters to trigger
out-of-bounds reads.
Fix this by:
- requiring the embedded INIT chunk length to be at least sizeof(struct
sctp_init_chunk);
- validating that the INIT chunk and raw address list together fit
within the cookie payload;
- verifying sufficient data exists for each address parameter header and
payload before parsing it.
Note that sctp_verify_init() must be called after sctp_unpack_cookie()
and before sctp_process_init() when cookie authentication is disabled.
This will be addressed in a separate patch.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: fix uninit-value in __sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup()
__sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup() in net/sctp/input.c only checks that the ASCONF
chunk can hold the ADDIP header and a parameter header, then calls
af->from_addr_param(), which reads the full address (16 bytes for IPv6)
trusting the parameter's declared length.
An unauthenticated peer can send a truncated trailing ASCONF chunk that
declares an IPv6 address parameter but stops after the 4-byte parameter
header; reached from the no-association lookup path, from_addr_param() then
reads uninitialized bytes past the parameter.
Impact: an unauthenticated SCTP peer makes the receive path read up to 16
bytes of uninitialized memory past a truncated ASCONF address parameter.
The sibling __sctp_rcv_init_lookup() bounds parameters with
sctp_walk_params(); this path open-codes the fetch and omits the bound.
Verify the whole address parameter lies within the chunk before
from_addr_param() reads it, the same class of fix as commit 51e5ad549c43
("net: sctp: fix KMSAN uninit-value in sctp_inq_pop").
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: openvswitch: fix possible kfree_skb of ERR_PTR
After the patch in the "Fixes" tag, the allocation of the "reply" skb
can happen either before or after locking the ovs_mutex.
However, error cleanups still follow the classical reversed order,
assuming "reply" is allocated before locking: it is freed after unlocking.
If "reply" allocation happens after locking the mutex and it fails,
"reply" is left with an ERR_PTR, and execution jumps to the correspondent
cleanup stage which will try to free an invalid pointer.
Fix this by setting the pointer to NULL after having saved its error
value.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: sit: reload inner IPv6 header after GSO offloads
ipip6_tunnel_xmit() caches the inner IPv6 header pointer at function
entry and continues using it after iptunnel_handle_offloads().
For GSO skbs, iptunnel_handle_offloads() calls skb_header_unclone().
When the skb header is cloned, skb_header_unclone() can call
pskb_expand_head(), which may move the skb head. The pskb_expand_head()
contract requires pointers into the skb header to be reloaded after the
call.
If the later skb_realloc_headroom() branch is not taken, SIT uses the
stale iph6 pointer to read the inner hop limit and DS field. That can
read from a freed skb head after the old head's remaining clone is
released.
Reload iph6 after the offload helper succeeds and before subsequent
reads from the inner IPv6 header. Keep the existing reload after
skb_realloc_headroom(), since that branch can also replace the skb.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: x_tables: avoid leaking percpu counter pointers
The native and compat get-entries paths copy the fixed rule entry header
from the kernelized rule blob to userspace before overwriting the entry's
counter fields with a sanitized counter snapshot.
On SMP kernels, entry->counters.pcnt contains the percpu allocation
address used by x_tables rule counters. A caller can provide a userspace
buffer that faults during the initial fixed-header copy after pcnt has
been copied but before the later sanitized counter copy runs. The syscall
then returns -EFAULT while leaving the raw percpu pointer in userspace.
Copy only the fixed entry prefix before counters from the kernelized rule
blob, then copy the sanitized counter snapshot into the counter field.
Apply this ordering to the IPv4, IPv6, and ARP native and compat
get-entries implementations so a fault cannot expose the internal percpu
counter pointer.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: revalidate bridge ports
ebt_redirect_tg() dereferences br_port_get_rcu() return without a
NULL check, causing a kernel panic when the bridge port has been
removed between the original hook invocation and an NFQUEUE
reinject.
A mere NULL check isn't sufficient, however. As sashiko review
points out userspace can not only remove the port from the bridge,
it could also place the device in a different virtual device, e.g.
macvlan.
If this happens, we must drop the packet, there is no way for us to
reinject it into the bridge path.
Switch to _upper API, we don't need the bridge port structure.
Also, this fix keeps another bug intact:
Both nfnetlink_log and nfnetlink_queue use CONFIG_BRIDGE_NETFILTER
too aggressive, which prevents certain logging features when queueing
in bridge family: NETFILTER_FAMILY_BRIDGE can be enabled while the old
CONFIG_BRIDGE_NETFILTER cruft is off.
Fixes tag is a common ancestor, this was always broken.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ip6_vti: fix incorrect tunnel matching in vti6_tnl_lookup()
In vti6_tnl_lookup(), when an exact match for a tunnel fails,
the code falls back to searching for wildcard tunnels:
- Tunnels matching the packet's local address, with any remote address
wildcard remote).
- Tunnels matching the packet's remote address, with any local address
(wildcard local).
However, vti6 stores all these different types of tunnels in the same
hash table (ip6n->tnls_r_l) prone to hash collisions.
The bug is that the fallback search loops in vti6_tnl_lookup() were
missing checks to ensure that the candidate tunnel actually has
a wildcard address.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: reject BR/EDR signaling packets over MTUsig
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:l2cap_sig_channel() accepts BR/EDR
signaling packets up to the channel MTU and dispatches each command
without enforcing the signaling MTU (MTUsig). A Bluetooth BR/EDR peer
within radio range can send a fixed-channel CID 0x0001 packet that is
larger than MTUsig and contains many L2CAP_ECHO_REQ commands before
pairing. In a real-radio stock-kernel run, one 681-byte signaling
packet containing 168 zero-length ECHO_REQ commands made the target
transmit 168 ECHO_RSP frames over about 220 ms.
Impact: a Bluetooth BR/EDR peer within radio range, before pairing, can
force 168 ECHO_RSP frames from one 681-byte fixed-channel signaling
packet containing packed ECHO_REQ commands.
Define Linux's BR/EDR signaling MTU as the spec minimum of 48 bytes and
reject any larger signaling packet with one L2CAP_COMMAND_REJECT_RSP
carrying L2CAP_REJ_MTU_EXCEEDED before any command is dispatched.
The Bluetooth Core spec wording for MTUExceeded says the reject
identifier shall match the first request command in the packet, and
that packets containing only responses shall be silently discarded.
Linux intentionally deviates from that prescription: silently
discarding desynchronizes the peer because the remote stack never
learns its responses were dropped, and locating the first request
command requires walking command headers past MTUsig, i.e. processing
bytes from a packet we have already decided is too large to process.
We therefore always emit one reject and use the identifier from the
first command header, a single fixed-offset byte read.
The unrestricted BR/EDR signaling parser and ECHO_REQ response path both
trace to the initial git import; no later introducing commit is
available for a Fixes tag.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ibmveth: Disable GSO for packets with small MSS
Some physical adapters on Power systems do not support segmentation
offload when the MSS is less than 224 bytes. Attempting to send such
packets causes the adapter to freeze, stopping all traffic until
manually reset.
Implement ndo_features_check to disable GSO for packets with small MSS
values. The network stack will perform software segmentation instead.
The 224-byte minimum matches ibmvnic
commit <f10b09ef687f> ("ibmvnic: Enforce stronger sanity checks
on GSO packets")
which uses the same physical adapters in SEA configurations.
The issue occurs specifically when the hardware attempts to perform
segmentation (gso_segs > 1) with a small MSS. Single-segment GSO packets
(gso_segs == 1) do not trigger the problematic LSO code path and are
transmitted normally without segmentation.
Add an ndo_features_check callback to disable GSO when MSS < 224 bytes.
Also call vlan_features_check() to ensure proper handling of VLAN packets,
particularly QinQ (802.1ad) configurations where the hardware parser may
not support certain offload features.
Validated using iptables to force small MSS values. Without the fix,
the adapter freezes. With the fix, packets are segmented in software
and transmission succeeds. Comprehensive regression testing completedd
(MSS tests, performance, stability).
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
inet: RAW sockets using IPPROTO_RAW MUST drop incoming ICMP
Yizhou Zhao reported that simply having one RAW socket on protocol
IPPROTO_RAW (255) was dangerous.
socket(AF_INET, SOCK_RAW, 255);
A malicious incoming ICMP packet can set the protocol field to 255
and match this socket, leading to FNHE cache changes.
inner = IP(src="192.168.2.1", dst="8.8.8.8", proto=255)/Raw("TEST")
pkt = IP(src="192.168.1.1", dst="192.168.2.1")/ICMP(type=3, code=4, nexthopmtu=576)/inner
"man 7 raw" states:
A protocol of IPPROTO_RAW implies enabled IP_HDRINCL and is able
to send any IP protocol that is specified in the passed header.
Receiving of all IP protocols via IPPROTO_RAW is not possible
using raw sockets.
Make sure we drop these malicious packets.