An example of BashOperator in Airflow documentation suggested a way of passing dag_run.conf in the way that could cause unsanitized user input to be used to escalate privileges of UI user to allow execute code on worker. Users should review if any of their own DAGs have adopted this incorrect advice.
In case of SQL errors, exception/stack trace of errors was exposed in API even if "api/expose_stack_traces" was set to false. That could lead to exposing additional information to potential attacker. Users are recommended to upgrade to Apache Airflow 3.2.0, which fixes the issue.
Dag Authors, who normally should not be able to execute code in the webserver context could craft XCom payload causing the webserver to execute arbitrary code. Since Dag Authors are already highly trusted, severity of this issue is Low.
Users are recommended to upgrade to Apache Airflow 3.2.0, which fixes the issue.
The `access_key` and `connection_string` connection properties were not marked as sensitive names in secrets masker. This means that user with read permission could see the values in Connection UI, as well as when Connection was accidentaly logged to logs, those values could be seen in the logs. Azure Service Bus used those properties to store sensitive values. Possibly other providers could be also affected if they used the same fields to store sensitive data.
If you used Azure Service Bus connection with those values set or if you have other connections with those values storing sensitve values, you should upgrade Airflow to 3.1.8
The example example_xcom that was included in airflow documentation implemented unsafe pattern of reading value
from xcom in the way that could be exploited to allow UI user who had access to modify XComs to perform arbitrary
execution of code on the worker. Since the UI users are already highly trusted, this is a Low severity vulnerability.
It does not affect Airflow release - example_dags are not supposed to be enabled in production environment, however
users following the example could replicate the bad pattern. Documentation of Airflow 3.2.0 contains version of
the example with improved resiliance for that case.
Users who followed that pattern are advised to adjust their implementations accordingly.
In Apache Airflow versions before 3.1.6, and 2.11.1 the proxies and proxy fields within a Connection may include proxy URLs containing embedded authentication information. These fields were not treated as sensitive by default and therefore were not automatically masked in log output. As a result, when such connections are rendered or printed to logs, proxy credentials embedded in these fields could be exposed.
Users are recommended to upgrade to 3.1.6 or later for Airflow 3, and 2.11.1 or later for Airflow 2 which fixes this issue