---
title: Cross-Tenant Legacy Correlation Disclosure and Deletion
draft: false
hero:
image: /static/img/heros/hero-legal2.svg
content: "# Cross-Tenant Legacy Correlation Disclosure and Deletion"
date: 2026-01-29
product: Grafana
severity: Low
cve: CVE-2026-21727
cvss_score: "3.3"
cvss_vector: "CVSS:3.3/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N"
fixed_versions:
- ">=11.6.11 >=12.0.9 >=12.1.6 >=12.2.4"
---
A cross-tenant isolation vulnerability was found in Grafana’s Correlations feature affecting legacy correlation records. Due to a backward compatibility condition allowing org_id = 0 records to be returned across organizations, a user with datasource management privileges could read and permanently delete legacy correlation data belonging to another organization. This issue affects correlations created prior to Grafana 10.2 and is fixed in >=11.6.11, >=12.0.9, >=12.1.6, and >=12.2.4.
Thanks to Gyu-hyeok Lee (g2h) for reporting this vulnerability.
The Grafana MSSQL data source plugin contains a logic flaw that allows a low-privileged user (Viewer) to bypass API restrictions and trigger a catastrophic Out-Of-Memory (OOM) memory exhaustion, crashing the host container.
A vulnerability has been discovered in Grafana OSS where an authorization bypass in the provisioning contact points API allows users with Editor role to modify protected webhook URLs without the required alert.notifications.receivers.protected:write permission.
A time-of-create-to-time-of-use (TOCTOU) vulnerability lets recently deleted-then-recreated data sources be re-deleted without permission to do so.
This requires several very stringent conditions to be met:
- The attacker must have admin access to the specific datasource prior to its first deletion.
- Upon deletion, all steps within the attack must happen within the next 30 seconds and on the same pod of Grafana.
- The attacker must delete the datasource, then someone must recreate it.
- The new datasource must not have the attacker as an admin.
- The new datasource must have the same UID as the prior datasource. These are randomised by default.
- The datasource can now be re-deleted by the attacker.
- Once 30 seconds are up, the attack is spent and cannot be repeated.
- No datasource with any other UID can be attacked.
Public dashboards with annotations enabled did not limit their annotation timerange to the locked timerange of the public dashboard. This means one could read the entire history of annotations visible on the specific dashboard, even those outside the locked timerange.
This did not leak any annotations that would not otherwise be visible on the public dashboard.
Stack traces in Grafana's Explore Traces view can be rendered as raw HTML, and thus inject malicious JavaScript in the browser. This would require malicious JavaScript to be entered into the stack trace field.
Only datasources with the Jaeger HTTP API appear to be affected; Jaeger gRPC and Tempo do not appear affected whatsoever.