The Conditional Authentication (Adaptive Authentication) script does not correctly enforce the completion of all required authentication steps when a specific multi-step pattern involving certain authenticators is configured. This allows an attacker to bypass intermediate authentication challenges by exploiting how the script handles callbacks and re-execution of authentication steps.
Successful exploitation allows a malicious actor to gain unauthorized access to a targeted user account. This vulnerability can only be exploited when all of the following conditions are met: the application login flow contains a specific secondary authenticator, the Conditional Authentication script is configured with particular event callbacks and re-executes an authentication step, the targeted user has one of the impacted authenticators enrolled, and the attacker successfully completes any preceding authentication steps.
When an Event Publisher output adapter is configured with irrelevant properties, the affected products log these properties. This logging occurs without sufficient validation or sanitization of the property values.
A malicious actor with access to the 'wso2carbon' log files could retrieve sensitive information, such as user credentials or other confidential data, that was inadvertently logged due to misconfiguration, potentially leading to unauthorized access.
The Ajax processor within the Carbon console fails to adequately protect state-changing operations from Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks. Specifically, it utilizes the HTTP GET method for these operations, and while the SameSite=Lax cookie attribute is employed for mitigation, this mechanism is bypassed as it permits cookies to be sent with cross-origin top-level navigation requests, including GET requests. This allows an attacker to trick an authenticated user's browser into unknowingly executing unintended actions.
An attacker can exploit this vulnerability to perform unauthorized state-altering requests on behalf of authenticated users. This could lead to consequences such as data modification, account changes, or other actions that could result in data compromise or loss of user control over their account. However, this attack is only feasible if the Carbon console and related services are exposed to the public internet, which is not recommended according to WSO2's security guidelines.
When Multi-Attribute Login is enabled, the login interface fails to consistently mask the existence of user accounts. For valid users, the server resolves and displays their canonical username, while for non-existent users, it echoes the original input. This occurs regardless of the validate_username configuration.
The discovery of valid usernames can increase the risk of brute force attacks, social engineering attacks, and targeted information leakage. Attackers can leverage this information to craft more effective phishing campaigns or social engineering tactics to compromise user accounts or extract sensitive data.
The check user account lock states feature within the email OTP flow fails to validate user input, allowing an attacker to infer the existence of registered user accounts.
The discovery of valid usernames can increase the risk of brute-force and social engineering attacks. Attackers can leverage this information to craft targeted phishing campaigns or other malicious activities aimed at tricking users into divulging sensitive data, potentially damaging the organization's reputation and leading to regulatory non-compliance and financial consequences.